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ABSTRACT
Knowing Others, or Not: Performing, Caring, Foreboding, and Acknowledging
in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction
By
Meechal Hoffman
Advisor: Talia Schaffer
Knowing Others, Or Not makes two overarching claims about the nineteenthcentury novel’s depictions of relations. First, they are overwhelmingly concerned with
epistemological questions about knowing others, and second, more often than not, the
problem of other minds is portrayed as productive of both pleasure and valuable negative
affects. While much scholarship on the relational nineteenth century focuses on either
sympathy or social responsibility within the framework of liberal individualism, I show
instead that the authors in this study—Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, Wilkie Collins, and
George Eliot—repeatedly register doubt about the usefulness or possibility of
authenticity, and posit the pleasure that bad feelings can bring to characters and readers.
As my subtitle indicates, I focus on four sites of epistemological inquiry: performances of
authenticity, care relations that distinguish between care as an action and care as a
feeling, foreboding as a feeling unlike anxiety that stems from accurate knowledge, and
acknowledgment of others in the place of sympathy or knowledge. Throughout, this
dissertation asks questions about performance, affect, and knowledge—What emotions
are structurally expected in what contexts? What social performances are demanded and
by whom? What options are there for acting out? How can we allow for radical
difference while acknowledging shared values?—and attends to the centrality of, and
indeed encouragement of, bad behavior and feelings in the nineteenth-century novel.
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KNOWING OTHERS, OR NOT: AN INTRODUCTION
DAPHNE. My dear Mrs. Humbug how d’ye
do? Oh! Fanny, t’is all over.
FANNY: Is it indeed!
MRS HUM. I’m very sorry to hear it.
FANNY. Then t’was to no purpose that I…
DAPHNE. None upon Earth.
MRS HUM. And what is to become of?...
DAPHNE. Oh! That’s all settled, (whispers
MRS HUMBUG)
FANNY. And how is it determined?
DAPHNE. I’ll tell you. (whispers FANNY)
MRS. HUM. And is he to?...
DAPHNE. I’ll tell you all I know of the
matter. (whispers MRS HUMBUG &
FANNY)
FANNY. Well! Now I know everything
about it, I’ll go [and dress] away.
MRS HUM. And so will I.
DAPHNE. And so will I.
[Exeunt.]
– Jane Austen, “The Mystery: An
Unfinished Comedy”
“What does knowledge do?”
–Eve Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and
Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So
Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is
About You”

On the brink of marriage to Dorothea Brooke, Mr. Casaubon “did not find his
spirits rising.” Instead, “Here was a weary experience in which he was utterly condemned
to loneliness as in the despair which sometimes threatened him while toiling in the
morass of authorship without seeming nearer to the goal. And his was that worst
loneliness which would shrink from sympathy” (85-6). Even in the moments when we
approach, finally, at long last, the relations we’ve sought, we are thrown, like “Poor
Casaubon,” back into isolated despair, or anxious jealousy, or guarded secrecy, feelings
more grievous for their very nearness to the desired object. Throughout George Eliot’s
Middlemarch, we are left with the gnawing feeling that if only they could tell one another
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everything, it would all be okay: if only Casaubon could have told Dorothea of his selfdoubt, if only Lydgate could be frank with Rosamond about their financial situation, if
only Bulstrode and Featherstone could have gotten their news out in time, and so on. My
dissertation spends time at this site of overlap between relations and epistemological
uncertainty. What happens to relations when we accept the problem of other minds,
conceding that we can’t know or get adequately close to others, and yet live in constant,
unavoidable proximity and reliance on them?
In the novels I consider, the answer is surprisingly exploratory, playful, and even,
at times, perverse. Indeed, the spirit of the teenage Jane Austen, author of the epigraph
above—a piece of juvenilia quoted in full—hovers over what follows: the mystery
underpinning all our relations is a cause for whispering, sarcastic hilarity as much as for
isolating self-doubt. As Austen wrote in dedicating this bit of mischief to her father, the
“following Comedy, which tho’ an unfinished one, is I flatter myself as complete a
Mystery as any of its kind” (56, emphasis in the original). Austen’s linguistic playfulness
provides minimal cover for her layered paradox: her mystery is complete in having been
whispered in full (albeit inaudibly to audiences or readers), it’s complete because it is not
truly a fragment but a finished piece of family fun (where the left-off and ambiguous
style is part of the design), it’s complete in the sense of being still a complete mystery
(where not only the whisperings are unknowable, but the very nature of the mystery
remains a mystery), and it’s completely both a mystery and a comedy. Further, the
enigma is delivered as a performance. In the novels by Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë,
Wilkie Collins, and George Eliot that make up this study, knowledge of the other is
presented as a complicated matter: a question with both the highest of stakes and an
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enormous potential for experimentation and pleasure. And in these novels that interrogate
the authenticity, veracity, and knowability of others, much attention is paid to the
performances of self that are enacted as a matter of course in daily life. These
performances differ greatly, as we will see, and correspond to historically shifting
expectations for behavior and affect, and the ways those expectations are contravened.
Throughout, the problem of other minds is a source of play and pleasure, even when it is
also a source of anxiety or loss.
Rife with marriage plots, care relations, webs of coincidence, and intertwined or
double plots, my dissertation shows the inescapable relationality of the novel form, but
demonstrates that nineteenth-century novelists were invested foremost in their difficulty,
performativity, and in the negative affects and behaviors they produce. While the novel
insists formally on the inescapably social nature of human relations, nineteenth-century
novels don’t often depict happy, collaborative characters engaged in seamless or even
functional interaction and communication. I argue that the novelists in this study, and
often in the period more broadly, are invested and interested in this discomfort and
nastiness. Meanwhile, however, scholarship on nineteenth-century British literature
remains deeply invested in ideas of liberalism, individualism, and self-improvement,
forms of political and philosophical theory designed to protect and solve against the
volatility of epistemological doubt. As David Kurnick points out in Empty Houses:
Theatrical Failure and the Novel (2012), it is still almost axiomatic to declare that the
novel, and especially the novels of the nineteenth century whose innovations—such as
free indirect discourse and stream of consciousness—led to what we might call the
modern novel, is committed to individualism:
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The novel of interiority seems to offer irrefutable support for Ian Watt’s
canonical description of the novel as “less concerned with the public and
more with the private side of life than any previous” literary form, as well
as for Sylvie Thorel-Cailleteau’s recent claim that “the history of the genre
is related to that of contracting space.” In a series of influential critiques,
each of the writers treated here [Thackeray, Eliot, James, and Baldwin] has
been faulted for a betrayal of the collective imagination […] Although
these novelists have received the harshest assessments from Marxist
analysts, the terms of those critiques chime with descriptions of the novel
of interiority articulated from a host of perspectives—from poststructuralist feminist Nancy Armstrong’s claim that the novel’s “phobic
representations of the human aggregate” indicate that “the novel of course
was not made to think beyond the individual” to sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu’s assertion that “the psychological novel…maximize[s] denial of
the social world” (2-3).
Elaine Hadley, in Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain
(2010), writes that “mid-Victorian liberalism offers the promise of abstracted
individuality, which emancipates the subject from these diverse formulations of
bodiliness and their constitutive social spaces through its twin practices of privatization
and abstraction” (64). Hadley shows that liberalism consists of having opinions and being
unique and individuated, but at the same time, not eccentric or threatening. This makes
“living liberalism” a contradiction, or, at best, nearly impossible. David Wayne Thomas,
in Cultivating Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic (2003), argues that liberal
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culture and aesthetics in the Victorian period are joined in a project of self-improvement
and social amelioration. Hadley and Thomas both show that liberalism is central to the
Victorian ethos, especially in the generation of moral self-improvement. Andrew Miller,
writing about moral self-improvement in The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and
Reading in Nineteenth-Century British Literature (2008), helps us see, though, the ways
that this individualism is always relationally figured in the Victorian period. While on the
one hand, Miller writes that “This desire [for moral self-improvement] has come to seem
not merely an essential expression of individualism, though it has often been that, but a
defining aspect of modernity,” he also writes that “this self needs discovering; we are not
readily apparent to ourselves or to others but must be called forth and given support” (8,
emphasis in the original). We come to know and improve ourselves through dialogue and
reaction. “The individual who emerges in response to such an injunction is not the
solitary subject of classical liberalism, cast against such imposing abstractions as the state
of public opinion […] Instead, moral perfectionism provides a complex, relational
understanding of self-hood” (15). In contrast to, and sometimes in parallel to, scholarship
on nineteenth-century individualism, much contemporary scholarship on the Victorian
novel, its relational ethos, and its cultural context is highly invested in moral selfimprovement as a relationally construed project in conversation with liberalism.
In addition to, and often in conjunction with, moral self-improvement, sympathy,
or more broadly, the ways we think about others in light of our insuperable distance, is
another highly trafficked site for relational nineteenth-century scholarship. Rachel
Ablow, Rae Greiner, Audrey Jaffe, Andrew Miller, Adela Pinch, and others have
contributed enormously to the field by historicizing and theorizing the way sympathy

6
functioned in the Victorian period, the way it harkened back to the moral sentimentalist
discourse, especially of Hume and Smith, about sympathy, and the way it was used to
formally structure the novel. Both thematically and formally, they show the ways that
writers of the period opened up the novel’s range and capacity to explore the nature of
human relations and trouble the problem of other minds. Andrew Miller has shown how
J. S. Mill “ephasiz[ed] the sustaining powers of ‘ideal sympathy’” (8), and examines
sympathy, whether readerly sympathy or that between characters, in a range of fiction
from the period. Cara Weber writes that “Victorian writers often focus questions of ethics
through scenes of sympathetic encounters that have been conceptualized, both by
Victorian thinkers and by their recent critics, as a theater of identification in which an
onlooking spectator identifies with the sufferer” (494). Audrey Jaffe, also interested in
the role of spectatorship in sympathy, writes in Scenes of Sympathy: Identification and
Representation in Victorian Fiction (2000), that “In Victorian fiction and the work of its
critics, the term ‘sympathy’ has commonly been used to describe an individualistic,
affective solution to the problem of class alienation: the attempt to ameliorate social
differences with assurances of mutual feeling and universal humanity” (15). Jaffe argues
that in Victorian fiction, “The scene of sympathy in effect effaces both its participants,
substituting them for images, or fantasies, of social and cultural identity” (4). Rachel
Ablow argues, in The Marriage of Minds: Reading Sympathy in the Victorian Marriage
(2007), that the Victorian marriage plot figures the wife as the novel: both teach the
urban, capital-driven, hardened person to be ethical, to have emotions, and to sympathize.
A good wife and a novel can both “influence” people and help them “resist the depraved
values of the marketplace” (1) but “the novel has additional resources and strategies no
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woman could ever possess” (7) like the ability to see into people’s consciousness. Rae
Greiner, in Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (2012), focuses on
the importance of distance to sympathy, arguing that similarity or identification are
destructive of sympathy. She argues that formal attention to the novel, in particular to
free indirect discourse, metonymy, and characterization, helps us see “a social
understanding of reality” (9) in which sympathy thrives on imaginative recreation of the
other. Writing about eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical, poetic, and
fictional texts, Nancy Yousef, in Romantic Intimacy (2015), looks to “intimacy” instead
of sympathy “in order to investigate, without reduplicating, symptomatic conflicts around
the term ‘sympathy’ and to hold in abeyance, as far as possible, the ethical and epistemic
goal of mutual recognition that is always at stake in the imagination of intimacy as a form
of sympathetic insight or achievement” (2). In other words, Yousef mobilizes intimacy to
think about uneven relations that don’t require knowledge of the other. “Unlike
sympathy, intimacy need not, and rarely does, entail a symmetrical relationship between
one and another; need not, and rarely does, involve the discovery of similitude between
one and another. Yet insofar as intimacy, like sympathy, designates feeling for and with
another, it also admits and discloses affective expectations and disappointments—from
aversion to self-abasing admiration, from gratitude and resentments, from frustration to
fascination—that involve neither mutuality nor reciprocity but that certainly must be
counted among the many ‘fine-spun and intricate’ threads of the web (to borrow from
Lessing’s metaphor) that bind one to others” (2-3).
Building on all of these approaches to sympathy and its relation to the nineteenthcentury novel, I focus less on the moral dimensions of and impediments to sympathy, and
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more on the negative feelings that stem from the fundamental problem of other minds
that sympathy is meant to solve. When I do treat sympathy directly, in my final chapter, it
is found to be lacking, and productive of more bad feelings than epistemological
solutions. This dissertation thus works against the resilient picture of a repressed, prudish,
moralistic nineteenth century by looking at epistemological questions apart from
sympathy, and by underscoring the pleasurable and productive outcomes of not feeling as
one should in light of the skeptical impasse.
Peter K. Andersson writes in The Journal of Victorian Culture (2015) that “the
established picture of the Victorian period [its supposed prudishness and repression]
lingers…not only in popular media, but also in academic research” (439). In Nancy
Armstrong’s influential How Novels Think: The Limits of Individualism from 1719-1900
(2006), she argues that while the eighteenth-century novel is populated by misfits, the
nineteenth-century novel is dominated by attempts to fit in socially: this tension is often
located within the female misfit who is cast out for her deviance. With a heavy reliance
on Foucault, Armstrong’s argument draws a repressive and conservative picture of the
period. As Bruce Robbins notes in his review in Victorian Studies (2007), Armstrong
mythologizes and loves the Althussarian “bad subject” she finds in the first part of
Robinson Crusoe, and feels its loss to be great in the Victorian period, where the
individual’s needs are subordinated to the social good. In this dissertation, I argue that
these persistent tropes of, in Andersson’s words, “visitations and hat-tippings” (440), in
which “fiction began to think of itself as a means of discipline” (Armstrong, 49), are
belied throughout the Victorian period, that they represent a fantasy of Victorian
affluence and leisure and a discounting of lived experience, including among working
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classes. Instead, this dissertation will look beyond the veneer of what seems alien to us—
the visitations, the hat tippings—to find an actually very recognizable current of rage,
boredom, anxiety, and other bad feelings that accompany the compromised reality of a
social existence defined by an inability to know others. Largely, then, this dissertation
will draw a picture of nineteenth-century relationality not reflecting moral selfimprovement and not describing sympathetic relations. More often than not, I’ll show, we
find failed marriages,1 bad care, and untrustworthy people in positions of great authority.
Courtship and marriage, care relations, and scenes of employment or cross-class
interaction are thus crucial axes for this dissertation, as they are heightened scenes of
problematic relations.
Theories of marriage have underpinned many studies of the relational nineteenthcentury, from Rachel Ablow’s Marriage of Minds to Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rivals:
Familiar Marriage in Victorian Fiction (2016). While this dissertation doesn’t treat the
history of marriage explicitly in its chapters, the subject of this scholarship not only
impacts all the texts considered—from Austen’s marriage plots to the radical form of
coverture imagined in The Woman in White—it also serves as a model for the kind of
epistemological questions and affective responses I study. Marriage, in the nineteenth
century, is at once profoundly alienating and, structurally speaking, increasingly designed
to unite two people into one flesh. Thus, a look at the impressive surge of scholarship
historicizing the relationship between changing kinship networks in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries and the novels of the period will help me describe the
epistemological questions this novel treats alongside the structural and historical nature
1

See Kelly Hager’s Dickens and the Rise of Divorce for an account of the period’s
preoccupation with the divorce, rather than the marriage, plot.
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of affective expectations. 2 The scholars who have done this work have, importantly,
argued for attention to the ways that marriage relates to the unknowability of others, and
the affective expectations in response to a changing institution. Ruth Perry’s Novel
Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 1748-1818
(2006), for example, argues that the shift from arranged to consensual marriage created
new anxieties for women, anxieties that the novel registered and responded to. Helena
Michie, in Victorian Honeymoons: Journeys to the Conjugal (2007), describes marriage
(and she is putting it mildly) as “very difficult cultural work,” in that it brings together
“two people with limited experience of the opposite sex, who often deeply identified with
their families of origin and with communities of same-sex friends, into a conjugal unit
that was to become their primary source of social and emotional identification” (2). To
cope with these profoundly unsettling changes, Perry argues, women were forced to
develop a new emotional framework within which to understand their roles in married
life. Thus, shifting structures of family life lead to shifting affective expectations,
responses, and performances of self.
There are four changes in particular that are central to the concerns of nineteenthcentury fiction and that are reflected in many of the novels this dissertation treats. I’ll
describe them in relation to George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss which, as will be shown
later in this dissertation, interrogates affective responses to “the great fundamental fact of
blood” (129.) First, there’s a radical shift in this period from sprawling kinship networks

2

For the two most comprehensive histories of marriage and family, see Ruth Perry’s
Novel Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 17481818, especially the Introduction, and Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rival: Familiar
Marriage in Victorian Fiction, especially the second chapter.
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to tight nuclear families.3 When Mr. Tulliver tells his wife that he is going to send their
son to a new school, she responds: “Well, Mr. Tulliver, you know best: I’ve no objections.
But hadn’t I better kill a couple o’ fowl and have th’ aunts and uncles to dinner next
week, so as you may hear what sister Glegg and sister Pullet have got to say about it?”
(9-10, emphasis in the original). Mr. Tulliver “defiantly” refuses to “ask neither aunt nor
uncle what I’m to do wi’ my own lad.” He sees himself as a part of a nuclear family, of
which he is the head. Mrs. Tulliver, on the other hand, sees herself as a Dodson first, and
a Tulliver second. This reflects a widespread shift, described by Ruth Perry, Lawrence
Stone, Stephanie Coontz, Talia Schaffer, and others, as occurring at some point in the late
eighteenth century, in which marriage overwhelmingly came to demand a departure from
one’s family of origin, and the beginning of a new life in which one was defined
exclusively in terms of the duties of wife and mother. Mr. and Mrs. Tulliver’s views on
family clash here. Mrs. Tulliver feels a part of an older form of family, in which her ties
to her kinship network are strong and persist beyond marriage. Mr. Tulliver, on the other
hand, feels himself to have created a nuclear family when he married, and doesn’t see
why her family of origin should impact their decisions about their children. His view on
this particular issue reflects his period, although on other issues, like water rights and
biblical forms of revenge, he is decidedly old-fashioned.

3

See Suzanne Graver’s George Eliot and Community: A Study in Social Theory and
Fictional Form for a parallel historical change: the shift from what German social
theorist Ferdinand Tönnies called Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft refers to
“local, organic, agricultural communities that are modeled on the family and rooted in the
traditional and sacred; and Gesellschaft denotes urban, heterogeneous, industrial societies
that are culturally sophisticated and shaped by the rational pursuit of self-interest in a
capitalistic and secular environment” (Graver, 14).
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Next, according to many historians of marriage and family, the shift from open
kinship networks to closed nuclear families brought about a shift from a culture that did
not put a premium on privacy to one that did. This change went hand-in-hand with the
previous one, bolstering the privacy and isolation from the larger kinship network that the
nuclear family was newly expected to maintain, and, according to Perry, isolating women
from their support networks. The need for private time, and space to spend it in, was a
new development. Historian of marriage Lawrence Stone argues that even the
architectural layout of homes reflected this shift, with houses newly arranged to have
rooms like closets and studies.4 Maggie exists at both stages of this development. From
the ritual she performs with her Fetish doll in the privacy of “her attic” (36), to her
clandestine relationships with Philip Waken and Stephen Guest, Maggie is a character
who chafes under the old standard of openness that the Dodsons expect and the voice of
“public opinion” which “always knew what to think” about the actions, however private,
of other people (490).
Third, marriage came to be seen as a binding together of two people who had
chosen one another, and, what’s more, were in love. This is a view expounded on at
length by Stone, who argues that affective relationships between husband and wife as
well as between parent and child are a relatively new phenomenon. While Stone’s claim
that relationships based on love were rare and incidental before 1700 is obviously faulty
4

Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500-1800, pp. 253-4.
Stone’s findings have been questioned and discredited by many. His sources are largely
diaries and letters, thus favoring evidence from the upper and middle classes, and
particularly, allows men to speak for the women they represent in their literature. Further,
much of his material is drawn from France, and Stone regularly uses sources from
multiple centuries while describing a single historical shift. However, many of his larger
arguments and narrower claims, including this piece about domestic architecture, have
formed the basis of later, more scrupulous studies and continue to be useful.
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(Romeo and Juliet, for example, suggests the centrality of romantic love to its culture), it
is true that the doctrine of coverture, with its legal and affective expectations of two
bodies becoming one flesh, represented a new ideal. Of course, this new ideal very often
remained just that—an ideal—but it was now no longer possible to view marriage as the
coldly functional institution it had been for many centuries. We see this in Maggie’s
difficulty in choosing between the safe, brotherly, disabled Philip and the romantic,
perfumed Stephen. What is love in this period? Is it closeness? Is it comfort? Is it like
siblinghood or cousinship? Does it require tingling sensations and sleepless nights? Is it
being helped into a boat by a tall, rich man and borne away? Perry writes, in Novel
Relations, that the shift to “privatized family” resulted in a net loss for women. The
pressure to find someone you love and live with them in an isolated nuclear family was
often impossible to enact, and marriage was thus more often than not the binding together
more tightly than ever of two incompatible people, with one of them giving up all her
rights. As Rachel Ablow puts it, “For most married couples […] husband and wife were
legally ‘one person,’ and, as one popular saying put it, ‘that one [was] the husband’”
(One Flesh, par 1). Perry argues that in consanguineal families—families organized
around many generations—women had clearly defined roles and were respected for their
contribution to the family’s work and life. In conjugal families women were
commodified, isolated, and legally vulnerable. Essentially agreeing with Stone, Perry
argues that this period saw the invention of love as we know it. In order to cope with their
new status in a new marriage arrangement, women developed an affective bond with their
husbands, or at least strove for one. Talia Schaffer has written about this new potential
for danger in marriage, arguing that relationships with cousins, disabled men, or close
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neighbors or brotherly types was a way of ensuring safety in marriage. In her reading,
forsaking love in order to remain a part of a larger consanguineal family was a regular
and acceptable choice for women in the nineteenth century.5 Regardless of whether the
match was one made for love or for relative safety, love was in the air in a way it never
had been before.
Fourth, and finally, childrearing came to be seen within the context of breeding,
eugenics, and the production of strong offspring. Scientific and sociological discoveries,
from Darwin and Spencer to McLennan, Engels, and Maine, changed the way people
viewed their own children, and the way they viewed marriage. Rather than consider the
interests of the family and the relative compatibility of the couple, fitness for producing
offspring came to be central to the function of marriage and the work of women. Witness
the Dodson sisters’ confusion at the way in which “the Tulliver blood did not mix well
with the Dodson blood” (60) or the narrator’s description of the doomed Maggie as “a
small mistake of nature” (13). Contemporary readers were struck by how Darwinistic the
novel seemed in its depiction of the animal magnetism, the natural (erotic) pull between
Maggie and Stephen.6 This evolutionary approach to marriage, in the context of
coverture, pressure to love, and new forms of nuclear privacy, throws into relief the
disparity between the institution of marriage as construed in the nineteenth century and
the epistemological and affective underpinnings of marriage as a project.
As the institution of marriage underwent a significant shift in the period under
consideration, and serves here to underscore the challenging relationship between
epistemological uncertainty and affective expectation, so too did relationships organized
5
6

See Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rivals.
See Rohan Maitzen’s “Queen of the Gypsies.”
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around the provision of care—another central site of relations in the nineteenth century.
Just as with marriage, epistemological questions are at the heart of care relations, and the
affective expectations in these relational contexts are more often than not defied in
strange, unexpected ways. To better understand these relations, I turn not to historicist
scholarship but instead to ethics of care, an ethical theory that privileges relatedness over
independence and helps me think about what is at stake in care relations, especially as
they became at once more isolated, and also more professionalized. Born in the latenineteen seventies out of a feminist interest in elevating and theorizing care, the ethics of
care argues that we are all born relational beings, completely dependent on others for
survival, and that the care we give or receive to or from dependents is the central feature
of our moral worlds and should be the basis for an ethical system. Ethics of care suggests
that, by acknowledging our universal state of interdependence, we privilege actual caregiving over the abstractions of justice, and that we view scenes of care, maternal care, for
example, as scenes of moral thinking. Virginia Held writes: “The ethics of care rejects the
view of the dominant moral theories that the more abstract the reasoning about a moral
problem the better because the more likely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the more likely
to achieve impartiality. The ethics of care respects rather than removes itself from the
claims of particular others with whom we share actual relationships” (11). The ethics of
care goes against our contemporary understanding of and practice of liberal
individualism. Taking the emphasis off independence, ethics of care argues that as much
as we might enact a semblance of independence, we are actually always interdependent,
and that as a society we should acknowledge that fact—that we once were or will be
again dependent on others—and build a moral system around care rather than on an
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ethical system that promotes and supports an imaginary independence.7 Virginia Held
sees the liberal emphasis on “autonomy, independence, noninterference, selfdetermination, fairness, and rights” as deluding and dangerous, as individuals don’t exist
without the care and cooperation of others. “…From the perspective of an ethics of care,
to construct morality as if we were Robinson Crusoe, or, to use Hobbes’s image,
mushrooms sprung from nowhere, is misleading […] The ethics of care is, instead,
hospitable to the relatedness of persons […] It often calls on us to take responsibility,
while liberal individualist morality focuses on how we should leave each other alone”
(14-15, emphasis in original). As Nancy Yousef writes in Isolated Cases: The Anxieties
of Autonomy in Enlightenment Philosophy and Romantic Literature (2004), “Hobbes’s
notorious invitation to ‘consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth like
mushrooms, come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other’
flamboyantly veers away from the familiar, the recognizable, and the obvious facts of
how human beings come into the world” (19, italics in the original).
Ethics of care has been deeply connected to feminist and gender studies from its
inception. Carol Gilligan for example, argues in In A Difference Voice: Psychological

7

In our contemporary context, these arguments are being made most visibly, though still
on the margins of our cultural and political discourse, about taxation, social safety nets,
and other forms of public care for the welfare of others. Think of Elizabeth’s Warren’s
2011 speech in Andover Massachusetts: “There is nobody in this country who got rich on
his own — nobody. You built a factory out there? Good for you. But I want to be clear.
You moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers
the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of police-forces and
fire-forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn't have to worry that marauding bands
would come and seize everything at your factory — and hire someone to protect against
this — because of the work the rest of us did. Now look, you built a factory and it turned
into something terrific, or a great idea. God bless — keep a big hunk of it. But part of the
underlying social contract is, you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid
who comes along.”
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Theory and Women’s Development (1993) against the findings of Lawrence Kohlberg’s
morality test, which were used to show that the development of moral reasoning was less
realized in girls than in boys. Gilligan argues that female respondents answered the
prompts by turning to their own experience of moral choices in personal relationships,
whereas the male respondents abstracted from moral principles. Because our political and
moral system privileges abstractions, ethics rooted in particular circumstance weren’t
seen as reflecting advanced moral development. Sara Ruddick, in Maternal Thinking:
Toward a Politics of Peace (1995), makes the connection between caring and mothering
explicit in her influential writing on the ethical work that takes place in the interpersonal
relationship between parent and child. She argues that moral judgment comes into play in
particular circumstances with particular others and challenges the idea that ethics only
takes effect or has valence in the public sphere, where it serves as an abstract system of
protection against the machinations of individuals.
Like the nineteenth-century novel, ethics of care asks us to take seriously the
feelings and responsibilities we have about particular others, and to place primary ethical
weight on those interpersonal relationships rather than on abstract principles about justice
and autonomy.8 By taking abstract ideas about love or friendship or abuse or
disappointment, and making them particular and specific, fixed in particular characters
and plots, the novel is in many ways a vehicle for the ethics of care. The nineteenth
century novel, in particular, is rooted in ethics of care, peopled as it is by characters
8

Indeed, thinking about ethics of care in relation to the novel form allows me to flip the
argument that the novel is the form that best reflects individualism (see Ian Watt, The
Rise of the Novel for the founding document of this line of thinking) because of its
attention to particular people in particular circumstances. Because the novel attends to
particular people in particular circumstances, it gives voice to the kind of moral thinking
(or, as we shall see, immoral or irreverent thinking) that exists in the particular.
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whose principle role is as care-giver—women, and in some cases, invalids (male and
female) whose invalidism bestows on them the responsibility to variously receive and
give care.9 The novel as a genre, and the nineteenth-century novel in particular, shows
that the most interpersonal, domestic, and emotional interactions we have rely on ethical
thinking. Think of Elizabeth Bennet’s agonizing, moral labor over the process of falling
in love, or Ralph Touchett and Isabel Archer’s process of coming to understand the self
and the other through a morally invested form of care and interdependence. Privileging
this ethics that happens between people in observation of our interdependence, rather
than relegating that kind of ethics to something that happens between women, for
example, or among domestic care givers, aid-workers, nurses—in other words, the
poorest and most disenfranchised—is the focus of relational ethics and of the nineteenthcentury novel.10
However, ethics of care raises serious questions. For example, detractors have
argued that privileging care has the effect of reinforcing the stereotype of the caring
female. Elevating maternal care, for example, into a site of ethical action has the potential
to re-instantiate essentialized gender roles. Virginia Held has argued that actually, the
ethics of care provides a moral framework through which care is something done by
everyone, not just women, and that its promotion to ethical work is meant not only to

9

Interestingly, disabled characters in Victorian novels are expert care-givers as well as
recipients of care. Think, for example, of Ralph Touchett in The Portrait of a Lady, or
Ermine Williams in The Clever Woman of the Family. See Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s
Rivals.
10
In our introduction to a special issue of Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies, Fuller,
Woods, and I argued that the care work of contemporary higher education—the work of
teaching, organizing conferences, performing departmental service—is most often
performed by women, and problematically under-recognized in the marketplace of tenure
and promotion that privileges productivity metrics.
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enfranchise the disenfranchised who typically do the care work in a society but also to
attract the historically enfranchised, including men, to care work.
Another complication in care theory is that care relationships are necessarily
uneven: one person is charged to give care to another. The caregiver is providing for
someone necessarily unable to reciprocate, and the likelihood that care will be returned in
equal measure is limited, especially given that structurally, care-givers give care for a
reason, and won’t likely be structurally empowered to receive it in turn. Nel Noddings
writes about this inequity by arguing that recognition of the care-giver’s efforts is a form
of returning care. She calls this “care completed in the other” (4). However, recognition
often isn’t given; when it is, it is more often than not affectively complicated, tinged with
feelings of resentment, anger, and disdain, just as the delivery of care was likely tinged
with feelings outside the boundaries of feeling caring.
The responses these challenges have elicited from care theorists have been
unsatisfying, and it is in part because I am so invested in the recuperation of care work as
a site of serious ethical work that I take on these challenges in this dissertation.11 And
indeed, nineteenth-century novels usefully complicate the power dynamics inherent in
care work, challenge the affective expectations of both the cared-for and the care-giver,
and struggle with the impossibility of knowing others in spite of the very interdependence
insisted on by care theory. This dissertation troubles the structural inequity that is

11

As I write, feminists are still arguing about the relative value (ethical, monetary) of
maternal and paternal care and in some cases, promoting legislation that would not only
secure a national requirement of 12 weeks of paid maternity leave, but a destigmatization of the labor of care, social security credits for parents who opt out of the
workforce in favor of the work of care, and other, even more utopian reorganizations of
our society’s perception of care work. See Judith Shulevitz, “How to fix feminism,” New
York Times, June 10, 2016.
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fundamental to care, the gulf between care work and care feelings, and the differences
between free care (maternal care, for example, or care for the Aged P) and care as
economic labor (as governess, teacher, or nurse). This dissertation argues that in fact, bad
care, uneven care, or even care that degradingly reproduces hierarchically dominating
relations can be both productive of pleasure and effective forms of care. This dissertation
therefore extends the rubric of ethics of care to include care given with uncaring feelings.
Undergirding all of these discourses are feminist questions about the relation
between affect and care; authenticity and the performances of social life; acting out and
powers of control. Thinking about ethics of care in the context of the nineteenth-century
novel helps me to understand the kinds of relationships available for women, the
expectations surrounding and inscribed within these relations, and their inherent
challenges. Again and again in the novels I consider, these challenges are narrated in
terms of authenticity: the degree to which relations, and care relations in particular, are
performed, and whether performance is figured negatively or even framed ethically.
Thus, in looking at the feelings appropriate to interrelations and care, and discovering
instead feelings distinctly inappropriate, many of which are either covered and hidden
through performance, or are exhibited and flagrantly performed, this dissertation attends
to affect theory: to structures of feelings, to the political and productive function of
feelings, and to the dangers of interiorized, private affect that can serve to isolate and
domesticate what might otherwise be the most politically powerful feelings of anger,
frustration, and fed up-ness.
Ann Cvetkovich begins Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian
Sensationalism (1992) with the admission that “This book is the product of my own
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mixed feelings about a feminist politics of affect” (1). Indeed, the claiming of feelings
and personal stories in feminist writing, and the claim that the personal is political, is
freighted. Affect has the power to be transgressive or transformative, but it also has the
power to be made safe, interiorized, or contained, repressed, and privatized. In other
words, Cvetkovich and many others writing about affect consider it an axis of power: it
either grants, gives way to, responds to, or rejects forms of power, dominance, and
control. I will never forget first reading Eve Sedgwick’s “Paranoid Reading and
Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid You Probably Think This Essay is About
You” (1997), and seeing in affect a way out of political defeatism. In Sedgwick and
Cvetkovich’s writing, there is a throbbing current of anger, shock, and sadness about
contemporary life: in both cases, largely in relation to the AIDS crisis in America. Both
are concerned about the power of affect in the face of outrage, and the responsibilities
that power affords. This rootedness in contemporary forms of and uses for feeling
circulates through the whole field,12 and as we have been freshly, rudely, unfortunately
reminded by the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, feelings are an important
tool for coalition building, empowerment, and change, but can just as easily produce
inertia, or excuse corruption and violence. Sianne Ngai, in Ugly Feelings (2005), is
interested in just this possibility. She investigates “canonically minor” (11) twentieth
century representations of what she calls “minor and generously unprestigious feelings”
(6) that reflect “what T.W. Adorno calls the fully ‘administered world’ of late modernity”
(1). Her focus is on negative affects that suspend agency rather than produce outcomes,
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See, for example, Naomi Greyser, “Beyond the ‘Feeling Woman’: Feminist
Implications of Affect Studies.”
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and that therefore counterintuitively do a lot: they reproduce the capitalist conditions that
are responsible in the first place for distancing, disaffecting, ugly feelings.
While my dissertation, too, focuses on negative feelings, my period is different
than Ngai’s. Rachel Ablow, in her introduction to a special issue of Victorian Studies on
Victorian Emotion (2008), writes that “Victorians commentators […] were fascinated by
the historical status of emotions. To what extent are emotions innate and to what extent
are they social? Can we control or train them? Does the experience of the emotions
change over time? These are questions to which the Victorians retuned repeatedly,
questions that contemporary scientists, historians, and literary scholars continue to puzzle
over” (376). Affect theory assumes that emotions are relational and have histories. For
Sara Ahmed, in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2014), for example, this means a
rejection of the psychological approach in which we have feelings inside of us, “within,”
and independently. It means, instead, that emotions circulate, and accrete meaning by
repetition and “stickiness.” Ahmed’s affect theory, in seeing feelings as in circulation
rather than originating from one’s interior, makes a move similar to the one I make in this
dissertation: instead of seeing the interiority of the nineteenth-century novel as a mark of
privacy and independence, it is reflective of the circulation of feelings between
interdependent bodies. This is a view of emotions that, as Adela Pinch shows in Strange
Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (1996), had currency in the
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries. As Pinch writes, “The books I study here […]
reveal the period’s […] tendency to characterize feelings as transpersonal, as autonomous
entities that do not always belong to individuals but rather wander extravagantly from
one person to another” (3). What happens in that circulation, and what is done with the
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feelings in circulation—what happens to and from those feelings—varies, but what
remains constant, deep into the nineteenth century, is that feelings don’t do what they’re
supposed to do, and they don’t do what social norms and codes of conduct would want
them to do. The response to epistemological uncertainty is not, often, sympathy; the
outcome of care relations is not, often, caring feelings; the effect of marriage is not flesh
made one, except in the substantial legal sense of coverture. Thus, this dissertation looks
at performances of authenticity, care dispensed with a range of uncaring feelings, cases
like foreboding where knowledge is to some degree possible, and forms of knowing that
don’t require knowledge, such as acknowledgment.

One difficulty of writing this dissertation has been choosing what texts and
authors to consider. While the claims wouldn’t reflect fiction from the whole period
under consideration nor all genres—Charlotte Yonge’s novels, for example, or the
socialist utopian News from Nowhere would not have found a comfortable home in these
pages—the greater problem was that too many things seemed to want to find a place.
Choosing to leave Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy out, for example, was ultimately a
matter of necessity, rather than choice. Beginning with Austen, however, allowed me to
establish some central ideas in relation to authenticity; Brontë enabled a study of the
pleasure of perversion; Collins provided a much-needed detour into sensation fiction,
which is so centrally concerned with questions of authenticity, bad behavior, and
feelings; and any dissertation that demands attention to nineteenth-century novels and
epistemology must, ultimately, return to Eliot’s theories of sympathy. Those needs
guided my selections, but one pleasure of the writing has been the imaginative project of
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applying these arguments to Hardy’s depressive characters, or Dickens’s seemingly
happy ones.
My first chapter argues that Jane Austen’s novels, far from punishing or
reforming her heroines and urging authenticity and right behavior, actually show that
selfhood is fundamentally inauthentic and performative. In Mansfield Park, I argue that
Austen’s narrator aligns herself not with Fanny Price but, surprisingly, with the amoral
Henry Crawford. Both are interested in inhabiting characters: Henry Crawford through
performance and Austen’s narrator through free indirect discourse. Further, though the
inhabitation of others is similar to the work of sympathy, Austen shows that this kind of
imaginative exercise can be divorced from ethical ends and mobilized purely for aesthetic
ones. Emma, I argue, continues this exploration of the badly behaving character by
challenging the very idea of authenticity that the “good” Mr. Knightley embodies.
Austen, it turns out, is concerned with the relation between morals and aesthetics, but her
work is not nearly as ideologically driven as Marilyn Butler or Claudia Johnson have
argued. In this chapter, I set the stage for questions that persist through the period about
whether there is such a thing as an authentic self, the degree to which behavior is
performative, and the value in troublesome and unmoral feelings.
My second chapter looks to Charlotte Brontë’s Villette, which, I argue, explores
the question of authenticity from the perspective of affective responses to labor, in
particular, the paid care work Lucy Snowe performs throughout the novel. Lucy is often
thought of as a paradigmatic individual, preferring and cultivating obscurity and
isolation, but I argue that she is instead inextricably bound up in a network of care
relations, and that her perplexing behavior is a response to the problematics of care. The
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treachery of power—Madame Beck’s, M. Paul’s, her wards’ and then students’—is so
great, and the forms of abuse are so pervasive, that Lucy’s bildung is toward the
development of her ability to derive pleasure from pain, and eventually, to also derive
pleasure from producing pain in others, such as M. Paul, her students, Ginevra, and her
reader. In other words, Villette posits sadomasochism as a response to the problematics of
care and of epistemological uncertainty. In thinking of Lucy as developing the capacity
for pleasure through abuse—both received and meted out—it is clear that the novel’s
interest in performance, though most explicit on the fete day and at the Vashti play, goes
beyond literal performance and extends to performances of power and pleasure. Lucy’s
ability to perform and manipulate her feelings is distinct from M. Paul, who is so
authentic he can’t control his performance. Though he teaches Lucy a great deal about
the pleasure of power-play in his delivery of abuse as a form of love, he is too authentic,
not a skilled performer like Lucy, and therefore not in control of the measured, attentive,
calibrated pleasures of sadomasochism.
Affect, performance, and care are particularly vexed in sensation fiction, centered
as the genre is on the relationship between bodies and feelings, deceit and truths, and the
terror of inescapable interrelatedness. In my third chapter I turn to sensation fiction’s urtext, Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White, a strange circus performance of a novel in
which the two competing ringmasters -- the obese light-footed man and the aspirational
drawing master—control the actions and narratives of the manly woman, the identical
women, and the man so full of hot air he goes up in flames. By attending to Fosco and
Hartright’s performances of authenticity on the one hand, and on the other to the
surprising authenticity of the dangers imagined, I show that this novel encourages fear on

26
the grounds that foreboding is prophetic rather than delusional. In a world where
inauthenticity is the norm, foreboding makes sense, and produces an uncomfortable,
pleasurable frisson for reader and character alike. This novel, thus, offers an opportunity
to deconstruct some of the assumptions inherent in one of our most interesting
contemporary critical conversations, that of suspicious and just reading practices. By
showing that a suspicious reading was right all along, the distinction between surface and
depth is collapsed, suspicious and just readings are the same, and we are no closer to
being able to differentiate between the authentic and inauthentic. And by attending to
sensation fiction, which demands verisimilitude like realist fiction but attends more
urgently to affective, sensational modes of describing reality, I show a broader
dimensionality to the discourse of performance, authenticity, and feeling in the nineteenth
century. In particular, I show that even in the face of epistemological uncertainty, there
are things one can know, and that feelings play a role in making those thinks knowable.
Public rage, enjoyable perversity, and performative nastiness, I argue, are
necessary in Victorian fiction because sympathy so often fails—even, and especially, in
the work of George Eliot, who is often taken to be its greatest proponent. I argue in my
final chapter that critics take as too static what I see as Eliot’s shifting and increasingly
skeptical view of sympathy. I show that in The Mill on the Floss, Eliot investigates the
use of sympathy among kin networks, and compares identificatory sympathy between
characters to that between text and reader. By the time of her writing of Romola, Eliot
uses the real, historical case of Savonarola, whose motivations remain unknowable in the
novel and historical record alike, to investigate the epistemological difficulties inherent in
knowing others, and posits a form of sympathy that forgoes knowledge of others
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altogether in favor of something else: acknowledgment. This critique of sympathy is
extended in her final novel, Daniel Deronda, but to the point that Eliot questions whether
sympathy is even the best or most useful feeling in the first place, and whether it isn’t,
actually, damaging and disturbing. Her eponymous character is an expert sympathizer,
but that leads him to an indolence and apathy that at times flares into deeply problematic
domination and judgment, as in his relationship with Gwendolen Harleth. Not only does
Eliot question whether sympathy is an impediment to action, she also shows that
sympathy can produce disturbing inequality in interpersonal relations when only one
person has the capacity to imagine the other. By closing this dissertation with George
Eliot, I show that failures of sympathy, and the anger, resentment, envy, and feelings of
inauthenticity that relations inspire, inform the period’s novels. Far from encouraging a
generation of docile readers disciplined into feeling as one ought, the nineteenth-century
novel investigates, delights in, and encourages bad feelings.

The work of this dissertation is rooted in the nineteenth century, but I also hope
that the questions it raises are transferable to our contemporary context. Looking at the
people, mostly men, running our government, questions about authenticity and
performance abound: What’s he really up to? Is our President as childlike and
intellectually compromised as he seems, or is he a mastermind with a plan for autocracy?
If selfhood is necessarily performative and historically determined, how might we
mobilize to construct new patterns of authenticity, where, for example, being a powerful
woman or a feminist man doesn’t look like a performance? More than ever in the modern
history of our country, members of our society are being marginalized, discriminated
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against, and violated. As we will see in the chapter on Villette, embracing the bad feelings
inherent in hierarchically uneven relations might be not only acceptable, but useful. To
care, bad feelings might be both natural and productive. Our current political predicament
is so unbelievable, and yet so hostile to truth and facts, that we urgently need ways to
think through what it means when we can know or could have foreseen. My chapter on
The Woman in White attends to this dynamic by introducing the affective category of
foreboding, and theorizing the implications of being able to know what is going wrong.
The chapter asks questions about the role of patterns, historical structures, and facts, and
troubles the relationship between the inability to know others and the stability of facts.
While our president and his administration unveil an agenda that depends on a radical
extension of epistemological doubt, in which no facts are knowable and all facts are
alternatives, it is incumbent on us to think not just about our inability to know, but also
our ability to know. Finally, while we recommit to the work of resistance, what kinds of
sympathy and connection is possible? What does sympathy look like with members of
one’s own party or protest movement? If we, like Ezra and Mordecai in Daniel Deronda,
form an ideal Victorian sympathetic marriage of two flesh made one, what comes of the
very difference we were hoping to celebrate and protect? What does sympathy with
others across coalitions look like, and what should it look like? My chapter on Eliot
shows that accommodating and encouraging bad feelings is a way of protecting
difference against threats to diversity and inclusion. Instead of consensus or knowledge,
we might instead acknowledge difference, allowing for disappointment, difficulty, and
disagreement.
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PERFORMING AUTHENTICITY IN JANE AUSTEN’S
MANSFIELD PARK AND EMMA
“When an individual plays a part he
implicitly requests observers to take
seriously the impression that is fostered
before them. They are asked to believe that
the character they see actually possesses the
attributes he appears to possess, that the task
he performs will have the consequences that
are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in
general, matters are what they appear to be.”
—Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self
in Everyday Life
“She had not quite done nothing—for she
had done mischief.”
—Jane Austen, Emma

Often considered a bridge between the forms she inherited and those she
inaugurated, Jane Austen is no stranger to studies of the nineteenth-century novel. Indeed,
Austen’s carefully mannered characters, genteel drawing rooms, and castigated local
villains have led some to describe her novels, Mansfield Park in particular, as protoVictorian.13 As I will show, this reflects a misunderstanding of both Austen and the
Victorians, neither of which exhibited the strict comfort with moralism and staid behavior
that are often presumed. Austen’s worlds are comprised of stifling small towns, very
small numbers of people available for social interaction, and complete interdependence.
All the while, there is little that can be known about others, there are countless secrets
being kept, and even those entrusted with authority are often less than stable or reliable.
From John Willoughby to General Tilney to Henry Crawford and even George Knightley,
Austen is interested in the everyday problem of the opacity of others, and the
performances of self, especially in men, that make up relations. As that character-list
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suggests, this preoccupation spans her career, but in this chapter I begin with her mid-late
career Mansfield Park, a novel that contains an actual, though aborted, private theatrical.
It is in this novel that I see Austen playing with the pleasure of performance, even when,
especially when, performance is purposefully deceiving. From there, I turn to Emma,
which, though it doesn’t contain any performances in its plot, upends the very notion of
authentic selfhood. I argue that by looking at these novels in light of the performances
they imagine, we can discover an Austen deeply concerned with the relation in everyday
life between the private and the social, and with the ways we perform our relationality.
When the stakes are high, as they are in marriage plots, not being able to know the other
is a troubling problem. But far from proposing that, through the vetting process that is the
courtship plot, authentic selves can be discovered underneath social performances,
Austen ultimately describes selves as inauthentic at their core, and even more radically,
takes pleasure in these performances, and produces them for us.
There is a paradox in some of the orthodoxies of Austen scholarship: on the one
hand, she is concerned first and foremost with interiority: indeed, her major innovation—
free indirect discourse—promotes the deepening of her characters’ inner lives. On the
other hand, she is concerned first and foremost with moral and social codes of behavior:
her novels enforce right and wrong and participate in punishment and correction. The
first orthodoxy implies that the novels evidence an intensifying individualism, the second
a relationality that regulates and prescribes. But in fact these apparently contradictory
orthodoxies converge with the interiority expressed through, among other formal
features, free indirect discourse, and the social expressed through an attention to social
codes of behavior. Furthermore, these contradictory positions assume a truth to
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interiority that is belied in her approach to selfhood. As Rachel Brownstein shows in Why
Jane Austen? (2013), Austen’s confidential tones flatter her readers into thinking that they
can distinguish between “truth” and “truths universally acknowledged,” but while certain
facts can be ascertained (for example, as Brownstein explains, they know Darcy “is
stalking the shrubbery near Rosings in order to meet [Elizabeth], that he is not turning up
there (as she thinks) by accident” (28)) other truths are much harder to ascertain.
Crucially, Austen’s depiction of interiority is actually experienced—by the
character, the reader, and the narrator—more relationally and less individually than many
have argued, and her depiction of the enforcement of social or moral norms does not
actually reflect an ominous social order as many have argued. In my view, Austen’s
vision of interiority, as communicated through free indirect discourse, is actually an
expression of the tendency we all have, and that authors especially need to have, to try
others on for size and speak as if through their voices. And what Foucauldians might
describe as Austen’s sinister enforcement of social order is actually, I will show, an
interrogation of this putting on of parts—manners, habits, tones—when we live
relationally, and that even within our own selves, we don’t even come close to knowing
the full cast of characters we embody. I argue that in Mansfield Park, Austen is interested
in the way that acting demands the actor to try on parts vastly different from the self and
in Emma, I argue that this interest matures toward an exploration of whether a self really
even is a stable entity, or whether, as the novel seems to suggest, the self/character
dichotomy is actually problematic because it rests on the false supposition that there is an
authentic self in the first place. Thus, my reading of Austen bridges this paradox in
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Austen scholarship by noting the way that the self functions in relation to the social: in
Austen, the self is constantly inhabiting others and playing parts.14
Further, I argue that in Mansfield Park and Emma, one of Austen’s ethical but
distinctly unmoralistic investigations is into the role of the novelist herself, whose
professional charge is not only to make things up, but also to present that fiction as truth:
in other words, she herself creates artificial authenticities. Indeed, I argue that some of the
most central ideological concerns that her novels take up within the plot—about
authenticity and relationality—are also examined in relation to form, the role of the
author, and the primacy of pleasure. My reading reveals a deeply ethically-invested
Austen rather than a moralistic one, whose understanding of relationality questions the
very nature of authenticity. There is a long critical practice of reading political and moral
philosophy into Jane Austen’s novels. From Marilyn Butler’s groundbreaking Jane
Austen and the War of Ideas (1975) to Claudia Johnson’s Jane Austen: Women, Politics
and the Novel (1988), scholars have read the novels and the precious little external
evidence (letters, socioeconomic status, marital status, etc.) to hazard claims about her
ideological commitments. In this chapter, I argue that Austen’s novels interrogate
ideology but from a unmoralistic position that instead raises and plays with difficult but
pleasurable ethical questions.
A few words, before moving on, about some of the loaded terminology in what
follows. Throughout this chapter I consider two primary dialectical concepts: first,
authenticity and performance, and second, ethics and moralism. Starting with the first
14

See Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and
the Business of Inner Meaning for more on the construction of an authentic, deep self in a
changing, commercializing social world. For Lynch, “deep” novel characters served to
facilitate the development for readers of inwardness, privacy, and authenticity.
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pair, my aim in thinking about authenticity is to trouble the very notion that Austen’s
characters range from more or less authentic, culminating in complete authenticity among
some choice specimens. We all know some people who seem the same across discourse
communities: a woman who demonstrates the same humor, behavior, and relational
patterns with her mother, whole family, work colleagues, best friends, and students. On
the other hand, we all know people whose selves get refracted and seem altered
depending on the social context. This is one measure of “authenticity.” Is the person who
retains a sense of self across discourse communities more authentic than the other? Or are
both performing selves, with the first performing uniformity while the second performs,
albeit against her will, fracture? These are questions this chapter addresses in discussion
of authenticity and performance.
As for the second dialectical pair, the relationship between moralism and ethical
thinking has been central to discussions, and disagreements, about Austen from the
earliest reviews of her work. I will go into greater depth on this as this chapter progresses,
but in short, the distinction is meant to reflect the difference between interest in the
ethical dimensions of choice, behavior, and selfhood on one hand, and on the other,
interest in making judgments about choices, behaviors, and authenticity. While Austen is
without a doubt interested in tensions between representation, language, and moral
thinking—in other words, an ethical thinker—I challenge the notion that Austen
moralizes—in other words, resolved the tensions in favor of making moral judgments. As
Gilbert Ryle established in “Jane Austen and the Moralists” (1966):
Jane Austen was a moralist in a thick sense, that she wrote what and as she
wrote partly from a deep interest in some perfectly general, even
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theoretical questions about human nature and human conduct. To say this
is not, however, to say that she was a moraliser. There is indeed some
moralising in Sense and Sensibility and she does descend to covert
preaching in Mansfield Park. Here I do discern, with regret, the tones of
voice of the anxious aunt, and even occasionally of the prig. But for the
most part, I am glad to say, she explores and does not shepherd (5).
By looking at Mansfield Park and Emma together, we discover a distinctly unmoralizing
Austen, one who is interested in theater and theatricality both as literal embodiment (the
private theatricals) and as a metaphor (for human behavior) but who doesn’t judge
theatricality moralistically. Rather, theater becomes a vehicle for Austen’s thinking about
the form and function of fiction, the relation between performance and pleasure, and
experiments in the nature of, and manifold meanings of, character. Looking at the novels
this way reveals an Austen who is neither Tory nor Whig, moralist nor anarchist,
individualist nor enforcer of a social order. Rather, in this chapter she is a dialectical
writer and a thinker interested in the relation between subject and social world, in the
confusing and complex ways that relationality manifests, and in the performances of self
that constitute our experiences of life, courtship, and pleasure.

I. “To undertake any character” in Mansfield Park: The Performance of Sympathy

Acting as analog
Many critics of Mansfield Park have struggled to understand the novel’s apparent
moralistic strain, especially in relation to its puzzling stance on acting. How can the
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author who created Elizabeth Bennet have gone on to create Fanny Price? How can the
author who wrote plays for her family’s consumption have written a novel that seems to
condemn acting in private theatricals?15 Regardless of the approach critics have taken,
their arguments have often been framed within the context of Austen’s morals. Implicit in
these arguments is the belief that the novel espouses a particular moral position as to
private theatricals and conduct in general. I would instead like to suggest that Austen is
more interested in thinking through philosophical arguments than in admonishing her
characters’ behavior, or prescribing behavior for her readers. In particular, she is
interested in thinking about the relation between sympathy and identification, and further,
in the idea that identification might end in non-sympathetic frames of mind that might
work against moral behavior. By exploring different aspects of identification, as she does
in this novel, Austen complicates and engages with ethical questions, playing the role of
moral thinker rather than moralist.
Austen’s own writing in Mansfield Park, and her characters’ acting—that element
of the novel often seen to be moralistically condemned—might actually, I argue, be
usefully considered as analogs, in that both arts require their practitioners to imagine the
inner lives of others and to act on that imaginative projection. Austen explores
identification and sympathy as activities productive of aesthetic as well as ethical
pleasures, and considers the relation and the tensions between ethics and aesthetics.
Mostly, she plays with depicting forms of identification that don’t lead to moral behavior
or even sympathy, but that produce pleasure and underwrite aesthetic form, language,
play, and performance.
15
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As the moral sentimentalists knew, and as many critics of moral sentimentalism
have since noted, sympathy is in many ways theatrical, with the object of sympathy
conceived of as a spectacle, and the sympathizer a spectator.16 It is not surprising, then,
that this novel about sympathy hinges on a theatrical event. By looking closely at the
rehearsals of “Lovers’ Vows” and at Henry Crawford’s reading of Shakespeare, as well as
at Fanny’s sympathetic nature, we will see that Austen teases apart and plays with two
aspects of sympathy—the moral motivation to recognize others and the aesthetic
enjoyment of perception and insight—exploring their complicated and at times disturbing
interconnection. Austen teases out aspects of this tension by holding open the possibility
that first, Fanny Price (or Edmund Bertram, for that matter) is not actually the novel’s
moral spokesperson, and, second, that Henry Crawford, in addition to being a scoundrel,
is actually also, intriguingly, an authorial surrogate, someone who artfully navigates the
inner lives of a whole cast of characters.
While Henry Crawford rightfully has a reputation among critics as one of the
book’s most morally dubious character (and there’s certainly stiff competition), he is also
the only truly gifted actor at Mansfield Park, able to act all roles equally well, in large
part because of his chameleon-like gift for identification. This virtuosic omniscience is,
of course, precisely what Austen achieves in Mansfield Park at large, the first of her
novels to employ from its inception free indirect discourse, a style of narration in which
the narrator shifts, often very subtly, from straight third person to one that seems to have
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privileged access to a character’s thoughts.17 In this novel, Austen shows us that this form
of imaginative identification is not just a moral tool, but is also one that can derive
aesthetic pleasure, not just for the subject of identification, but for the production of
representative, realistic, mimetic artistic work (such as novels and plays). What’s more,
she is interested in what happens when the aesthetic function of identification is isolated
from its moral function, as seems to be the case with Henry Crawford. While I don’t want
to argue that Austen is unconcerned with ethical conduct and ethical thinking (she is of
course very interested in her characters as moral beings, and as characters undergoing
moral development), I do think it is valuable to see the ways that, in this novel, she teases
out sympathetic identification and applies it not just to Fanny Price, but also to Henry
Crawford, who, like Austen, imagines himself into others.
My reading redresses a longstanding imbalance in critical attention to Fanny and
her moralism as opposed to the novel’s aesthetic investment.18 Austen vests the moral in
Fanny, but embodies the aesthetic in Henry Crawford, who has been far less attended to.
That Austen plays in this novel with the aesthetic function of sympathy, and its complex
relation to its moral uses, may be gleaned from her enjoyment of her readers’ often wildly
17
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off the mark reactions to Mansfield Park. Chapman tells us that Austen transcribed what
she gleaned “from her correspondence, from hearsay, and from remarks passed on to her
by members of the family” (Minor Works, 431). On their frequent (and frequently
negative) comparisons of the new novel to Pride and Prejudice: “We certainly do not
think it as a whole equal to P. & P.;” “Not so clever as P. & P.;” “My mother—not liked it
so well as P. & P.;” “Your characters are drawn to Life—so very, very natural & just—but
as you beg me to be perfectly honest, I must confess I prefer P. & P.” On their (often
underwhelmed) responses to Fanny: “Edward admired Fanny—George disliked her;”
“Highly pleased with Fanny Price--& a warm admirer of the Portsmouth scene.—Angry
with Edmund for not being in love with her, & hating Mrs. Norris for teasing her;” “Mr.
J. P. made two objections, but only one of them was remembered, the want of some
character more striking & interesting to the generality of Readers, than Fanny was likely
to be” (Southam, 48-51). One begins to think, after reading pages of these copied-out
comments, that she relished them. Perhaps it was amusing to her to think that her readers
judged her book on the likeability of her characters or on the moral justice of the plot. By
writing them all out in her own hand she got a chance to laugh at and distance herself
from her readers, especially the ones who read her novel as they might a book of
sermons. In the novel, too, she often seems to be laughing quietly, under her breath. That
Austen depicts Fanny as being capable of falling in love with Henry Crawford as he
reads, among other parts, that of the power-hungry Wolsey in Shakespeare’s Henry VIII,
or the womanizing king himself, is a fine comic touch.19 Austen seems to be poking fun
at those who would look for moral direction, for moralism, in the novel.
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Instead, Austen plays with the idea that Fanny is not the heroine, exactly, of the
novel, and that her moral perspective is not the novel’s. The distance between the novel’s
and Fanny’s moral and aesthetic sense is thrown into relief when Fanny is sent back to
Portsmouth by Sir Thomas Bertram, who correctly assumes that a trip back to a filthy,
over-crowded home will change her mind about her place in society. What she most
objects to, tellingly, is the noise:
The living in incessant noise was to a frame and temper, delicate and
nervous like Fanny’s, an evil which no super-added elegance or harmony
could have entirely atoned for. It was the greatest misery of all. At
Mansfield, no sounds of contention, no raised voice, no abrupt bursts, no
tread of violence was ever heard […] Here, every body was noisy, every
voice was loud. (266-267)
Fanny’s hatred of noise contrasts sharply with the novel in which she appears. Mansfield
Park is, in a way, an exaltation of dissonance, a prime example of what Mikhail Bakhtin
called heteroglossia. The novel is not Fanny’s novel.
I argue, then, that it serves our understanding of Austen and of this novel if we
train our attention on the complicated play between identification for aesthetic and moral
ends, and look at how Austen explores this through her characters’ acting. Rather than
seeing this as her most moralistic novel, one that condemns acting, I argue that we should
attend to the ways in which Austen uses the novel, via acting, to suggest that sympathy is

“What Signifies a Theatre?” which took place in Jane Austen’s Chawton at which I
delivered a version of this chapter, and was further developed in conversation with Talia
Schaffer.
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an artistic device as well as a moral one, and that identification can have very troubling
but interesting results.

The moral problems with acting: A critical history
Before addressing in detail the moral and aesthetic aspects of sympathy that
Austen was responding to in Mansfield Park, it will be helpful to give a sense of some of
the ways that critics have addressed her use of theatricals in the novel, since it is through
theater that Austen explores the aesthetic aspects of sympathy. E. M. Butler, who, in 1933
was the first critic to discuss the relationship between Elizabeth Inchbald’s loose
translation of August Friedrich Ferdinand von Kotzebue’s play and the action of the
novel, argued that Mansfield Park was a rewriting of Lovers’ Vows, but one that
reasserted the moral values that had been subverted in the original. “The real fact of the
case I believe to be this: Mansfield Park is nothing more nor less than Lovers’ Vows
translated into terms of real life with the moral standard subverted by Kotzebue neatly reinverted” (326). In other words, in Lovers’ Vows immorality is rewarded, whereas in
Mansfield Park it is punished. The main example for this, in Butler’s essay, is that in
Lover’s Vows Agatha gets to marry the Baron in the end and is reinstated to respectability
despite having had premarital sex with him, whereas in Mansfield Park, Maria, who plays
Agatha in the play and mirrors her role in the novel, is exiled for her bad behavior.
William Reitzel, later in 1933, reinforced Butler’s claim that Kotzebue’s play, and even
Inchbald’s bowdlerized translation of it, was widely considered immoral in England,
quoting for proof a review in the anti-Jacobin magazine, The Porcupine and AntiGallican Monitor, which portrays the play as dangerous and un-English, an opinion
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Reitzel says Austen would be aware of even if she hadn’t ever picked up a copy of The
Porcupine (451-456). Winifred Husbands, writing in 1934 in direct response to Butler,
and to a lesser degree, to Reitzel, argues that Austen was not writing in protest against the
immorality of Lovers’ Vows, and that, indeed, Austen wouldn’t have considered the play
immoral in the least. Lovers’ Vows, according to Husbands, depicts a woman who is
betrayed, deceived, and left essentially for dead, but whose dignity is finally restored
when she marries the very man who had taken her virginity. It is not, in other words, her
sin that is rewarded (as Butler argued) but her perseverance and faith. Furthermore,
Husbands argues, Maria’s guilt in Mansfield Park is actually greater than Agatha’s in
Lovers’ Vows—the former has an extramarital affair, the latter only has premarital sex
after receiving a false promise of marriage—while her punishment is more lenient.
Better, in Husbands’ reading, to have to go abroad but still be monetarily supported than
to be on the brink of death after a twenty-year period of deprivation and abandonment.
Husbands argues that if the situation depicted in Lovers’ Vows is more morally upstanding
than that in Mansfield Park, then the novel’s (or Austen’s) problem with acting must be
that Maria’s “situation” (her engagement to be married) makes private theatricals
inappropriate and morally unsound (Husbands, 176-179), an argument made by Edmund
within the novel itself (Austen, 89).
Lionel Trilling, writing in 1955, thought that acting was presented in the novel as
problematic in the Platonic sense—Austen’s concern, according to Trilling, was that the
amateur actors would lose their identity and begin to imagine themselves as something
other than what they are (427-428). In this sense, acting risks hardening you into the
character you are portraying—a souped up don’t-cross-your-eyes-or-they’ll-get-stuck-
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that-way argument. Many have questioned this position, in particular those who see a
ready-made correspondence rather than a disjunction between the characters and the parts
they play (Maria corresponds with Agatha, Mary with Amelia, Edmund with Anhalt, Mr.
Rushworth with Count Cassel, and so on). Whereas most early critics saw the characters
in the play as bad influences and argued that it was perilous to expose the Mansfield Park
crowd to their behavior lest they themselves engage in premarital sex, reverse genderroles, or overturn class boundaries, Dvora Zelicovici argues just the opposite: “If
anything, Lovers’ Vows is a didactic play with an over-insistence on poetic justice and
moral judgment” (531). The problem isn’t that the amateur actors are playing parts they
are at risk of becoming themselves, she argues, but that they fail to learn the lessons
offered to them by the characters in the play: “But—and this is Austen’s keenest irony—
in sharp distinction to the main characters in Lovers’ Vows, who learn the right lessons,
the actors do not profit from studying and rehearsing the play” (532). In spite of the fact
that the Mansfield Park characters play roles perfectly suited to their own situations, or
closely enough related that it should have been easy for them to recognize themselves and
the pertinent moral lesson in Kotzebue’s play, they remain none the wiser. Had the cast
done a better job and studied their roles more imaginatively,20 they might have profited
from acting. All they do, though, is further their own agendas: for Maria, the play allows
her to flirt with the man she prefers to her fiancé; Edmund and Mary are able to explore
their affection for one another under the guise of the script; Mr. Rushworth gets the
opportunity to wear, among other costumes, “a blue dress, and a pink satin coat” (98).
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The problem with acting that Zelicovici offers is anti- Platonic: the actors remain
themselves instead of becoming their characters, and thus lose the opportunity to learn
from them. This argument, though quite different from the previous arguments, is still
moralistic at its core: it is about a failure to learn the right lessons. Indeed, it assumes
that portraying a character on the stage is somewhat like the work involved in moral
forms of sympathy: if you imagine your way into another character, you might improve
morally. Zelicovici is correct that the novel relates acting to sympathy, but, crucially,
Austen’s interest is not moralistic and is instead about the relation between sympathy and
acting—or novel writing.
In “The Infection of Acting: Theatricals and Theatricality in Mansfield Park,”
Joseph Litvak writes: “The question, in other words, is not so much ‘What motivated
Austen’s anti-theatricalism?’ as ‘What motivated her to create the impression of
antitheatricalism?’” (333). Litvak argues that theatricality serves as a cover for more
subtle forms of theater at Mansfield Park: “the theatricals serve….as a ‘diversion,’ as
Hazlitt would say, from the subtler and more comprehensive theatricality that persists
long after Sir Thomas has reclaimed his study” (343), especially and most interestingly,
in the form of Fanny who “has in fact been playing a role, albeit ‘sincerely’” (348).
Litvak, in destabilizing our impression of Fanny, goes on to conclude that “Indeed, in
reading the final chapter of the novel one has the impression that its protagonist is less
Fanny than Sir Thomas himself, or the ‘governing body’ that he represents” and that “Sir
Thomas maybe be viewed as the agent of Jane Austen, insofar as both appear to endorse
the fortification of a conservative social order” (351). But then, he argues, “No sooner has
Sir Thomas expelled his demonic counterpart [Mrs. Norris]—whose ‘anxiety for
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everybody’s comfort’ mocks his own need to keep everybody in their place—than she
returns in the form of the anxious, ‘impatient,’ comfort-oriented author herself” (352). In
other words, for Litvak, “theatricality is not a single, unitary phenomenon but an already
self-divided set of practices capable of serving both reactionary and subversive causes”
(352). This subtle expansion of theatricality to include its subversive and repressive
forces runs parallel to my thinking on the multiple implications of identification in
Mansfield Park.

Austen’s ethical interests
Austen inherited her interest in the relationship between acting and sympathy
from the moral sentimentalists. Even without access to a reading journal or letters like the
ones we have for George Eliot, it is safe to say that Austen was a reader and thinker
intimately familiar with the fundamental concerns of the Enlightenment, including
sympathy.21 In this novel, you can see that familiarity at work, as she plays with and
explores, in particular, the theatrical nature of sympathy. Hume and Smith both described
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such as Anglicanism, and he reminds Austen scholars that Enlightenment thinking was
coursing through her family home, via her brothers and her father.
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sympathy as being like a theatrical event, an activity that starts with spectatorship, and
culminates in role-playing. For Hume, sympathy is largely a question of point of view, of
the position from which one spectates. He is concerned, throughout A Treatise of Human
Nature, to determine what point of view, or frame of mind—what seat in the theater—one
sympathizes from. Sympathy is naturally strongest for those we are close to, he says. It
“gives the preference to ourselves and friends, above strangers” (3.2.2.11) and thus it is
necessary “to fix on some steady and general points of view” (3.3.1.15) that take into
account the general good of mankind. Our sympathy is biased, and so we need to learn to
sympathize with the general good. Hume’s preoccupation, then, is about the position
from which one spectates, and the effects that has on the sympathetic exchange. Audrey
Jaffe, in Scenes of Sympathy, writes of Victorian fiction that “the term ‘sympathy’ has
commonly been used to describe an individualistic, affective solution to the problem of
class alienation: the attempt to ameliorate social differences with assurances of mutual
feeling and universal humanity” and that “sympathy thus formulated seeks to efface the
social and political problems for which it is offered as a resolution” (15). While for Jaffe,
Victorian sympathy entails a kind of sour rejection of failed others as opposed to Hume’s
more convivial eighteenth-century version, for both, the spectacle of the other breaks
down the atomism of social difference and provides access to a “general point of view,”
in Hume’s terms, or, in Jaffe’s, “a universal humanity.” Thus, in these readings, sympathy
is a way around the individualism of experience, and a requirement for moral action.
Adam Smith is even more commonly associated with depicting sympathy as a
dramatic affair, largely due to the stirring opening image of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments: “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease,
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our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry
us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any
conception of what are his sensations” (11). The observer is passively watching,
contemplating his difference in circumstance and experience from the sufferer on the
rack. But through imaginatively identifying with the sufferer, by getting worked up by the
scene being played out, we are carried “beyond our own person.” For Rae Greiner,
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the ur-text for understanding sympathy in the
nineteenth-century novel, and in particular, she argues that Smith is correct in depicting
the maintenance of difference and distance as being central to the sympathetic exchange.
“Against the standard claim that knowing more and seeing further into the hidden hearts
and minds of characters heightens our sympathy with them, novels of the period are
dubious of the tie that binds sympathy to knowledge. What’s more, sympathy resists
identification” (4). The mirror that identification props up, Greiner argues, is
counterproductive for sympathy or the consideration of a real and individuated other.
Better to look at the other from a distance, and without assumptions of identification and
knowledge. She cites James Chandler and Ian Duncan as postulating the major difference
between Hume and Smith as being “that Smith’s sympathizer abstracts feelings, routing it
through cognition, while Hume allows for sensation to be transmitted both directly and
unconsciously from one person to the next” (5). Greiner’s argument is that realist fiction
is actually more invested in Smith’s form of sympathy than Hume’s—moral sympathy is
a distant and cognitive process rather than a feeling-driven one. Like Greiner, I’m
interested in separating identification from sympathy, but what Greiner neglects is that
identification can lead to aesthetic enjoyment, bypassing all moral outcomes. Instead of
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looking at our brother suffering on the rack and, through imagining what he feels,
entering sympathetically into his position, what if this identification is simply
aesthetically interesting?
I argue that Mansfield can be read as an oblique commentary on, and a novel
hugely influenced by, these theories of sympathy. Austen’s characters are famous for their
ability to imagine the thoughts of others, to think about what another person will need
before that person has even thought of it, and to respond to others as unique and
independent subjects. Or she shows that they aren’t. On a formal level, too, she was
fascinated with the uses of, and problems with, sympathy. Her newly developed narrative
style, free indirect discourse, seems especially to draw from arguments, like those made
by Hume and Smith, about the perspectives from which one sympathizes—removed and
remote, or involved and implicated—and the moral repercussions of those perspectives.
Mansfield Park, in particular, relates sympathy to acting, stressing the imaginative,
theatrical nature of sympathy. Hume and Smith postulated that imaginative identification
with others would lead to some kind of moral behavior. Austen shows that it might or it
might not. And in many cases, it might just end at identification—and that identification
might be an aesthetic process rather than anything moral or other-directed.

Fanny and Henry’s different sympathies
Austen shows that sympathy can be a moral or an aesthetic faculty in part by
dividing the two functions of sympathy between two of her main characters: Fanny and
Henry. Fanny Price, in the word of Austen’s mother, is “insipid” (Southam, 49). Kingsley
Amis put it well when he said that he would not take lightly the decision of whether to
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accept a dinner invitation from her and Edmund (14). Passive, sickly, and retiring though
she may be, she is also fascinating for our purposes. Fanny is the only character in the
novel who enters sympathetically into all her peers’ minds. She imagines what they might
be thinking or feeling, and thinks and feels for them and with them.22 When the strict and
forbidding patriarch of Mansfield Park, Sir Thomas Bertram, departs for Antigua, leaving
the younger generation to their own devices, they do the nineteenth-century equivalent of
throwing a house party: they begin planning a private theatrical. Fanny, however, refuses
to participate. “Higher consequence was against it” (93) she tells herself. Regardless, in
her role as wallflower,23 Fanny masters Lovers’ Vows. Whereas the others fail to learn
even their own parts, and stage rehearsals mainly in order to flirt, Fanny memorizes the
whole play simply by observing. Not only is Fanny the only one in the house who
actually knows the play, she is the only one who sees, as it were, the play taking place
outside the play, and the erotic motives behind the decision to stage Lovers’ Vows. When
Henry Crawford slyly chooses Maria to play the part of Agatha, thereby slighting Julia,
Fanny alone comprehends Julia’s disappointment, and does so despite the fact that Julia
has always ignored or outright mistreated her. Once the rehearsals are underway and Julia
is devoting herself to her misery while watching her sister, Maria, flirt with Henry, the
narrator says: “Fanny saw and pitied much of this in Julia; but there was no outward
fellowship between them. Julia made no communication, and Fanny took no liberties.
They were two solitary sufferers, or connected only by Fanny’s consciousness” (114).
22
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Fanny is the only one who sees the relationship between Julia, Maria, and the flirtatious
Henry Crawford for what it is: a quagmire of jealousy on the female side and a pleased
puffing of the chest on the male side. Of Maria’s acting, Fanny thinks, “Maria […] acted
well—too well…” (115). She knows exactly what is going on between Maria and Henry,
who have chosen to act the mother and son pair largely, it seems, because mother and son
do a fair amount of touching in the play. Of Edmund’s participation in the play, despite
his objection to the activity, Fanny sees that he joins in order to be closer to the girl with
whom he is smitten, and to ensure that nobody else ends up playing the part of her lover.
Edmund is not fully aware of his own reasons—only Fanny has entered into his mind and
imagined what he must be feeling. This is Fanny’s mode of sympathetic engagement.
Henry Crawford, on the other hand, is neither insipid nor high-minded. He is a
cad. Nevertheless, he, too, has a highly developed ability to enter sympathetically into
others—even if it’s only as an actor, not as a person. Before Lovers’ Vows has been
chosen for the group’s theatricals, Henry says in a moment of exultation:
I really believe I could be fool enough at this moment to undertake any
character that ever was written, from Shylock or Richard III down to the
singing hero of a farce in his scarlet cloak and cocked hat. I feel as if I
could be any thing or every thing, as if I could rant and storm, or sigh, or
cut capers in any tragedy or comedy in the English language. (87)
Henry is as good as his word. He proves this ability in the novel, not just by
consummately preparing to play Frederick in Lovers’ Vows, but also later, after he decides
he is in love with Fanny and continues his attempted seduction by reading from
Shakespeare’s Henry VIII. The narrator says:
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[…] in Mr. Crawford’s reading there was a variety of excellence beyond
what she [Fanny] had ever met with. The King, the Queen, Buckingham,
Wolsey, Cromwell, all were given in turn; for with the happiest knack, the
happiest power of jumping and guessing, he could always alight at will on
the best scene, or the best speeches of each; and whether it were dignity, or
pride, or tenderness, or remorse, or whatever were to be expressed, he
could do it with equal beauty. It was truly dramatic. His acting had first
taught Fanny what pleasure a play might give, and his reading brought all
his acting before her again. (228)
Henry’s “truly dramatic” performance is so powerful that it compels Fanny, against her
will, to drop her needle-work and watch him attentively. The remarkable thing about his
acting is that he does all the parts, and does them all well. He can inhabit any character,
exhibit any quality or expression. However, this ability to enter imaginatively into other
selves evaporates when Henry is not reading Shakespeare or acting in private theatricals.
Although he can enter into a fictional character’s subjectivity, he shows little interest in
identifying with actual people. Fanny’s thoughts are a mystery to him—indeed, as his
sister notes, his attraction to her is based on precisely the fact that she is the only woman
he hasn’t been able to comprehend, the only woman who hasn’t fallen for him without his
having to try to imagine what she might be like inside.
Fanny Price’s moral artlessness and Henry Crawford’s joy in rendering others
represent the novel’s two models of sympathetic engagement. Critics of the novel have
almost always worked under the assumption that Austen, whose narrator refers
affectionately to “my Fanny,” quietly but unmistakably endorses Fanny’s model of
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sympathy. This is one of the reasons the novel is so controversial, even disliked. Looked
at another way, however, the novel is even more controversial than commonly supposed,
for Austen is showing that, contrary to prevailing notions, sympathy as a purely
aesthetically productive act has its own distinct power. She invites us to appreciate
Henry’s charm and talent, his moral dubiousness notwithstanding, precisely because he is
the novel’s one creative character whose skill relies on an imaginative activity related to
the sympathy that we find so overwhelmingly moralistic and irritating in Fanny.

Jane Austen and Henry Crawford
I propose that Austen is exploring her alignment with the aesthetically charged
dimensions of sympathy in Mansfield Park. This novel is Austen’s first to fully employ
(from its inception as a novel, rather than in its revision) what many credit to be her
major innovation, free indirect discourse. The narrator moves freely in and out of
different characters’ minds, undertaking any character, to paraphrase Henry Crawford.
The narrator enters into Fanny’s mind most frequently in this way, but the narrator enters
everyone’s mind, including Henry’s—one count has it at nine times for Henry to Fanny’s
ninety seven.24
The narrator, at Austen’s direction, identifies well and promiscuously,
“undertaking all the characters,” and thereby allowing the readers to do the same. Even if
we never come to like Mrs. Norris, we have still entered into her thoughts and come to
know her a little more. This feels morally productive—our access to her allows us insight
into her moral character, and affects our own moral calculus. But gaining insight into her
24

Louis Ann Flavin, The Aesthetic Effects of Free Indirect Discourse in the Novels of
Jane Austen.

52
thoughts also simply brings us intense pleasure. The affects involved in identification are
limitless, but whether identification is felt as funny, pleasurable, morally productive, or
disturbing, the experience is aesthetically charged. It begins with a dramatic entering into
another, “beyond our own person,” and culminates in an aesthetic, affectively layered
response.
By readjusting our focus and attending to these multiple aspects of identification,
we get a fuller understanding of this novel. In doing so, we find an author who is
interested in the central role that language and pleasure play in the work of sympathy.
Henry Crawford is able to find his way into any text, especially if he reads it aloud, as he
does with Shakespeare and Lovers’ Vows, and even if he knows little else, he knows the
pleasure of language. Despite the fact that Mary Crawford is shallow and thoughtless, we
derive great pleasure from her language game about rears and vices. Instead of seeing this
as a moralistic novel that censures theatricality and asks us to admire an insipid heroine,
it is productive to retrain our gaze and recognize it as a novel about the pleasures of
reading and of identification, and about the way that sympathy is a process steeped in
language and in narrative. Instead of mourning that Mary Crawford—whose zest and
verbal playfulness reminds us wistfully of Lizzy Bennet—isn’t the main character, we
might see her as simply one of the many characters, like Fanny, like Henry, that Austen
inhabits and gives voice to. Rather than view this as Fanny’s novel, and feel frustrated
with Austen for giving us this wilting, speechless girl for a heroine, I argue that we
should see the narrative voice, and Austen behind it, as the novel’s main character. In
Patricia Rozema’s 1999 film version of Mansfield Park, Fanny is depicted as a stronger,
more interesting and talkative character than she is in the novel. Most controversially, she
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is depicted as a writer, and we are encouraged to imagine her as a young Austen. The
film even has Fanny write Austen’s own impressive piece of juvenilia, a mock schoolroom exercise, “The History of England.” Rozema is battling with the same issue I am:
the problem of Fanny, and the problem of the novel’s seeming conservatism.25 My
conclusion, however, is different than hers. Rather than rehabilitate Fanny by making her
more like Austen, I see the novel as one in which Fanny is a decoy. We are forgiven,
certainly, for assuming at first that she is the heroine; the novel sets us up for that reading.
But by examining her in relation to Henry Crawford, and in light of the novel’s focus on
acting, we can see that the real main character of the novel is Austen herself, undertaking
any character, imagining her way into all of them: the sassy, superficial Mary Crawford,
the talented and handsome but morally bankrupt Henry Crawford, the silly but
dangerously powerful Mrs. Norris, as well as the fainting, insipid Fanny Price.
More than moralistic pronouncements or disavowals, this is a novel that admires
beauty and wit, and enjoys making fun of others. Mary Crawford’s jokes, beauty, and
skill with the harpsichord are admired and held in contrast to Fanny’s boring attempt to
say something improving about trees to Edmund: “Cut down an avenue! What a pity!
Does it not make you think of Cowper? ‘Ye fallen avenues, once more I mourn your fate
unmerited’” (41). We can’t help but laugh at Mr. Rushworth when, after we’ve been told
that he “liked the idea of his finery [for his part in the performance] very well, though
affecting to despise it,” he “step[s] forward with great alacrity to tell [Edmund] the
agreeable news. ‘We have got a play,’ said he. ‘It is to be Lovers’ Vows; and I am to be
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In addition to tweaking Fanny’s character, Rozema’s film also differs from the novel in
its more explicit incorporation of the issue of slavery on Sir Thomas Bertram’s Antigua
estate. In Rozema’s version, Fanny becomes increasingly outraged the more she learns.
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Count Cassel, and am to come in first with a blue dress and a pink satin cloak, and
afterwards am to have another fine fancy suit, by way of a shooting-dress. I do not know
how I shall like it” (98). Another, more thorough takedown is of Mrs. Norris, and it is
done largely through free indirect discourse. While the young occupants of Mansfield
Park are choosing a play that will suit them for a private theatrical, the narrator reports
that “an enormous roll of green baize had arrived from Northampton, and been cut out by
Mrs. Norris (with a saving, by her good management, of full three quarters of a yard), and
was actually forming into a curtain by the housemaids” (92). The reader knows that in
fact Mrs. Norris spends her brother in law’s money quite freely, and is only frugal when
it comes to her own small fortune. However, within that parenthesis, we see Mrs. Norris
patting herself on the back for her excellent management of Sir Thomas’s expenses
despite the fact that she has just bought baize for a private theatrical of which he would
surely disapprove. (There is also the fact that the amount—three-quarters of a yard—is
negligible.) The joke continues after Sir Thomas returns from Antigua and shuts down
the theatricals:
Mrs. Norris contrived to remove one article from his sight that might have
distressed him. The curtain, over which she had presided with such talent
and such success, went off with her to her cottage, where she happened to
be particularly in want of green baize (134).
Again, Mrs. Norris’s thoughts are being accessed by the narrator for fun: it is Mrs. Norris
who invents the pretext that it will upset Sir Thomas to see the green baize, remembers
her talent and success at overseeing the curtain-making, and decides that she truly needs
some green baize. Mansfield Park is a novel invested in language, playfulness, nasty
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humor, and playful, interesting, but not necessarily moral, imagination into the lives and
minds of others. This investment in the pleasure of performance and the multiplicity of
selves that good actors can produce is extended in Emma to even more radical ends.

II. “If it was a falsehood, it was a very pleasant one:” Playing Your Part in Emma

Austen the “Imaginist”
Among Austen critics, Emma tends to be everyone’s favorite, and Mansfield Park
everyone’s least favorite novel. Emma is an “imaginist,” Fanny is “insipid;” Emma flirts,
Fanny withdraws; Emma makes mistakes and is loved in spite of, or because of this
quality, Fanny watches and judges the mistakes of others. And yet, there are similarities
in the approach critics tend to take in discussing the two novels, especially a tendency to
describe both in moralistic terms. Mansfield Park teaches, according to many critics, that
acting in private theatricals is bad and leads to loose morals, problematic flirtations, and
even adultery. In Emma, the moral lessons are all directed at Emma herself. As Eve
Sedgwick puts it in “Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl” (1991), “Austen criticism is
notable […] for its unresting exaction of the spectacle of a Girl Being Taught a Lesson —
for the vengefulness it vents on the heroines whom it purports to love, and whom,
perhaps, it does…” (833) In response to this critical landscape, Sedgwick made available
an alternative mode of reading Austen: “It is partly to interrupt this seemingly
interminable scene of punitive / pedagogical reading, interminably structured as it is by
the concept of repression, that I want to make available the sense of an alternative,
passionate sexual ecology — one fully available to Austen for her exciting, productive,
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and deliberate use, in a way it no longer is to us.” (834). With Sedgwick, I hope to show
some of the ways that Austen is not a moralistic writer, slapping her heroines on the
wrist, but rather one who explores the delicate boundary between thinking morally and
being a creator of fiction—an “imaginist.”
One area to which Austen’s imagination returns again and again is the subject of
authenticity. She was forever, in her fiction, thinking about whether people are what they
purport to be and what happens if they aren’t. This exploration, with Mansfield Park and
Emma, is, I argue, conducted by thinking about authenticity and acting, or the act of
putting on roles. In Mansfield Park this was overt. Under the cover of her
overwhelmingly moral heroine, Austen creates enough clearance to explore her relation,
as author, to the novel’s best actor and worst person. In so doing, she suggests that a self
can contain many characters, and that identification can be a performance without any
moral component. In Emma, the relation between acting and fiction-writing is less overt,
but, in some ways, more pervasive. In Emma, I argue, acting is what everyone is doing all
the time. Such a claim may seem perverse—Emma wraps up, after all, with Knightley
saying things like: “My Emma, does not every thing serve to prove more and more the
beauty of truth and sincerity in all our dealings with each other?" (457) Mr. George
Knightley, arbiter of all that is true in this novel, representative of the right thoughts and
best behaviors, knight in shining armor, and Saint George of England, schools devious
Emma and makes things all right in the end. Or, that’s how the novel is often read. I
argue, however, that Knightley is himself a master of characters, and that the novel shows
that human relations are a constant putting on of characters. This is to say that Austen
posits, in this novel, that there is no such thing as an authentic self or behavior. Instead,
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Austen is exploring what it means to be a character in many senses: a character in a novel
who is characterized, for example, as having fine moral judgment but who nevertheless
loves a naughty woman like Emma; in life, one might be described as having character
(being a fine upstanding gentleman like Knightley, for example); in a novel and in life,
being a character implies that the self might be unstable, and that one’s character might
really be one of several characters (as is the case most obviously with Frank Churchill).
Austen considers the character of her fictional character, Knightley, in both senses—he is
a fine character, and he is also a person in character. Thus, Knightley is not entirely
dissimilar from Frank Churchill who is characterized by his putting on multiple
characters, or, for that matter, from Henry Crawford. By looking at the way Emma
portrays people portraying themselves to others, I will show that the author’s
representative is not Knightley who schools Emma into marriageability with his message
of authenticity and truth. Instead, I argue that Austen shows truthfulness itself to be but a
performance, a character to assume but not an authentic self. In Emma, Austen shows that
we are all, even Knightley, always playing a role.

“Dear Jane”
Reading Austen as a moralistic writer satisfies a longstanding critical urge that is
still hard to work against, but this perception of Austen is a feature of history, not a
reliable truth. The image of “dear Aunt Jane,” later shortened to “Dear Jane” or just
“Jane,” began in earnest, as is well know, with her nephew’s 1869 publication, A Memoir
of Jane Austen, which increased the popularity and circulation of her works dramatically,
but hardened the image of the author into, as Kathryn Sutherland has written, “a
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comfortable figure, shunning fame and professional status, centered in home, writing
only in the intervals permitted from the important domestic duties of a devoted daughter,
sister, and aunt” (Sutherland, Memoir, xv). In short: by the mid-Victorian period, Austen
had received public treatment that painted her as perfectly reflective of the Victorian cult
of true womanhood. Sutherland brilliantly plots what happens with this image of the
kindly aunt through the long and storied course of readership and criticism, revealing the
ways that certain narratives came to congeal. For example, Sutherland argues that during
the dislocating and horrific experience of the First World War, Austen’s seemingly
regulated world and language served the much-needed function of making the world
appear to have meaning and coherence. For Kipling’s “Janeites,” for example, “Jane” is a
therapeutic presence who creates order out of a hellish war experience and holds out the
promise of a stable England. The epigraph alone tells the story of a whole century of
Austen criticism:
Jane lies in Winchester—blessed be her shade!
Praise the Lord for making her, and her for all she made!
And while the stones of Winchester, or Milsom Street, remain,
Glory, love, and honour unto England’s Jane!
“Jane” is England’s mascot, representing virtue and as much stability as the stones on
which her heroes and heroines walk. Sutherland then connects the post-war pride in
national values, and the production of, among other things, R. W. Chapman’s Oxford
University Press editions of Austen. These texts, Sutherland suggests, participated in the
promotion of old-fashioned English values, and depicted a version of Austen that has had
a lasting and troubling effect on Austen scholarship to this day. The Chapman edition, as
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Sutherland shows, leaves out many things, most strikingly the fact that Austen was a
wartime writer (as Chapman was a wartime editor) and obscures her relation to ideas in
the act of making her a safe and stable vehicle for the reproduction of moral English life.
Austen the moralist is, thus, a product of our uses for her.
D.W. Harding, one of the first to argue against the “Dear Jane” narrative, wrote,
rather radically in 1939, that Jane Austen “has none of the underlying didactic intention
ordinarily attributed to the satirist.” Gilbert Ryle, in his 1966 essay on what he argues is
Austen’s Shaftesburian influence, argues that in her novels she was concerned with moral
problems, but was not didactic or what I’ll call moralistic. Lionel Trilling’s influential
writing on Austen, however, suggests that Harding’s and Ryle’s writing on a nonmoralistic Austen was outside the critical norm. For Trilling, Austen was interested in
moral thinking insofar as her novels promoted and produced moral growth, both in her
characters and for her readers. As Marilyn Butler has written, “He saw Mansfield Park as
a case-study of the process whereby, with pain and danger, the self became a moral
agent” (xi).
That Austen is a moral thinker is clear. Her novels give character and action to the
moral debates of her time. Whether she is a didactic moralist is, it would seem from
contemporary criticism, still a lot less clear. D.A. Miller, for example, in Narrative and
its Discontents: Problems of Closure in the Traditional Novel (1989), argues that
Austen’s closures are always moral. He writes that the paradox in Austen’s writing is
that though her novels always promote knowledge, truth, and goodness prevailing over
falsehood, error, and evil or less-goodness, she first needs, in order for there to be a story,
the absence of all the good stuff in order for it to be prevailed over. For Miller, this
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constitutes a real problem: what is a novelist who ideologically stands at the closure side
of things to do about the fact that if she is to create a story, she needs to mostly spend her
time withholding closure? Miller, in this book, sees Austen as ideologically opposed to
ambiguity. Rather than show that narrative and ideology are in constant and unsettled
battle in Austen, he argues that ideology wins. Miller’s claims are of a piece with a larger
trend of Foucault-inspired criticism that is suspicious of the past for the covert ways its
values were enforced and that sees Austen as, ultimately, another promoter and enforcer
of conservative values.26
Among contemporary Austen critics, there are, broadly speaking, two camps:
those who, along with Marilyn Butler, see the novels as betraying a political and social
conservatism and those who, along with Claudia Johnson, see Austen as essentially an
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In his later book on Austen, Jane Austen and the Secret of Style, Miller writes about
what he calls “Austen Style”—an “Absolute Style” derived from being outside of what
she describes. Miller shows that Austen creates protagonists who are themselves stylish
and outsider-ish, but who then necessarily renounce this status at the novel’s end. He
observes that this renunciation of Style always happens, surprisingly, rather happily, and
argues that it is because Style is wedded to a fear of shame. To renounce Style in favor of
marriage, then, is a liberating act, and even her most Stylish leading ladies are more than
happy to trade insecure Style for secure ordinariness. Austen, though, if she is to remain
Austen the writer, must not release herself from Austen Style, and must retain her
intimate relationship with shame. In this later reading of Austen, Miller recognizes and
indeed builds a dialectical tension into his reading of Austen: she recognizes what might
be an easier and happier choice (marriage, ordinariness, insider-status) but chooses to
maintain a harder, less happy position (single, extraordinary, outsider-y). While I take
issue with some of Miller’s assumptions (that she is unhappy as a single woman and that
marriage mattered as much to her as he says it does) his premise that her writing comes
from a divided place is similar to mine: to be a moral person and follow the rules is
certainly good, and perhaps easier, too. To think deeply about the rules, and about right
and wrong, and from that interrogation, to discover the potential for dark, unmoral
thoughts is harder and alienating, and yet it is Austen’s writerly necessity. In order to
marry, Emma must tamp her overly active imagination, but Austen can never tamp hers.
Mansfield Park and Emma are absorbing and masterful marriage-plot novels with
satisfying endings, but they are also meditations about the art of the imagination and the
slippery, hall-of-mirrors Style moral path it takes one down if one is to do it at all well.
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ironic writer who depicts with biting sarcasm that which appears conservative. The
Butlerians tend to focus on the staid settings, customs, characters, and expectations we
see represented in the novels, while the Johnsonians tend to focus on language and
pleasure and the way those undercut the novels’ depictions of conservatism. In Butler’s
preface to the 1988 edition of Jane Austen and the War of Ideas she quotes Terry
Eagleton on the “scandal of [her] book:” “it sheared coolly through decades of diplomatic
Trillingesque talk about Austen’s ‘tensions’ and finely tuned ambivalences and actually
said that, well, when you get down to it, she’s just a straight Tory” (Butler, xvii;
Eagleton, 24-25). To sheer coolly through decades of ambivalent talk and to offer some
straight truth sounds admirable, but, I argue, inappropriate to a discussion of Austen,
whose writing is deeply committed to ambiguity rather than to ideology. In what follows,
I will show that rather than shearing coolly through anything, in Knightley’s adamant,
declarative mode, Austen asks questions that don’t have clear answers about the
complexity of identity, and the social demands of being somebody stable when in fact we
are multiple. I will show that it is precisely ambiguity that Austen aims to identify as the
universal human experience, and that, contrary to the critical history of Austen that, from
its “Dear Jane” narrative to the Foucauldian or the Butlerian assertions of her oldfashioned conservatism, she is not a moralistic or didactic writer, nor a Tory writer, nor
even an ideological writer. In this study of Emma, I will show that she is a writer
interrogating the degree to which anyone can ever be a truthful and authentic self.

Seeming, not being, in Emma
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Emma begins with these words: “Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich,
with a comfortable home and happy disposition, seemed to unite some of the best
blessings of existence; and had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world with very little
to distress or vex her.” Critics have focused on that word, “seemed,” often asking some
variety of the question: Why did it only seem, and what was the reality? I argue that there
is no straightforward answer to that question and that in fact the “seemed” is only meant
to suggest that, in fact, everything “seems” but nothing “is.” It’s not that Emma “seems”
one thing but “is” another—it’s that she, and everyone, “seems” one thing or another all
the time.
This “seeming” but not being extends to Knightley and to the very character of
the English gentleman. Claudia Johnson argues convincingly, in her afterword to
Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s—Wollestonecraft,
Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (1995), that Austen’s novels, especially Emma, were central to
the construction of the nineteenth-century English Gentleman. Responding to the
tradition of Emma criticism that addresses Emma as transgressive in some gendered way
-- frigid, lesbian, or masculine—Johnson argues that actually, “Where this novel is
concerned with gender transgression, it is from the masculine, not the feminine side”
(196). Rather than show the normative English gentleman as an eighteenth-century
sentimental hero, Austen invents the English gentleman that, to this day, we associate
with gentlemanliness. Johnson shows that Mr. Woodhouse is a man in the sentimental
mode and should be, therefore, the gentleman of the novel. “The qualities that typify
him—sensitivity, tenderness, ‘benevolent nerves,’ allegiance to the good old ways,
courtesies to the fair sex, endearing irrationality, and even slowness, frailty, and
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ineptitude itself—also typify the venerated paternal figures crowding the pages of Burney
and Radcliffe, to say nothing of those of Edmund Burke” (198). Of course, Mr.
Woodhouse is not the model for manhood in this novel, nor is “gallant Mr. Elton” or the
“chattering coxcomb” Frank Churchill; Knightley is.
Deviating from the model for the sentimental hero of the eighteenth-century, that
of the nineteenth, which Knightley originates, is, according to Johnson, “a man of few
words. Whereas an earlier generation of sentimental men had made a spectacle of their
affect—of honorable feelings so powerful as to exceed all possibility of control, thus
saturating handkerchiefs and liberally bedewing eloquent pages—the manful Knightley
retreats from display, cultivating containment rather than excess…And this new, plain
style of manliness is a matter of national import, constituting the amiable, ‘the true
English style,’ as opposed of course, to the aimable, the artificial, the courtly, the
dissembling, the servile, and (as the tradition goes) the feminized French” (201). In other
words, what Austen does in Emma is to recreate the English gentleman in a style of
reticence, quiet strength, and benevolent wisdom—a revision so powerful that it now
strikes us as normative, to the point that, as Johnson argues, criticism of Emma takes it
for granted. But, in fact, Knightley is a new type in English literature. Drawing on
Johnson’s reading of Emma, I argue that the next step in re-seeing Knightley is to see that
even the Truth-upholding Knightley is engaged in role-playing. He originates and enters
into the character of the English Gentleman with such aplomb that he inspires a shift in
literary and historical masculinity so successful that it is almost unnoticed.
Knightley is often taken to be Austen’s surrogate in the novel—the person who
foresees much of the plot and is in the right regarding behavior and character. I argue that
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once again, as in Mansfield Park, Austen is playing with character-surrogacy, and that in
this novel, she investigates what it means to be both a truth-teller and an actor—a doublelife that, as a novelist, she is particularly interested in. Contrary to most interpretations
that take for granted that the novel promotes authenticity and truth, I argue that the novel
shows relations to be necessarily performative and identities to be various. Further, I
argue that Austen, through Knightley, shows truth itself to be unstable given that we are
all always playing a role.
The idea that people are characters who take on multiple characters (who “seem”
but never actually are) is suggested everywhere in Emma. When the Westons host a
dinner party on a snowy winter evening, Mr. Elton is delighted by the idea of an extended
opportunity for flirtation, while John Knightley, as uptight as his brother and as
hypochondriacal as his father-in-law, is vexed at the idea of going out in the snow. But
when they arrive, they have to arrange their faces, arrange the outward depiction of their
moods, and put on the right character for a social evening: “Some change of countenance
was necessary for each gentleman as they walked into Mrs. Weston's drawing-room;—
Mr. Elton must compose his joyous looks, and Mr. John Knightley disperse his illhumour. Mr. Elton must smile less, and Mr. John Knightley more, to fit them for the
place” (117). When Emma is coaching Harriet into swapping her romantic interest in Mr.
Martin for Mr. Elton, she highlights Mr. Eliot’s virtues by describing them as a good
model or pattern for any young man in search of a persona.
In one respect, perhaps, Mr. Elton's manners are superior to Mr.
Knightley's or Mr. Weston's. They have more gentleness. They might be
more safely held up as a pattern. There is an openness, a quickness, almost
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a bluntness in Mr. Weston, which every body likes in him, because there is
so much good-humour with it—but that would not do to be copied.
Neither would Mr. Knightley's downright, decided, commanding sort of
manner, though it suits him very well; his figure, and look, and situation in
life seem to allow it; but if any young man were to set about copying him,
he would not be sufferable. On the contrary, I think a young man might be
very safely recommended to take Mr. Elton as a model. Mr. Elton is goodhumoured, cheerful, obliging, and gentle. (E, 31).
Emma speaks of these men as patterns and models as if they have slipped into costume
and as if any young man in the market for a character could do the same. Indeed, what
Emma is discussing here is the matter of manners, and she is using the language of the
conduct manual in a novel that, among Austen’s other novels, became one of the
textbook novels of manners. Emma takes for granted that manners are assumed, not
indexes to the soul. Conduct manuals and novels of manners describe the moral
imperative to behave correctly. What Austen shows, however, is that this moral
imperative is to behave well, but not to be anything except an adopter of the appropriate
behavior, calibrated to the context. Manners are transferable and situational, not reflective
of the self, the real, or the authentic—if they weren’t there wouldn’t be conduct manuals.
The fact that manners are context-driven and transferable, which is to say not
tethered to an “authentic” origin, is hard to square with Knightley who, as Emma points
out, is not an easy model to follow precisely because of how fixed and authentic he
seems. But Knightley, as the novel shows, has assumed a role defined by its performance
of truth. Knightley’s supposed authenticity is a persona that he performs expertly, though
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he does, importantly, slip from time to time. Take, for instance, his uncharacteristic
arrival in a carriage at a party at the Coles’. Emma “was pleased to see that it [the
carriage] was Mr. Knightley's; for Mr. Knightley […] was too apt, in Emma's opinion, to
get about as he could, and not use his carriage so often as became the owner of Donwell
Abbey.” Their conversation about his character, and her commendation of his playing it,
in her mind, correctly, is telling:
"This is coming as you should do," said she; "like a gentleman.—I am
quite glad to see you."

He thanked her, observing, "How lucky that we should arrive at the same
moment! for, if we had met first in the drawing-room, I doubt whether you
would have discerned me to be more of a gentleman than usual.—You
might not have distinguished how I came, by my look or manner."

"Yes I should, I am sure I should. There is always a look of consciousness
or bustle when people come in a way which they know to be beneath
them. You think you carry it off very well, I dare say, but with you it is a
sort of bravado, an air of affected unconcern; I always observe it whenever
I meet you under those circumstances. Now you have nothing to try for.
You are not afraid of being supposed ashamed. You are not striving to
look taller than any body else. Now I shall really be very happy to walk
into the same room with you."
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"Nonsensical girl!" was his reply, but not at all in anger. (216-217)
The question is not just what the appropriate manners are for someone in Knightley’s
station—whether it befits the master of Donwell Abbey to use a carriage at all times, or
to save money and healthfully walk instead—not only whether these manners and
behaviors are visibly reflected but also whether they reflect what they seem to reflect.
Emma thinks that Knightley is, for once, traveling through Hartfield in the manner
appropriate to a gentleman and the owner of the best property in the area. What he
doesn’t reveal is that his behavior is indeed gentlemanly, but in a different way: he
arrives in his carriage because he wants Miss Bates and Jane Fairfax to have a method of
conveyance to and from the party, and not have to walk, a fact only revealed to Emma
through Frank’s gossipy patter later that night: “Mr. Knightley's carriage had brought,
and was to take them home again. Such a very kind attention—and so thoughtful an
attention!—the sort of thing that so few men would think of. And, in short, from knowing
his usual ways, I am very much inclined to think that it was for their accommodation the
carriage was used at all. I do suspect he would not have had a pair of horses for himself,
and that it was only as an excuse for assisting them” (226). Emma reads his arrival in a
carriage as an appropriate status marker. In fact, though, it is an act of noblesse oblige.
He performs his position in society, and enacts an authentic gentlemanly self. But,
crucially, part of this performance requires of Knightley to keep the truth from Emma. He
lets her think what she wants and smiles at the disparity in their understanding of the
situation, hiding the truth because it suits him to hide his good deed and because in this
case, it is required for this particular performance. If this act of gentlemanliness serves to
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make him even more authentic a gentleman, it also serves to make his authenticity that
much more a performance of authenticity.

“The whole truth”
At stake in this argument is whether Austen is making any claims about truth and
authenticity in this novel, what they are, and whether they coincide with Knightley’s
claims to and about truth and authenticity. By way of addressing this question, I want to
look at the depiction of “truth” in the novel. Knightley is, notoriously, often right in
predictions for the future and in his readings of people. He predicts that the relationship
between Emma and Harriet won’t come to any good. He is right that there’s something
going on between Frank and Jane. He is right that there’s something disingenuous about
Frank’s claim that he is unable to manage his own time and visit his father whenever he
chooses. He is right about many things. But so are many other people, including people
who are regularly schooled by Knightley for being wrong.
The discussion Emma and Knightley first have about Harriet and Mr. Martin is
often taken as another example of Knightley getting it right, but nestled within this
conversation are some very interesting statements of truth that come from Emma.
Knightley expresses “surprise and displeasure” and stands up “tall in indignation” upon
hearing that Harriet refused Mr. Martin’s proposal of marriage. Emma responds by
reminding Knightley that women, who have very little power at all, do have the power of
refusal. In her typically playful manner, she scoffs, “Oh! To be sure, it is always
incomprehensible to a man that a woman should ever refuse an offer of marriage. A man
always imagines a woman to be ready for anybody who asks her” (58). Later, in the same
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conversation, she reminds Knightley that it wouldn’t be so odd if a man above Harriet in
station fell in love with her, as men often do fall in love with women for their looks rather
than for their qualities of mind: “Till it appears that men are much more philosophic on
the subject of beauty than they are generally supposed; till they fall in love with wellinformed minds instead of handsome faces, a girl with such loveliness as Harriet, has a
certainty of being admired and sought after…” (61). This is an example of something that
happens again and again throughout the course of the novel. Of course, she is wrong: she
shouldn’t have meddled and Harriet should have accepted Mr. Martin. But Emma’s truthtelling should not be overlooked. It is true that women are valued primarily for their
beauty and not for their opinions, that they are thought idiotic if they exercise any of
them, and that as such women have very little power. Again, Austen weaves a paradox
for her readers: characters are often both right and wrong, and truth is less stable than it
might appear. As Knightley later concedes, Emma is right that Harriet has some excellent
qualities, and that Emma has really improved her. This novel is narrated in two modes,
primarily: unmediated dialogue and free indirect discourse. This scene is notably told in
the former mode, a narrative mode that excludes the narrator’s voice and opinion. Each
person’s words are taken at face value, and the reader responds to them based on
everything else that has come before, and based on what they bring to the text. It is up to
the reader here to make judgments on each conversant’s truth-telling or rightness, and,
like in actual conversations, the result is probably that each person seems somewhat right
and somewhat wrong. That’s the best we can get: what seems right.
Another example of the murkiness between truth and falsehood in the novel is
Emma’s Mr. Dixon theory. Every time I re-read Emma, her theory is more compelling,
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even though I know it to be false. This is perhaps enhanced by my forgetting the details
every time (largely because Austen designed the novel to keep these characters at a
remove, never to appear) but every time I return to the novel, I can’t quite remember
what the details of Emma’s misconception are, and each time I read her theory, I think to
myself that it’s actually not that unfounded. She suspects that a plain girl is jealous of her
beautiful friend for being preferred, at times, by her husband. Not only is this not that
unlikely, we don’t actually know that it isn’t the case, since we never hear from Mrs.
Dixon. It is probably likely that, even if Mr. Dixon never gave a thought to Jane in any
romantic way, Mrs. Dixon still at times doubted herself and feared the worst.
Furthermore, in this novel of desires that don’t always get directed at the right object at
first, it wouldn’t be that strange if Mr. Dixon did at first desire Jane, or at least consider
Jane an object of potential desire before marrying Jane’s plain but wealthy and classappropriate friend. Even if he’s not the one who bought the piano, which is really all that
we know, who is to say that he didn’t harbor a little flame for the more beautiful, more
accomplished friend? This is, of course, a bit of imaginative play on my part, and yet
none of it seems unfounded in a novel that is itself a series of close observations of the
blunders and missteps that are the stuff of love. In fact, it is the kind of “imaginist”
matchmaking that the novel itself depicts and plays with denouncing, while all the while
showing its powerful “imaginist” pleasures.27
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See Bharat Tandon’s “Jane Austen and the Morality of Conversation” for more on
Austen’s “gleefully disproportionate and indecorous” juvenilia, the way it informs her
mature work, and especially for his exploration of her “double ironies” in which
characters can be right in larger ways even when they’re wrong. Tandon’s example is
Catherine in Northanger Abbey: she is wrong about General Tilney being a murderer, but
she is certainly right that he’s even worse than he at first appears.
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Truth, far from being straightforwardly upheld in the embodied form of
Knightley, is actually destabilized in this novel. Not only is Emma sometimes right even
when she’s wrong, but what’s right and wrong is sometimes unknowable. Much has been
written about the fact that Frank Churchill’s letter explaining his behavior doesn’t explain
nearly enough, but I argue that this is not because it’s Frank, for whom secrets and
evasions are natural—it’s because there is no central, accurate narrative, for him or
anyone. A fully explanatory letter cannot, in keeping with the vision of human nature this
novel depicts, exist. Which is all to say that Frank Churchill’s remarkable sin of
concealment (his first name is one of the novel’s most simplistic but satisfying jokes) is
not actually such a sin after all, nor is it so remarkable. We are always concealing things,
intentionally and unintentionally, to others and ourselves. Mrs. Weston exclaims to
Emma, upon their discovery of Frank’s engagement, “I can hardly believe it.—I thought I
knew him” (405). What Frank did was wrong, surely, but perhaps Mrs. Weston’s first
mistake was thinking she knew him, or anyone. Frank was acting—playing the part of a
single man, and playing it too well—but everyone in the novel has secrets, including
from themselves, and plays multiple characters.
Even in the moment of Emma and Knightley’s love becoming known to each
other, in which they supposedly open up to one another completely, a secret remains unconfessed, and feelings and thoughts in general move at too “wonderful [a] velocity” to
be shared in their entirety. Despite being, as he claims, unable to make speeches,
Knightley delivers a touching confession of love to Emma. While he does so, “Emma’s
mind was most busy.” While she listens to him and comprehends every word, she is also
managing to think about all of the following: her newfound happiness, her latest mistake
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with Harriet, her real sorrow at Harriet’s predicament, her belief, though, that a
Knightley-Harriet match would have been “unequal and degrading.” Knightley speaks in
his plain and honest manner, and while he does so, Emma’s mind races and any response
she might offer, the novel insists, would necessarily be incomplete. How to tell the whole
truth when the mind can move so rapidly and contain so many conflicting emotions?
Emma refrains from telling Knightley that she had accidentally caused Harriet to fall in
love with him, and it’s a secret she takes with her to the end of the book. Even in this
moment of love-fueled confessions, her heart is closed on at least one important matter.
Even in the moment where Emma is supposed to be schooled into truthful authenticity by
the exemplary Knightley, she maintains her selfhood, which is to say that she remains
unknowable to him. Further, we don’t ever learn what she said in response to Knightley’s
confession of love. He tells her it is hard for him to make speeches and then makes one.
The narrator then takes over to report: “She spoke then, on being so entreated.—What did
she say?—Just what she ought, of course. A lady always does.” We never find out; all we
know is that she plays her part, the role of the lady in love being proposed to by a reticent
gentleman, admirably.
Once Emma and Knightley have become lovers, Emma shows him Frank’s letter
of explanation, to which Knightley responds, in his rather school-master-y manner, “My
dear Emma, does not everything serve to prove more and more the beauty of truth and
sincerity in all our dealings with each other?” (457). Not only does this little speech make
any serious reader of Austen’s playful irony groan, it is completely outside the tone and
tenor of the novel as a whole. Further, it’s unrealistic and undesirable. Truth and sincerity
in all our dealings? Does he now want to hear exactly and in full what’s on Emma’s mind,
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as he was wise enough not to want on Box Hill? Putting aside the obviously dystopic
effects of a world with complete truth and sincerity in all our dealings (or, at least the
brain-numbing effects of a world of honest and open Miss Bateses), truth and sincerity
are shown to be aspirations, but not practicable and not even always desirable.
Furthermore, truth and sincerity, when we do see them, are themselves a role.
Knightley is not truth itself, he is not the embodiment of truth, he performs it.
Truthfulness is part of his character’s persona. But even Knightley slips from his role. As
Mary Waldron writes, “Far from being above it all, Mr. Knightley is involved in the same
kind of social/moral confusion as Emma and all the other characters…” (115). He takes
his carriage to the party in order to perform his noblesse oblige, and withholds from
Emma why he brought his carriage, while being ribbed by her for having finally done the
proper gentlemanly thing, because it suits his role to retain that information, even though
it is an omission and a deviation from straight-forward openness. Additionally, he isn’t
honest with himself or anyone about his feelings about Frank. He dislikes him and
distrusts him from the beginning, and while some of his reasons are legitimate (it’s not
likely that Frank is truly unable to visit his father on occasion and it is ridiculous to go all
the way to London to get a haircut), the real reason he doesn’t like Frank is because he’s
jealous of his flirtation with Emma, and resents the general assumption that Frank and
Emma are intended for one another. Knightley’s performance of honesty has a blind spot
when it comes to Frank; he breaks character when it comes to his exaggerated antipathy
to Frank because of his feelings for Emma. And it’s not just with Frank that Knightley’s
performance of honesty and sincerity are compromised. Knightley has biases about
Harriet that he doesn’t acknowledge and that are as deluded as Emma’s. When he expects
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her to marry Mr. Martin, he thinks highly of her. When he hears that she has turned down
Mr. Martin’s proposal, he speaks of her as an idiot who has neither birth nor merit to
recommend her. Waldron writes in depth about this scene in which Knightley’s opinion of
Harriet (and of Mr. Martin) changes rapidly and unfairly, concluding: “In his previous
account, Martin has been ‘“very well judging”’, now his love has overcome reason;
before, ‘“he could not do better”’, now ‘“he could not do worse”’; and the ‘“fair lady”’ is
little better than a base-born idiot. Is this the sober, rational thinker we have at one level
been let to expect?” (123). Knightley is not the novel’s spokesperson, nor is he even
perfectly truthful. Rather, he performs truthfulness expertly, though with notable breaks
in character, and in doing so, underscores the novel’s representation of character as a
performance, even when the character is one that performs unperformativeness.

“Very great amusement in tricking us”
So, if the novel isn’t a public service announcement on behalf of truth, what is it?
It might help to look first at the moment when Emma and Frank first meet after Frank’s
engagement becomes openly known. Emma tells Frank that he must have enjoyed his
secret immensely, and gotten “great amusement in tricking us” (489). He insists that he
didn’t and that it was torture, but we readers saw him at it. If it did produce a few
moments of torture for him, it also produced many more of pleasure. And it is along these
lines that I propose to look for meaning in this novel, rather than accept Knightley’s
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lesson about truth. The novel is full of little in-jokes and winking gestures, to say nothing
of the word games, charades, enigmas, riddles, and quizzes the characters partake in.28
The novel promotes pleasure, lightheartedness, jokes, and tricks by showing its
opposite in Knightley, a veritable party-pooper. At the party at the Coles’, Jane, whose
musical talent has been touted throughout the novel, plays and sings for the group, and
does so beautifully. Knightley, however, breaks it up like a parent telling the kids to
knock it off.
Towards the end of Jane's second song, her voice grew thick.
"That will do," said he, when it was finished, thinking aloud—"you have
sung quite enough for one evening—now be quiet."

28

For pleasure’s sake, I’ll go through a few of my favorite of the novel’s little tricks. As
Jill Heydt-Stevenson has written in her book, Austen’s Unbecoming Conjunctions:
Subversive Laughter, Embodied History, about the persistent presence of the body in
Austen’s novels (which many consider to be body-less), Mr. Woodhouse is perhaps not a
hypochondriac for nothing—his symptoms and concerns call to mind venereal disease.
This in itself is a hilarious joke, which, Heydt-Stevenson argues, contemporary readers
would have picked up, and the frequency with which Mr. Woodhouse sits by the fire or
vaunts the healing powers of gruel (supposed treatments for syphilitic symptoms) makes
the joke repeatedly pleasurable. (Heydt-Stevenson doesn’t mention one thing I noticed on
a recent re-reading, which is that Mrs. Goddard, the head of the school in which Harriet is
placed, is said to have “formerly owed much to Mr. Woodhouse’s kindness, [and] felt his
particular claim on her.” I couldn’t help feel, after having read Heydt-Stevenson, that one
wouldn’t be remiss to wonder whether Mr. Woodhouse paid a great deal of attention to
Mrs. Goddard and her pupils in any way untoward. This is just a hypothesis, but another
one that made me giggle in a way that felt sanctioned by the text itself.) Another favorite
trick of mine is one that the narrator plays. Early in the novel, the narrator suggests that
Mr. and Mrs. Weston have their hearts set on a match for Emma. At this point, Frank
hasn’t showed up, and the main male contender for this role is the ever-present
Knightley. The reader wouldn’t be faulted for thinking that it is Knightley they mean, and
only finds out much later that the hoped for match is one between Emma and Frank.
Through this little trick, the narrator plants the idea of a Knightley and Emma union in
the mind of the reader, while also providing a moment of pleasure for re-readers who will
only pick up on the trick the second time through.
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Another song, however, was soon begged for. "One more;—they would
not fatigue Miss Fairfax on any account, and would only ask for one
more." And Frank Churchill was heard to say, "I think you could manage
this without effort; the first part is so very trifling. The strength of the song
falls on the second."
Mr. Knightley grew angry.
"That fellow," said he, indignantly, "thinks of nothing but shewing off his
own voice. This must not be." And touching Miss Bates, who at that
moment passed near—"Miss Bates, are you mad, to let your niece sing
herself hoarse in this manner? Go, and interfere. They have no mercy on
her" (232).
Miss Bates, in her real anxiety for Jane, could hardly stay even to be
grateful, before she stept forward and put an end to all farther singing.
Here ceased the concert part of the evening, for Miss Woodhouse and
Miss Fairfax were the only young lady performers; but soon (within five
minutes) the proposal of dancing—originating nobody exactly knew
where—was so effectually promoted by Mr. and Mrs. Cole, that every
thing was rapidly clearing away, to give proper space.
It is of course Frank, in contrast to the over-protective fogey Knightley, who originates
the suggestion that people dance and continue to have some pleasure. Knightley doesn’t
object to the dance (the reader waits for it, and can hardly believe he doesn’t) and we
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catch a glimpse of him, through Emma’s eyes, standing, as per usual, outside the fun.
Emma’s observation that “He was no dancer in general” is, especially at this moment, a
rather comic understatement.
Another night of entertainment and fun is planned, this time at the Westons’ (the
novel is structured around opportunities for fun: planning, waiting for, and then enjoying
(or not) various social engagements) and Knightley’s response (reminiscent of Fanny
Price in its hatred of noise and fun) is: “Very well. If the Westons think it worth while to
be at all this trouble for a few hours of noisy entertainment, I have nothing to say against
it, but that they shall not chuse pleasures for me.—Oh! yes, I must be there; I could not
refuse; and I will keep as much awake as I can; but I would rather be at home, looking
over William Larkins's week's account; much rather, I confess.—Pleasure in seeing
dancing!—not I, indeed—I never look at it—I do not know who does.” Could any
statement be more against the mood and tone of the novel?
“What a banal, reductive and limiting ‘moral’”
The novel, then, puts Knightley’s overly sober and the novel’s playful ways in
opposition. Michael Gamer, in a collection of essays on the Box Hill scene published in
Romantic Circles (2000), writes: “But as [Claudia] Johnson has argued persuasively,
Austen often raises such polemical antitheses—here opposing verbal transparency to
verbal play and obfuscation—‘in an exploratory and interrogative, rather than hortatory
and prescriptive, manner’ (Johnson, xxi)” (Gamer, paragraph 2). Verbal transparency
(Knightley’s truth) versus verbal play (Austen’s interest): this is the polemical antithesis
Emma sets up. So what of the arguments that many critics have made, and extremely
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persuasively, that Knightley is the novel’s spokesperson, the representative of Austen’s
message (and here we move back again to Butler’s camp)? George Levine, in the same
issue, bemoans the unsavory moralism of the novel as he sees it:
Perhaps the most difficult thing for a modern reader of Emma to do is to
take it straight, to accept Mr. Knightley as the moral authority the story
seems to make him and to agree that Emma should indeed marry him
(paragraph 1).
But, Levine argues, it must be taken “straight:”
[…] Emma offers itself as a novel that is, through its various detours and
duplicities, what it claims to be, and this, for skeptical modern readers, is
rather hard to take (paragraph 5).
Levine, himself a modern reader, doesn’t like the fact that this novel teaches “humility
and circumspection:” “What a banal, reductive and limiting ‘moral’ for a novel so
extraordinarily rich in nuanced dancing around doubleness of meaning, around the virtual
inaccessibility of a stable and verifiable truth, around the edgy if muted excitement of
female independence and imaginative play!” (Levine, paragraph 1). But where Levine
argues that this dancing around doubleness is ultimately not the novel’s message, and that
Knightley’s moral message is, I argue that Knightley’s moral message is continually and
variously played with and cannot be held up as Austen’s message. Knightley is not
always “right”—nor is he in a novel that values being right above being imaginative. The
tension between being right and being an “imaginist” is the point. It is not a novel about
pure pleasure, nor is it a novel about the value of moral lesson-making. It is about the
tension between those. The novel is so interesting because it is a dialectical text, not one

79
that can be settled one way or another; it is so compelling and formally interesting
because of the tension between Knightley’s correctness and Emma’s playfulness, and
everything these opposing ideals stand for. This novel would be a bore if it were more
clearly Knightley’s novel. It wouldn’t allow Emma’s brilliant, naughty playfulness and,
to be frank, it would be a party pooper. And if it were Emma’s novel, it wouldn’t have
the seriousness and interest in moral questions. But it has both—the two elements are
married literally and figuratively—and I argue that it is a novel that is interested in what
happens to play and imagination in the face of morality.

80
CARING UNCARINGLY: SADOMASOCHISM IN
CHARLOTTE BRONTË’S VILLETTE
“Lucy is the bossiest bottom”
—Eve Sedgwick29
Our various ways of theorizing such
encounters with relation shape our different
views of the political and affective
consequences of social embeddedness. We
are constantly asking, What do our
distinctive responses to each other and our
cases tell us about the structural conditions
that produce the encounter with
nonsovereignty in the first place?
—Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, Sex, or
the Unbearable, viii

In this chapter, I continue to argue for the frequency of nineteenth-century
novelists’ investment in depicting a relational, rather than individual, framework for
experience that is centrally defined by the inability to know others. Furthermore, I show
that this unknowable relationality often produces negative feelings and behaviors that the
novelists in this study, far from condemning, actually encourage, showing that they can
often be productive of pleasure or other useful outcomes. This chapter addresses these
questions through an analysis of Charlotte Brontë’s Villette and the role of these feelings
and the behaviors they elicit in the context of ethics of care theory. I show that even the
paradigmatically isolated, individual Lucy Snowe is deeply embedded in a social context
revolving, largely, around care-relations. Furthermore, I show that Brontë’s investment is
not in Lucy’s redemption through a therapeutic recovery of healthy subjectivity, but
rather, in her pleasure, perversion, and the normality of anti-social feelings and behaviors
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This was said in a 2007 Seminar at the CUNY Graduate Center entitled “Reading
Relations in the British Novel.” While I wasn’t there, Sedgwick’s remark was passed on
to me by Miciah Hussey.
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inherent in care relations.30 Over the course of the novel, Lucy experiments with the odd
power-dynamics that care entails—the powers that employ you in care-giving roles, and
the powers invested in the act of caring—and develops the ability to control both her
abasement and her mastery. Because of this particular set of power dynamics, trust is
essential to care relations, and yet, the problem of other minds can be more pronounced
and damaging in these contexts than in others. In response to these challenges, power
dynamics, and tendencies toward both self-concealment and careful watching of others,
Lucy becomes adept at sadomasochistic roleplay, and learns to derive pleasure in both
being controlled and in controlling others.
Christopher Lane, in “Charlotte Brontë on the Pleasure of Hating” (2002), writes
that “few critics have addressed her novels’ preoccupation with hatred or claimed that
this trait determined her characters’ ontological relationship to the world. Highlighting
the obstacles that thwart these protagonists, these critics turn her fiction into a form of
protest while finding ways to reconcile her heroines to women’s limited opportunities.
This curtails Brontë’s interest in hostility, viewing her work as redemptive in aim and
merely a therapeutic extension of her life” (199). With Lane, I argue that to view
Brontë’s novels, especially her last—which Matthew Arnold described as
“disagreeable,”31 and which Harriet Martineau called “almost intolerably painful”
because “[Lucy Snowe] allows us no respite”32—as ultimately redemptive or therapeutic,
whether for its characters or its author, is to overlook Brontë’s pleasure in the tensions
30

Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive rejects normative,
socially productive and reproductive forms of relationality and serves as a foundation for
some of my thinking in this chapter.
31
Letter to Mrs. Forester, 14 April 1853. McNees, Critical Assessments. Vol 3, 610.
32
Review of Villette, in McNees, Critical Assessments. Vol 3, 589.
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she constructs. Where Lane focuses on hatred, I look instead at a range of negative
affects that inhere in and around power, and I look at the pleasures, rather than the
recuperations, those affects can produce.
In the groundbreaking Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the
Nineteenth-Century Imagination (1979), Gilbert and Gubar do attend to Lucy's more
negative, strange cast of feelings, but in the context of their repression. Here, I focus
instead on the pleasure Lucy derives from these feelings and behaviors. For good reason,
Lucy’s professional and social disenfranchisement as a woman has been a central node of
Villette scholarship, and this feminist criticism often either depicts her as repressed and
oppressed or, alternatively, as writing from a place of ultimate professional and authorial
release. Brenda Silver, for example, writes in “The Reflecting Reader in Villette” (1983)
that Villette “responds to the limited plots available for women” by creating an
unconventional narrator who shapes a new kind of fiction. “Lucy is deliberately creating
not only a new form of fiction for women, but a new audience—part critic, part
confidant, part sounding board—whose willingness to enter her world and interpret her
text will provide the recognition denied to women who do not follow traditional paths of
development” (92). Lucy, in this reading, is a feminist vanguard creating community and
opportunity for women, and if she has a tendency toward isolation or silence, it is
nullified by the text itself. Silver writes: “Speak she must, though, for to remain silent
would be to become the cretin who makes mouths instead of talking, and whose silence
becomes a metaphor for Lucy’s own potentially arrested development. To overcome this
two-fold silence, Lucy evolves another reader, a nonjudgmental reader, a sharer of the
insights that she cannot communicate to those more in tune with the accepted social
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codes” (103). I agree with Silver that Lucy creates her own community through a
readership she is intently focused on forming and training. However, the readership she
creates is far from reformed or nonjudgmental; on the contrary, Lucy, who constantly
judges, expresses disdain, or disgust, trains a readership to be eminently judgmental,
hostile, and unrepentant.
Indeed, Lucy’s strange, untrusting, mildly abusive treatment of her readers forms
a readership that teeters from submissive to aggressive. In Dear Reader: The Conscripted
Audience in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (1996), Garrett Stewart follows Silver’s
line of thinking and expands on Villette’s relationality vis-à-vis the Lucy-reader
relationship. Most famously, she not only hides her recognition of Dr. John from him, but
she also keeps it from her readers. Another episode of this perverse treatment is the
elusive, much discussed ending. Lucy’s reticence about M. Paul’s end requires us, her
trained readers, to do the killing and the mourning of M. Paul for her. She has trained her
readers to not be naïve, and so when she dangles the possibility that he might be alive,
she willfully demands that her readers be the ones to reject that possibility and declare
him dead. Lucy has trained her reader to be executioner. The novel ends not with a
transformed Lucy, trained to behave, feel appropriately, and exhibiting a healthier
subjectivity. Instead, she remains a character immune to our therapeutic expectations,
unrepentantly perverse in her relationships, including with her readers, and likely with
her students and teachers at her new school.33

33

Villette interestingly complicates Frank Kermode and D.A. Miller’s arguments about
the unnarratability of happiness and marriage. It ends not on a life of fulfilled marriage,
nor on a life of fulfilled and healthy subjectivity, but because it simply isn’t practicable to
continue narrating a life of unrepentant, pleasure-producing nastiness.
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Part of my intention is to contribute to a broader reexamination of the Victorian
period, one that challenges the impression, which has proven more resilient than a
cockroach in the pensionnat’s attic, that the Victorians were prudes, controlled by their
manners, consumed by conduct manuals, and above all, civilized.34 Peter K. Andersson,
argues that “the established picture of the Victorian period [its supposed prudishness and
repression] lingers…not only in popular media, but also in academic research” (439). He
traces this established picture to two main sources. First, to Norbert Elias’s writing,
furthered by Cas Wouter’s research, on the “history of mentalities from the late Middle
Ages until today” (439) which led to “an ‘informalization’ of manners and an
‘emancipation of emotions’ in the twentieth century” (439) only after an “increasingly
formalized regime of manners” in the nineteenth that produced a “complicated system of
introductions, invitations, calls, leaving calling cards, ‘at homes,’ receptions, dinners, and
so on” (440). Second, and much more notoriously in the context of Victorian literary
scholarship, and also more directly pertinent to scholarship on Villette, Andersson traces
this established picture to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) and its outsize
influence on Victorian scholarship. In large part because of Foucault’s historicist
theorization of reformist movements and their impact in the creation of a totalizing
culture of discipline, scholars continue to depict the period as cartoonishly civilized and
straitlaced, and, in so doing, maintain a flattering distance between savvy contemporary
scholar and repressed, repressing Victorians. In this chapter, I argue that these persistent
34
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tropes of, in Andersson’s words, “visitations and hat-tippings” (440) are belied
throughout the Victorian period, that they represent a fantasy of Victorians affluence and
leisure and a discounting of lived experience, particularly among working classes, and
that Villette shows us perhaps most explicitly what is actually a dominant, if obscured
from view, trope of the nineteenth-century novel: the manipulation of power in pursuit of
queer or non-normative forms of pleasure.
Neither Lucy’s writing, nor her relationship with M. Paul, nor her care
relationships, even when she becomes master of her own school, bring Lucy into a closer
or more productive society with others. On the contrary, these relationships—with her
readers, her distant partner, her wards—thrive on the basis of her comfort in and pleasure
with powerplay and sadomasochism. As Talia Schaffer puts it, “In the simplest form, we
can say that Lucy…does not care for the objects of her caregiving. In Lucy’s case, this
dissonance causes intense stress, but she also, paradoxically, cherishes it as a guarantor of
her psychological liberation” (Lucy, 2). The fact that she contains all these habits,
behaviors, and feelings, that she is at once, for example, self-abasing and prone to
abasing others, brings to the fore the final aspect of Villette I will address: Lucy’s
multiple personalities are explored in part through the novel’s focus on acting and the
performances inherent in powerplay. In the context of acting, sadomasochism and the
role-playing it entails, Lucy’s variety of selves is less perplexing. The acting scenes
remind us that the authenticity of selfhood is a specter, as ghostly as the novel’s nun, and
as changeable as the nun who turns out to be Alfred de Hamal. Artless authenticity is
possible, but not for chameleon-like Lucy Snowe, whose very name suggests heat and
cold, light and dark.

86

Liberal individualism and ethics of care
Lucy Snowe has been considered a paradigmatic isolated individual for good
reason. She has no relations, no background or family, no home, and offers no
explanations; she prefers to be left alone, unattached, and independent; she resists being
known. Mary Jacobus writes in “The Buried Letter: Feminism and Romanticism in
Villette” (1980) that “the seed of Villette” (42) is the inalienable rights of self. And yet,
she is in fact deeply embedded in several interconnected social worlds. This social life,
however, is not based on mutual respect and reciprocity. On the contrary, her
relationships are marked by uneven care and sadomasochism. Lucy isn’t an atomistic
individual, she is a relational being who functions fluently in the language of disturbing
relationships that are phenomenologically normative. If this strikes readers as odd—and it
still does—it is because we are not accustomed to seeing a character so at home in the
dangers and disappointments of relationships. Lucy’s oddity lies not in her isolation, but
rather, in her disturbing expectation that relationships are necessarily disturbing.
Lucy’s social orbit is continually disappointing: Dr. John fails to recognize her
feelings, Ginevra Fanshawe teases and annoys her, Polly takes her for granted, Madame
Beck abuses and surveils, and M. Paul’s love takes on abusive, constricting forms. But
this is not to say that we should read Lucy’s social alterity, her proclivity for seeking out
privacy, and her narrative deceptions at face value. Lucy is always in some way engaged
in a conversation with her social world—with people from her past whose literal return is
an uncanny event that seems paranormal but reflects her continued relationship with
people not in her immediate proximity, as well as, of course, with people she is engaged
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with in her present—and her supposed desire to be a free agent is not only never possible,
but is also never actually depicted as desirable from the perspective of the narrative that
Lucy herself produces. And yet, this continual disappointment underscores the fact that
Brontë isn’t writing about happiness, and her writing isn’t oriented toward emancipation.
Lucy’s relationships are unsatisfying and lopsided. They are not sympathetic encounters
in which there is fellow feeling or mutual understanding. Not even, or perhaps especially
not, her relationship with M. Paul.
This novel, in addition to being about a person who claims to be independent but
is in fact extremely interdependent, is about the backbone of interdependence: care
relationships. As I wrote in my introduction, care theory both responds to the inequities
inherent in justice-approaches to ethics, and creates inequities that it doesn’t adequately
resolve. Ethics of care argues for the interdependence of all people, both at their infancy,
and throughout their lives in ways that fluctuate and always loom. To build an ethics
around this central fact of interdependence that privileges care as a site of ethical thinking
and work yields a system oriented toward equality across spectra that aren’t typically
equal especially in care relations. Ethics of care aims to prioritize care work not just
among women, the poor, migrants, and those to whom care work often calls, but among
men, and those more affluent and enfranchised. However, in the rehabilitation of care, in
its elevation to a field of ethical thinking and society-construction, there is an
overreliance in the theory on the good sides of care, on embracing and taking back a site
of ethical work that is centered on love, respect, protection, and mutuality.
However, it is a fact of care that it is built on structural inequities—someone
needs care for a reason, and the other is giving care for a reason—and that these
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inequities can be difficult to overcome, and can produce distinctly uncaring feelings. For
example, a parent caring for an infant can become overwhelmed at the helplessness of the
cared-for and the thanklessness of the tasks associated with keeping it alive. A care
worker employed to look after someone else’s children might be forced into performing
aspects of love and care that are not felt simply to keep their job.35 Thus a central
problem in ethics of care is the question of what to do about the wide gulf between care
and one’s feelings while providing care. Frustratingly, this chasm is not sufficiently
addressed in ethics of care theory. Often enough, the care-giver provides care while
inhabiting a variety of affective states, including, for example, love, guilt, or hatred. And
of course, people in care-taking roles often dispense bad or unsympathetic care. Where
Jane Eyre ends in a marriage that is made possible by Rochester’s disability and need for
care, and highlights care as an attractive vocational outlet for women and men alike, thus
promising a kind of ideal mutual care relationship,36 Villette returns to the issue of care
but presents instead an array of badly given care, care that doesn’t ever get returned to the
care-giver, and care given with feelings that are far from caring. While ethics of care
theory doesn’t do enough to theorize these discrepancies, the novel as a form, and Villette
in particular, can help us understand what it means to care without caring, to care for pay,
and to care while learning to experiment with the power dynamics inherent in care work.
In this chapter, I extend the ethics of care to include bad care, mutual antagonism, and
intentionally charged power relations. Rather than just focusing on the more pleasing
35
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aspects of care, Villette helps us see that the uglier sides of care can also be built into an
ethics of care. Care can be exercised through dominating, uglier forms of care, and
performed with a range of negative feelings. Indeed, it often is.

Sadomasochism, Power, and Lucy Snowe
The power dynamics inherent in care work, especially in care work performed as
labor in an economic marketplace, produce a variety of affective responses in the
characters thus employed. Zelig St. Pierre peacocks and performs her understanding of
her own sexual power. Madame Beck and Dr. John, care-givers of a different class but
still caring for payment and not quite affluent, wield power in radically different ways,
Madame Beck through close guard of her troops, Dr. John through obliviousness, which
has a power of its own. In Lucy’s telling, she began her social existence as a docile, meek
wretch, but even from the earliest scenes, by being a close observer of others, Lucy
obtains a kind of power. What she learns over the course of the novel is how to use this
attention and insight, and to use this power for her own pleasure, whether by controlling
her own abuse, or abusing others. That is to say, Lucy’s response to the power dynamics
inherent in care work is to be insistently antisocial and to learn to use power as a tool in
her own transgressions. The novel posits sadomasochism as a response to the
problematics of care.
From her unpaid care for Paulina when they are both children, to her paid care for
Miss Marchmont (a job she initially turns down), and her paid work first as bonne for
Madame Beck’s children, then as English teacher in her school (most care theorists
include education as a form of care work), Lucy learns to derive pleasure from the abuse
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inherent in caregiving, and she also discovers her own power to abuse others. She learns,
in other words, to use the uneven power dynamics inherent in case relations as a tool for
pleasure. Claire Jarvis, in Exquisite Masochism: Marriage, Sex, and the Novel Form
(2016), argues that masochism is a vehicle for para-sexual sexual pleasure in a novel
form that has trouble containing actual sex. The pleasure I argue that Lucy derives from
the abuses of care work is, likewise, non-genital but nevertheless deeply sexually
gratifying.
For Freud and later Gilles Delueze and Frances Ferguson, sadism and masochism
were completely different emotional states with different perversions and impulses.
Deleuze argued that sadomasochism was a problematic term, bringing together two states
and forms of desire that are radically opposed. Jarvis is similarly interested in masochism
as distinct from sadism. Havelock Ellis and later Foucault argued that sadism and
masochism were complementary and as impulses often existed within the same person.
Indeed, masochism requires a paradoxical capacity to ask for and direct one’s own
abasement, while sadism requires an attention to the limits and needs of the other so
extreme that power is only a part of the pleasure, which must also derive from studied
attention to the others’ limits. The lines between masochism and sadism are blurred, and
their expression constitutes a very complex form of deeply layered role-play.
With these latter thinkers, I argue that Lucy’s response to the tyranny of power in
this novel is to learn the pleasures of sadism and masochism in order to move between
them. Sara Ahmed, calling power an affective economy, writes that, like all affects, it
doesn’t reside in a person or outside a person but rather moves between people. Contrary
to the psychological approach, feelings aren’t “within,” they are in circulation. I use this
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thinking to help me understand Lucy’s sadomasochism: the feelings associated with
pleasure through abjection or through abuse circulate, they don’t inhere within a person.
The feelings of abjection and, complementarily, of pleasure in abusing others, are not
“within” Lucy, but rather “stick” to her in certain social circumstances, to use Ahmed’s
term. Lucy discovers access to these affective economies—the pleasure of abusing and
paining others, and of being abused and pained—primarily in her relationships, especially
with Ginevra Fanshawe, Dr. John, and M. Paul, Madame Beck, and in her pedagogy.
Lucy’s complex, layered sadomasochism can be seen in her signature social
stance of keeping others at arm’s length while at the same time drawing them very close.
Often, this is coupled with finding others repellent while also being deeply attracted to
them. This can be seen in her relationship with Ginevra Fanshawe, the coquette with
whom Lucy herself coquettes.
She was not proud; and—bonne d'enfants as I was—she would forthwith
have made of me a sort of friend and confidant. She teased me with a
thousand vapid complaints about school-quarrels and household economy:
the cookery was not to her taste; the people about her, teachers and pupils,
she held to be despicable, because they were foreigners. I bore with her
abuse of the Friday's salt fish and hard eggs—with her invective against
the soup, the bread, the coffee—with some patience for a time; but at last,
wearied by iteration, I turned crusty, and put her to rights: a thing I ought
to have done in the very beginning, for a salutary setting down always
agreed with her (96).
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Lucy discovers early that she can be rough with this hardy tease, and that she doesn’t
have to fawn at her or even be nice. Ginevra comes to Lucy to complain, to ask for many
little favors, Ginevra eats half of Lucy’s breakfast (“the morning pistolets or rolls, which
were new-baked and very good”), and Lucy in turn can speak bluntly, and tease her back,
and have someone light and bright in her company. What she establishes with Ginevra is
a relationship in which she can assert boundaries and establish her independence, gain a
kind of social satisfaction, and be both the abused and the abuser. She constantly marvels
at her beauty and enjoys simply looking at her. “Notwithstanding these foibles, and
various others needless to mention—but by no means of a refined or elevating
character—how pretty she was! How charming she looked, when she came down on a
sunny Sunday morning, well-dressed and well-humoured, robed in pale lilac silk, and
with her fair long curls reposing on her white shoulders.” Lucy revels in Ginevra’s
beauty, and in the fact that this creature has chosen Lucy as her confidante. There is a
pleasure in the self-abasement inherent in being chosen by the beauty. Lucy has a
perverse attraction to Ginevra’s annoying qualities, and makes an effort to keep her close
because of these qualities. In the passage describing Lucy’s habit of sharing her
breakfast, Lucy writes with a faux-naiveté about the nature of their relationship:
This way consisted in a habit she had of making me convenient. […]I
don't know why I chose to give my bread rather to Ginevra than to
another; nor why, if two had to share the convenience of one drinkingvessel, as sometimes happened—for instance, when we took a long walk
into the country, and halted for refreshment at a farm—I always contrived
that she should be my convive, and rather liked to let her take the lion's
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share, whether of the white beer, the sweet wine, or the new milk: so it
was, however, and she knew it; and, therefore, while we wrangled daily,
we were never alienated. (2771)
Lucy claims to notice that Ginevra makes her convenient (she gets extra breakfast, and
the lion’s share of beer, wine, or milk while on expeditions), but of course the more
interesting thing about this passage is the fact that Lucy is making herself convenient to
Lucy because Ginevra is convenient to Lucy. Having a companion clinging to her arm
who she can abuse but who also abuses her is Lucy’s social position of choice. Ginevra is
a beautiful girl who is sought after by many men, including one that she herself is
interested in. This is a form of torture Lucy can’t resist, and it’s amplified by the
flirtatious, even sexual frisson of their roleplaying. With Ginevra, Lucy gets the pleasure
of submission but also the corollary pleasure of knowing her own power, should she
choose to flip Ginevra over and force her to submit.
The two men in Lucy’s life—Dr. John and M. Paul—are also tested and
experimented with on these terms: to what degree will they be satisfying partners for
abuse given and received? Both challenge Lucy’s self-determination, and both elicit a
wide range of emotions from her. Importantly, none of these emotions allow for
complacency, satisfaction, or even happiness, and yet both are attractive to her on those
very grounds. Her relationships with both Dr. John and M. Paul suggest that troubling
relationality defines our social existence, and that the choice to remain apart and selfgoverning is not practicable. Lucy’s strangeness, therefore, is not that she prefers
isolation, and it is not that her relations are so troubled and troubling, but, rather, that
unlike most other fictional characters, and unlike us, her readers, she expects the
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relational world she finds herself in and maneuvers deftly within it, mobilizing sadism,
masochism, shame, and hauteur, aggression and passivity as they suit her.
Full of abuses for its readers, the novel fools us for at least the whole middle
section into imagining that it will close with Lucy and Dr. John’s wedding bells. Indeed,
so many of Lucy’s narrative deceits involve Dr. John (most famously she refrains from
telling her reader and Dr. John himself that she knows who he is), and many of her
feelings in the first half of the novel—and her experiments producing feelings in others,
including her readers—are worked through with Dr. John. Dr. John cares for others
professionally, and yet he is distinctly ineffectual as a carer for Lucy. He has no
sympathy, no ability to know how she feels or what might hurt her. He writes to her and
then ignores her, lavishes her with attention when it suits him and then forgets about her
when he falls in love with Paulina (after having used her previously during his infatuation
with Ginevra). Oblivious to her feelings for him, oblivious to anything that doesn’t relate
to himself, he is a care-giver without the capacity for emotional care or support.
In particular, Dr. John lacks depth and insight, making him an inadequate caregiver to those whose wretchedness demands depth and sensitivity. He falls in love first
with the shallow and beautiful Ginevra Fanshawe, and then with the simpler Paulina
Home, whose surname reveals her safe distance from the uncanny. Most damning of all,
he fails to read Lucy and know her feelings toward him, and this shallowness is a feature
of the limits of his care. In a novel of abasement, buried letters, and workaday
wretchedness, Dr. John’s care is inadequate. His shallowness is in some ways most
apparent when he fails to respond deeply to the performance he spontaneously takes Lucy
to. Lucy watches Dr. John watching the play, recognizes keenly that his failures are in the
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shallowness of his feeling, and his resultant inability to respond adequately to needs that
are wild, pained, and untamed:
For what belonged to storm, what was wild and intense, dangerous,
sudden, and flaming, he had no sympathy, and held with it no communion.
When I took time and regained inclination to glance at him, it amused and
enlightened me to discover that he was watching that sinister and
sovereign Vashti, not with wonder, nor worship, nor yet dismay, but
simply with intense curiosity. Her agony did not pain him, her wild
moan—worse than a shriek—did not much move him; her fury revolted
him somewhat, but not to the point of horror. Cool young Briton! The pale
cliffs of his own England do not look down on the tides of the Channel
more calmly than he watched the Pythian inspiration of that night (301).
The fire that comes next, and that leads Dr. John to Paulina, springs not from him, who is
described by Lucy as “impressionable…as dimpling water, but almost, as water,
unimpressible” (300, italics in the original). Dr. John’s failure is his simplicity, his
blindness to the moans and shrieks that surround him, and this sets the limits of his care.
Lucy’s well-known deceit, both to Dr. John and the reader, of keeping her
knowledge of his identity to herself, is just one example of her perverse enjoyment of his
abuse. In the face of not being known by someone who should really have recognized
her, Lucy suffered but also derived satisfaction and gratification. Rather than tell him the
truth when he catches her looking at him intently, “observing the colouring of his hair,
whiskers, complexion” (111), and accuses her, speaking to her for the first time, she puts
her head down and resumes some work she had dropped. The pleasure of keeping herself
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in an abased position to him is also tinged with the pleasure of holding power over him.
He thinks she has been looking at him critically, and her silence and show of humility
only serves to allow him to continue to think that if he wishes. “There is a perverse mood
of the mind which is rather soothed than irritated by misconstruction; and in quarters
where we can never be rightly known, we take pleasure, I think, in being consummately
ignored. What honest man on casually being taken for a housebreaker, does not feel
rather tickled than vexed at the mistake?” (112). Because Dr. John is not susceptible to
being abused by Lucy—he couldn’t care less, really, and you have to care to be a
satisfying object of someone’s abuse—Lucy turns it outward, to her reader. It’s not a
coincidence that Lucy’s biggest, most notorious trick and degradation of her reader is in
relation to Dr. John.
When it becomes clear, if it was ever unclear for any credulous readers, that Dr.
John is not going to be the man to make Lucy an offer of marriage, the novel’s focus
switches abruptly to M. Paul—indeed, the penultimate section ends with a chapter on M.
Paul and the entire final section is dedicated to illuminating the progress of Lucy and M.
Paul’s relationship—and his form of relating is tested, shown to be more complex than it
first seemed, and ultimately turns out to be a more ideal form of relationality for Lucy.
Like Madame Beck, M. Paul is an expert in espionage. His surveillance extends to a
secret room rented across the alley from the school, a perfect perch from which to
observe the students and teachers, especially, Lucy. Unlike Madame Beck, M. Paul’s
characterization never portrays him as an independent, atomistic individual. He is needy
and jealous—his moods depend entirely on his perception of the treatment and esteem he
receives from others, and his surveillance is more a method for gathering as much
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intelligence on how others view him as a method for controlling others in a world
dependent on individualist self-protections. He seems to live entirely for the opinions of
others—he knows himself only by comparing himself to others, and through the esteem
of others. Early in the novel, Lucy’s opinion of him becomes one of the most important
for M. Paul, and her responses to him either give him validation, or they knock him off
his feet and cause him to sulk, or, more often, to rage. At first his obsessive tracking of
her opinion of him seems to derive from a competitive interest and unease. He insists, to
her chagrin, that she is very much like him, and this insistence seems to fuel his anxiety
that he will lose his special place as the most powerful teacher in the pensionnat. As the
narrative progresses, his concern with her opinion of him is more clearly the result of his
growing romantic attachment to her, however conscious.
Lucy’s opinion of M. Paul becomes so important to him that her behavior has the
capacity to change his humor from “a mood which made him as good as a new sunbeam
to the already well-lit first classe” to, a few moments later, exhibiting “the shadow of
some great paroxysm—the swell of wrath, scorn, resolve.” M. Paul has the capacity to
abuse Lucy, as in the time he locks her in the roach-infested attic to learn her lines for a
last-minute performance in Madame Beck’s fete day play. But sometimes his storming,
influenced as it is by Lucy’s power over him, makes him vulnerable to Lucy’s abuse.
Take for instance M. Paul’s fete day, when everyone brings him gifts, stacking them in a
great pyramid on his desk. One by one, everyone makes their offering, including
Mademoiselle Zélie St. Pierre who leaves him an extravagant “bouquet of hot-house
flowers.” When he notices that Lucy hasn’t added to the growing pyramid, “five minutes
might have elapsed, and the hush remained unbroken; ten—and there was no sound.”

98
Lucy knows why he is silent and what he is waiting for—a present from Lucy—and Lucy
has brought something to give him: the watchguard that he saw her making, and which
caused him to fly into a rage because he thought it was for someone else. And yet she sits
on her box with the watchguard, keeping him in suspense. Finally breaking his silence, he
asks several times, “Est-ce là tout?” Still, she keeps silent instead of giving him the
watchguard. She knows just what will anger him and cause him to feel insecure of her
approval or care, and her discovery of this power is significant for her, the withholding of
gratification pleasurable. As M. Paul begins his lesson, Lucy says, “I can't at all
remember what this "discours" was; I did not listen to it: the gulping-down process, the
abrupt dismissal of his mortification or vexation, had given me a sensation which halfcounteracted the ludicrous effect of the reiterated "Est-ce là tout?"” With M. Paul, she has
the opportunity to experiment with her relationality in ways she hadn’t had before. Most
of her scenes of abuse involve withholding, making him wait, delaying his gratification—
his body contorts and responds, while hers is immovable, controlled, and—in her more
modest and stern dress—untouchable.
Madame Beck’s school management is an important model for Lucy, and
Madame Beck herself is an important player in Lucy’s universe of powerplay and
shifting hierarchies of domination. Indeed, Madame Beck functions as a nexus of many
of the critical concepts here, and serves to usefully complicate discussions about ethics of
care, the feelings appropriate to care, and the relationship between liberal individualism
and the relational power dynamics of sadomasochism. Madame Beck is a rugged
individualist who is nevertheless enmeshed in several interlocked communities, and she
provides for Lucy an arena in which she thrives, largely due to Madame Beck’s abuses.
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Though most critical attention to Villette focuses on Lucy Snowe herself, there has
certainly been a great deal of criticism on Madame Beck’s surveillance, and surveillance
in the novel in general.37 I argue that this surveillance is a form of social attention, an
aspect of relationality, and that Foucault’s panopticon is an important site of relational
attention. Though she is described in terms of archetypal liberal individualism, Lucy’s
narrative undermines the very concept of autonomous agency, instead showing Madame
Beck to be an interdependent relational being whose disturbing relationality relies on all
manner of deception and exploitation. Her relationality is, crucially, couched in the
language of liberalism:
Yet, woe be to that man or woman who relied on her [Madame Beck] one
inch beyond the point where it was her interest to be trustworthy: interest
was the master-key of Madame's nature—the mainspring of her motives—
the alpha and omega of her life. I have seen her feelings appealed to, and I
have smiled in half-pity, half-scorn at the appellants. None ever gained her
ear through that channel, or swayed her purpose by that means. On the
contrary, to attempt to touch her heart was the surest way to rouse her
antipathy, and to make of her a secret foe. It proved to her that she had no
heart to be touched: it reminded her where she was impotent and dead.
Never was the distinction between charity and mercy better exemplified
than in her. While devoid of sympathy, she had a sufficiency of rational
benevolence: she would give in the readiest manner to people she had
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never seen—rather, however, to classes than to individuals. "Pour les
pauvres," she opened her purse freely—against the poor man, as a rule,
she kept it closed. In philanthropic schemes for the benefit of society at
large she took a cheerful part; no private sorrow touched her: no force or
mass of suffering concentrated in one heart had power to pierce hers. Not
the agony in Gethsemane, not the death on Calvary, could have wrung
from her eyes one tear (83).
Madame Beck does only what is in her “interest,” a central word in the discourse of
individualism. If that interest aligns with yours, you’re in luck. If not, then don’t expect
any favors. Furthermore, in the tradition of liberal individualism, she privileges the
abstract over the particular. Justice relies on abstract principles: for it to work, the court
of law must prevail over the suasion of particular and sympathetic parties that complicate
principles.
Relatedly, her characterization as a classic liberal individual centers around her
distinct absence of sympathy. Her heart is locked and immune to the influence of others.
If her feelings are appealed to, she recoils. Only if a request is made known to her in
rational, abstract terms can she be motivated to offer aid. She would give charity to “les
pauvres,” the abstract poor, but never to the individual making a specific and personal
claim on her sympathy. Even with her own children, she has no feeling, only a rational
desire that they be healthy, have a good education, and grow up to be functioning adults
and citizens. It is in her interest that her children thrive, but she does not feel for them or
display anything approaching love or even affection. This safety from feeling, and this
outright unembarrassed care for self is, as Lucy observes, immensely impressive, and
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represents a fitness for a greater sphere of influence—a political one, even. Lucy is only
partly facetious when she claims: “That school offered her for her powers too limited a
sphere; she ought to have swayed a nation: she should have been the leader of a turbulent
legislative assembly… In her own single person, she could have comprised the duties of a
first minister and a superintendent of police” (84). The ideal outlet for her individualism,
were she not a woman, would be leadership of the foremost nation of individuals,
themselves striving to achieve higher stations in life.
But the novel is more complex than that, and reveals just how reliant she actually
is on others. First, and most obviously, she is reliant on her pupils and their families for
sustenance. She organizes her pedagogical aims around what will please the students and
the families. She relies on them and panders to them accordingly. She makes leisure a
regular feature of her pupils’ days because more than anything, she needs to keep
everyone happy to keep the engine of her school, and income, running smoothly. She
plans her fete to engage and entertain her pupils and their families. Additionally, her
surveillance, far from typifying her independence and individualism, points to how
reliant she is on her teachers, and how important she feels it is to have information about
them. In a world in which you need others, but in which those others might lie, cheat, or
steal (in Hobbes’s brutish world), it isn’t unreasonable to feel you need to spy on them.
The social contract, even as it focuses on the individualism inherent in human relations—
the opacity of other people and the safety we therefore need for our persons and
property—is founded on the realities of relations: deception, violence, and competition.
Madame Beck’s surveillance reminds us that the social contract is an admission of our
reliance on unreliable others.
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She is also reliant, in more sinister ways, on a few people in particular. Madame
Beck relies on her cousin and employee, M. Paul, for the important role he plays in the
school, as well as for the social role he plays for her, often keeping her company in her
private salon and occupying the role, it turns out, of love interest. Along with Madame
Walvarens and Pere Silas, Madame Beck conspires to keep Lucy Snowe and M. Emanuel
apart. Madame Walvarens and Pere Silas don’t want him to marry because they don’t
want him to find a new outlet for his generosity, off of which they are living. Madame
Beck doesn’t want them to marry because she entertains thoughts of marrying M.
Emanuel herself. At any event, she doesn’t want him to belong to anyone other than her.
Lucy, happening upon this group of co-conspirators in the park one semi-hallucinatory
evening, calls them “the secret junta.”
The fact that Madame Beck’s relationality is disturbing and sinister shouldn’t
blind us to the fact of her social connectedness, her reliance on others, and her particular
social contract with those in her orbit. This disturbing relationality serves Lucy, strangely
enough, particularly when Madame Beck forces Lucy to, without warning, teach a class,
an activity which serves to instill in Lucy a new understanding of her pleasure in abusing
others and obtaining power over them. When Madame Beck invites her to teach a lesson
as a substitute at the last minute, her anger, resentment, irritation, and disgust are
mobilized into classroom management tools and ultimately garner respect and obedience
from her students. Importantly, her pleasure in dominating never becomes domesticated
or safe through her work in the classroom, and her teaching is in no way figured as
therapeutic. Lucy’s feelings persist, but they become productive as well as pleasurable.
By tapping into the variety of roles she is becoming adept at taking on, Lucy enacts a
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performance of abuse. In the moment of struggle, as Schaffer puts it, “Lucy must quickly
develop a new method, and what she develops is acting. She substitutes dramatic visual
tableaus of violence for words” (Lucy, 14).
Madame Beck, plotting to fire her English teacher Mr. Wilson, begins scrutinizing
Lucy, first asking her whether she has teaching experience, which Lucy assures her she
does not, and then watching her anyway, over the course of two weeks, while Lucy is
teaching her children. Finally, Madame Beck comes abruptly to Lucy with the request
that she teach one lesson, “just that the pupils might not have it to say that they had
missed their English lesson” (86). Lucy describes her immediate reaction: “with my usual
base habit of cowardice, I shrank into my sloth like a snail into a shell…If let to myself, I
should infallibly have let this chance slip” (86). Lucy’s apathy, her preference for
inaction now that she has the comfort of a secure job and a place to live, might have
prevented her from taking the opportunity to take on a more challenging and fulfilling job
and improving her status, both socially and economically. “I was capable of sitting
twenty years teaching infants the hornbook, turning silk dresses, and making children’s
frocks” (86). Madame Beck’s insistence, her aggressive and insensitive demand that
Lucy drop her work and come do a “short dictation exercise” (86), changes Lucy’s life, in
part because Lucy learns in this scene to perform aggression, insensitivity, and nastiness
herself. She is crying on her way to the classroom, and when they’ve “reached the carre,
a large square hall between the dwelling-house and the pensionnat” Madame Beck says
“sternly:” “Dites donc…vous sentez vous reellement trop faible?” (“Tell me, you really
think you are that weak?”) (87). This challenge rouses Lucy, who otherwise might have
“gone back to nursery obscurity, and there, perhaps mouldered for the rest of my life; but
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looking up at madame, I saw something that made me think twice ere I decided” (87).
Lucy’s apathy, an affect best maintained in isolation, is challenged when she comes up
against Madame Beck. Her affects don’t become more positive—she doesn’t become
motivated, or excited about the prospect of educating young minds. She doesn’t develop
socially productive feelings to ease her transition into teaching. On the contrary, her fear,
defensiveness, anger, competitiveness, and resentment are mobilized into something
useful. She doesn’t become invested in her care work, she becomes attentive to the ways
she can use the power inherent in the position for her own gratification.
These negative but relational affects continue to serve Lucy when she enters the
classroom full of girls not so much younger than herself, but importantly superior in class
status, who are “rondes, franches, brusques, et tant soit rebelles” (straightforward, frank,
brusque, and a little rebellious) and who have experience “throw[ing] over timid
teachers” (88). True to form, the students attempt to sabotage her, disdaining the idea that
a bonne will teach their class, and also simply enjoying the opportunity to cause trouble
and have fun rather than work in class. Three “titled belles in the first row…opened the
campaign against her…by a series of titterings and whisperings” (89) which spreads
quickly into “a growing revolt of sixty against one” (90). In the face of this insolence and
rebellion, Lucy is anxious, feels inferior to her position, fears her lack of French language
skills, and is disgusted by these students and their behavior. But her growing pleasure in
being both powerless and powerful is called upon in this scene. “All I could now do was
to walk up to Blanche—Mademoiselle de Melcy, a young baronne—the eldest, tallest,
handsomest, and most vicious—stand before her desk, take from under her hand her
exercise-book, remount the estrade, deliberately read the composition, which I found very
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stupid, and, as deliberately, and in the face of the whole school, tear the blotted page in
two.”
This doesn’t quite quell the rebellion, however, and a dark-eyed Catalonian is still
rioting loudly in the back, so Lucy coolly surveys her body structure and facial features,
thinks to herself, “I thought I might manage her,” and marches up to her with an air of
casual carelessness, and then swiftly pushes her into a closet and locks the door. It turns
out nobody likes this girl anyway, and the students are all thrilled to see this action taken
against her. Lucy’s campaign against the students is won, and it is precisely her abuse of
them—through some carefully chosen proxies—that seals her victory. Madame Beck,
who has characteristically been watching through a spy-hole, promotes her from nurserygoverness to English teacher.
Lucy’s long-felt powerlessness is turned around in this scene, as she practices the
performance of power, meting out abuse instead of only receiving it. Her abuse from her
care-work employer, Madame Beck, and from those she is charged to care, gives way to a
charged scene with props—the workbook, the closet—flushed cheeks and beating heart,
and a discovery of her own sadistic pleasure in power. While this scene might not be the
sexiest—though Lucy’s performative, exhibitionist tearing of the blotted page in two is
quite suggestive—it sets the stage for the kinds of power play Lucy learns over the course
of the novel, and suggests how deeply connected it is to her employment as a care
worker.
This short episode, in which Lucy is approached by Madame Beck and then enters
into a kind of battle in the classroom, is a central moment in Lucy’s story. Compared to
Nel Nodding’s description of the centrality of education to care work, it is a shocking
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account. Whereas Noddings focuses on fostering happiness in education, on
responsiveness and modeling, and on holistic approaches to the student rather than on
punitive measures and tests, Lucy’s education-as-care is punitive, violent, and distinctly
unfocused on happiness.38 For the first time in her story, her ugly feelings are central to
her comfort, her self-respect, and her position in society and among her peers.39 The
scene also highlights the usefulness of the ugly feelings of others—Madame Beck’s
aggressive disgust and pushy impatience are central to Lucy’s decision to act and break
out of her apathetic comfort as a bonne. Likewise, the students’ disdain of Lucy’s lower
class position and their nastiness toward her as a substitute teacher inspires in her a
corresponding nastiness. She embarrasses one of the titled belles, producing a rippling of
fear, awe, and probably schadenfreude among the students, who no doubt enjoy a public
shaming of the “eldest, tallest, handsomest, and most vivacious” of the school’s young
nobility. She ambushes another girl, whose imprisonment in a closet probably also
produces a round of schadenfreude among the students—delight at the swift and harsh
punishment of a racially marked girl the students all “dreaded and hated.” Lucy’s actions
as a teacher are hardly calm, sweet, or loving. She does not possess any of the ideal
educator’s qualities—she would not receive any teaching awards in todays’ schools. And
yet, it is her nastiness, anxiety, disdain, frustration, feelings of inferiority, and pent up
anger that propel her to success in this classroom. By mobilizing ugly feelings among her
students, capitalizing on their long-simmering, class- and race-based prejudices, Lucy
38

See Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to
Education, and Happiness and Education.
39
See Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings for the negative affects reflected in and derived from
late capitalism. While it would be anachronistic to apply Ngai’s arguments to the
Victorian period, her book applies most directly to Villette, in which negative feelings get
translated into action most explicitly in depictions of labor.
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asserts her power, makes use of her feelings, and practices ways of tapping into the
abuses that give her pleasure.
Crucially, Lucy’s success, her entrance into a new and more esteemed socioeconomic position, and her battling of her apathy comes not from socially or morally
productive feelings like sympathy, but her ugly, antisocial feelings like resentment,
anger, anxiety, and disdain. Lucy’s resentment of these students, and of Madame Beck’s
power, is crucially not figured in this scene as ressentiment, a passive-aggressive and
non-productive figuration of overly aggressive negative feelings, but as a resentment that
has traction and aids her in her labor. The ugly feelings are not transformed into safe or
domesticated feelings—they retain their dangerous, ugly edge—and the scene in the
classroom is in no way figured as therapeutic. Lucy’s ugly feelings persist, but they
become productive.

“Rather than be a companion, I would have made shirts and starved”
Fundamentally, both sadomasochism and relationality trade on boundarycrossing, welcome and unwelcome. The blurring of personal boundaries is a risk inherent
in care professions, especially when the care worker comes from outside the dependent’s
family, and is at once in need of boundaries and expected to be worker, friend, and quasifamily member. Lucy is keenly aware of this danger and its impact on her professional
choices. Of the standard nineteenth-century employments available for single women,
being a governess (a’la Jane Eyre) or a nurse (a’la Mary Garth) mixes you up in the
family in ways that constrict one’s independence and potentially one’s sense of self, or
dignity. Working in a school, even as governess to the headmistress’s children, provides
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more boundaries: there, her boss is another worker, drawn in many directions, and though
she is notorious for surveillance, her surveillance, in its strange pleasures for Lucy and in
its pervasiveness, is not as personally invasive as is, for example, Mary Garth’s place
with Mr. Featherstone. While there is hardly any personal time or space at a school, there
is at least the freedom of not being in someone else’s private home. This confusion
between personal and professional is evident in Lucy’s description of her first prospect of
employment, with Miss Marchmont: “It seemed that a maid, or rather companion, who
had waited on her for some years, was about to be married; and she, hearing of my
bereaved lot, had sent for me, with the idea that I might supply this person's place” (38-9)
In the off-hand remark, “or rather companion,” Lucy implies that not only is there a vast
difference between being a maid and being a companion, but that the difference is often
elided in reality. Miss Marchmont, however, has the goodness, as an employer, to be
frank about the difficulty of the life she is offering to Lucy, and Lucy, not liking the
sound of the job, turns it down. Having had the opportunity to assert her rights as an
applicant on the job market—to hear the job description, to meet the employer, and to
accept or deny the offer—paves the way for her ultimate acceptance of the job. If she
hadn’t first said no and received respect and approval despite her refusal, she might not
have said yes. Immediately after turning down the job and receiving a sympathetic
response, Miss Marchmont undergoes “a paroxysm of pain.” Lucy tends to her, and
discovers that Miss Marchmont is an impressive and admirable patient. The experience of
tending to her, and of seeing what kind of sufferer she is, allows for a bond to develop.
“… By the time she was relieved, a sort of intimacy was already formed between us [...]
She sent for me the next day; for five or six successive days she claimed my company.
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Closer acquaintance, while it developed both faults and eccentricities, opened, at the
same time, a view of a character I could respect” (39-40). Once Lucy sees what kind of
relationship her position in the house will entail—once she sees that it will be hard work,
that she will be intensely intimate with Miss Marchmont, but that she can respect this
person for whom she will serve as maid as well as companion—she can accept the
position, and the relationality it occasions. She will suffer, but she will suffer for and with
someone whose simultaneous suffering is compelling and suggestive of depth.
Lucy receives another job offer to be a “companion” later in the novel from
Paulina Home, one she refuses. Paulina views Lucy as indispensible, latching onto her
when she is present and summoning her when she is not. She suggests that Lucy leave the
pensionnat and Rue Fossette to live with her and her father. Lucy reports:
Mr. Home himself offered me a handsome sum—thrice my present
salary—if I would accept the office of companion to his daughter. I
declined. I think I should have declined had I been poorer than I was, and
with scantier fund of resource, more stinted narrowness of future prospect.
I had not that vocation. I could teach; I could give lessons; but to be either
a private governess or a companion was unnatural to me. Rather than fill
the former post in any great house, I would deliberately have taken a
housemaid's place, bought a strong pair of gloves, swept bedrooms and
staircases, and cleaned stoves and locks, in peace and independence.
Rather than be a companion, I would have made shirts and starved (345).
Lucy frames the above claim as a general unwillingness and unfitness for private care
work (being a governess or a companion). This is to some extent hyperbolical, an
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extreme response to the particular case of being companion to Paulina. After all, she has
already worked as someone’s companion (Miss Marchmont’s) and as someone’s
governess (for Madame Beck’s children, before being promoted to English teacher). To
say that she would rather “make shirts and starve” is then not entirely true as a general
claim but this passage brings into focus many of the same concerns with caretaking that
were raised when Lucy had the opportunity to work for Miss Marchmont, and that clearly
depict a consistent opinion on both her fitness as an employee in various fields, and on
her needs when it comes to finding work that suits her. Care work, especially in the
cared-for’s home, threatens to reduce freedom, complicate the boundaries between
employee and employer, and, importantly, to isolate the care worker. When working for
Miss Marchmont, Lucy found that these concerns were in check, and that her employer
respected Lucy’s need for boundaries and self-governance (which Lucy established in her
original rejection of the job offer and which Miss Marchmont accepted, however
provisionally) and offered companionship in turn that she enjoyed.
Paulina, a much weaker woman than Mrs. Marchmont, would not have the mental
and emotional resources to give Lucy the boundaries she would need, nor is she someone
who commands Lucy’s respect as Mrs. Marchmont and Madame Beck both do in their
different ways. Paulina follows Lucy around from room to room, literally refusing to give
Lucy space. Many have remarked on Paulina’s last name for the second half of the novel,
“Home,” suggesting not only the uncanny returns in the novel, but also underscoring the
difference between Lucy and Paulina: Paulina has a home, Lucy does not; Paulina would
like Lucy to join her home, Lucy knows it would never become a home. To accept
Paulina’s offer and live in her home would be to give herself up, and accept the needs of
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a person as above her own. Paulina is not self-aware, she is needy, and she doesn’t
recognize, to use George Eliot’s terms, that others have equivalent centers of self. She
does not allow for the fact that Lucy has her own feelings and history, never probing into
Lucy’s life or even recognizing that there is one. Most notably, she is oblivious to the fact
that both women are romantically interested in the same man. Lucy is keenly aware, of
course. Some of Lucy’s extreme language in the passage quoted above comes, no doubt,
from this awareness. It is one thing to watch Dr. John and Paulina fall in love, and even
to counsel both Dr. John and Paulina in their courtship, but it would be another thing
altogether to work for her, to be her employed companion. Lucy is not willing to be a
caretaker under those circumstances. She would rather buy “a strong pair of gloves,
[sweep] bedrooms and staircases, and [clean] stoves and locks,” and “make shirts and
starve” than work for Paulina.
Lucy’s response to Paulina’s job offer is, in my reading, not a proof of her
atomistic independence, but rather, proof of the challenge she faces integrating the desire
to be independent with the reliance she has on others, for community and even emotional
sustenance. When she says she would rather do all kinds of difficult forms of labor than
be in Paulina’s employment as companion, she is not asserting her independence from
others so much as expressing an exasperating need for others, for employment and
survival, as well as an emotional reliance on others through which she can thrill to the
disappointments, pleasures, and pains that excite her. In ensuring boundaries and refusing
certain kinds of work, Lucy is not engineering happiness or healthy sociality for herself.
On the contrary, she is identifying the kinds of abuses she is interested in, and refusing
the kinds that would require her to numbly serve those she doesn’t respect. As Schaffer
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says, “Lucy’s ‘pleasure’ derives, perversely, from controlling her own degradation”
(Lucy, 22).
When Lucy is able to derive enjoyment out of the degradations of care, she
thrives. But with Paulina, there is no interrelational frisson, no enjoyment in submission,
and with the “poor deformed and imbecile pupil, a sort of cretin” entrusted to her during
the long vacation, there is even less. The cretin does not have the powers of mind
necessary to either command respect, as Mrs. Marchmont did, or provide pleasure, as
abusing and being abused by Ginevra does. The cretin is just a body whose needs,
including even the most private needs, must be attended to. “I did my best to feed her
well and keep her warm, and she only asked for food and sunshine, or when that lacked,
fire. Her weak faculties approved of inertion…it was more like being prisoned with some
strange tameless animal, than associating with a human being” (180). Lucy suffers deeply
in this period of care; her suffering leads to her illness, the revelation of one of her
biggest narrative tricks, and her reunion with the Brettons. But it’s worth noting that in
this period of near-complete isolation, during which time she is responsible for even the
“personal attentions to be rendered which required the nerve of a hospital nurse” (180),
Lucy does contrive a thrilling interpersonal relationship of a sort. Lucy imagines herself
to be subservient to the ultimate dominator: God. “How I used to pray to Heaven for
consolation and support! With what dread force the conviction would grasp me that Fate
was my permanent foe, never to be conciliated. I did not, in my heart, arraign the mercy
or justice of God for this; I concluded it to be a part of His great plan that some must
deeply suffer while they live, and I thrilled in the certainty that of this number, I was one”
(180). There’s a joy, a thrill, to this kind of self-pity, and to this kind of abasement before
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a master. Lucy’s relationship with God gives her what the cretin cannot: the
interrelational tensions and thrills she craves and feeds on.
Lucy’s employment, and her behaviors and feelings while in those difficult roles
of subservience, have caused critics to read her as an individual aiming for greater
isolation and as existing in a liberal world of individualism, surveillance, and personal
interest and advancement. I read these feelings and behaviors differently: as a source of
both pleasure and pain, and as a relational style Lucy cultivates. Amanda Anderson, in
Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment (2001), writes
that Villette “self-consciously takes up questions of detachment in its foregrounding
different modes of observation, alienation, and cultivated emotional distance” (46).
Crucially, though, Lucy cultivates closeness, connection, and community. If Villette were
just a novel about alienation and cultivated distance, it would not be nearly as strange a
novel as it is. It is precisely in its confusing mixture of distance and closeness, narrative
clarity and obscurity, emotional intensity and vagueness that the novel achieves bizarre
and appealing shape. Anderson acknowledges this. She claims that “In a sense the novel
is an extended record of Lucy’s refusal of the limited and sometimes even damaging
forms of detachment that manifest themselves around her, even as she aims, with uneven
results, to claim a detachment she can call her own” (47). But what Anderson calls
“damaging forms of detachment,” I call the kinds of relations that Lucy cultivates.

“I played it with relish”: Sadomasochism as Performance
The care relations that Lucy relishes are ones that allow her to perform her own
degradation, to control her abasement or to abase others in a controlled role play.
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Throughout the novel, Lucy discovers and develops her ability to perform, and act out.
While Lucy’s performance in the classroom, discussed above, is one of her finest, it’s not
her only performance in the novel. Lucy’s more straightforward acting on Madame
Beck’s fete day serves to underscore how broadly acting figures not just on the stage but
in every day life. I have argued in this dissertation that while Mr. Knightley, in Emma, is
often read as the very archetype of authenticity, Austen shows that he is actually always
playing a role: that of the new figure of the English gentleman. In Villette, however,
Brontë envisions a world in which it is possible to be wholly authentic, but in which
authenticity means not Knightley-like good manners, but rather a lack of self-control, a
nasty lack of filter, emotional frailty, and a mercurial temperament. The only person in
the novel who embodies this Brontëan authenticity is M. Paul. To M. Paul, life is a
drama, but he is not acting. When he asks Lucy to perform in the vaudeville, he says,
“Listen! The case shall be stated, and you shall then answer me Yes or No; and according
to your answer I shall ever after estimate you” (153). He is not in control of his
performance of the role of drama queen.
Lucy, however, is eminently in control of her roles, and when she is asked to play
the foppish lover competing with a steadfast man for the love of the coquette, played by
Ginevra, she masters the role to the point where she is even able to improv, deepening the
role into several performances at once. While practicing, locked in the attic and sitting
atop a trunk and a box stacked high enough to keep her from the rats, cockroaches, and
beetles, Lucy begins finding her way into the role. “Entering into its emptiness, frivolity,
and falsehood, with a spirit inspired by scorn and impatience, I took my revenge on this
‘fat’, by making him as fatuitous as I possibly could” (155). She masters the role by
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mobilizing her “scorn and impatience.” Once again, Lucy finds use for her anti-social
feelings.
When Lucy is actually on the stage, performing in front of the whole school, the
visiting parents, and the assortment of permitted “jeune hommes,” she finds even more
feelings to mobilize: curiosity at Ginevra’s “acting at some one” (161, italics in the
original), jealousy of her attentions, jealousy at the sense that she was acting at Dr. John,
defensiveness for Dr. John at the budding realization that he is the “sincere lover” that
Ginevra was acting indifference to, jealousy at the idea that Dr. John loves Ginevra, and
emboldened wickedness at her ability to act the play so well that she can manipulate the
character to help her uncover what Ginevra is up to. M. Paul says, between the acts, that
“he knew not what possessed us” (161) but the readers can recognize this ability of
Lucy’s to read a situation, see more than everyone else can see, and perform accordingly.
Her insight into Ginevra’s double-meanings while acting and her reciprocal performance
are just like her insight into Dr. John’s identity and her performance of silence in
response, or like her insight into M. Paul’s sensitive, artless authenticity and her
subsequent sadomasochistic power-playing.
What has emerged in this discussion is a response to care work that relishes the
power discrepancies because they produce a frisson of abuse and pleasure. However,
you’ll have noticed that these are not scenes that involve consent; M. Paul does not
consent to the role he is reduced to by Lucy’s slow, drawn out, sexual withholding, as in
the watchguard scene. Lucy’s students don’t consent to being made examples of, to
having their articles torn, or to being locked in closets for Lucy’s excitement. So Lucy’s
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access to sadism and masochism is, while deeply social and collaborative, also essentially
masturbatory.
The scene of sadism or masochism is a scene by definition: it necessitates a miseen-scene, multiple characters, often props: and it involves role play and performance.
And yet, Lucy’s chosen partner for sadomasochistic gratification—M. Paul—is uniquely
unqualified for these scenes, in part because he is completely and utterly authentic,
unable to perform a role, unable to control his angry abuses or his cowed flagellations.
Lucy, on the contrary, is a masterful performer as we learn when she performs the role on
Madame Beck’s fete day of the foppish lover competing with a steadfast man for the love
of the coquette, played by Ginevra. She masters the role to the point where she is even
able to improv, deepening the role into several performances at once, and playing a
sexual game with Ginevra in order to understand who her lovers are, and to perform her
multiple attractions to Dr. John and Ginevra.
Brontë’s final gift to her readers in her final novel is a final chapter that lends
itself to endless fascination and interpretation. Many read M. Paul’s death as a reinstantiation of Lucy’s loneliness and isolation, as a state of affairs perhaps in some
unacknowledged way preferable for her than his return would have been. With him dead
at sea, she can retain her independence doubly—as mistress of her own school, and as
mistress of her own self, without a husband to limit her freedom. M. Paul gave her
freedom by giving her a school, but he engaged her to be his wife. With his death, critics
have suggested that the novel redemptively ends with her hard-earned, long-desired
freedom. It won’t be a surprise that I read the ending differently. Maybe M. Paul’s death
is necessitated by Lucy’s having outgrown him. He was an essential player in her sexual
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development, but his inability to perform limits his potential for her. We can only hope
that in Lucy’s new school, she finds someone—another teacher, a pupil’s parent, someone
in Paulina and Dr. John’s circle—who can match her perversions and take part in her
scenes.
M. Paul’s obsessive tracking of others’ opinions of him, his surveillance, his
desperate desire to know where he stands in others’ esteem, especially Lucy’s, and his
symbiotic sadomasochism, whereby he is the perpetrator and recipient of pain, actually
results in an ability to relate to Lucy better than anyone else has. He recognizes that she
doesn’t want isolation: she wants a relationship in which she is not a dependent, in which
she dispenses and receives pain, and in which she recognizes the agony of life in her most
precious, real relations. She desires relations in which her dependence on others is
balanced against an ability to freely play out her emotional range: relations in which she
can receive and dispense pain, watch and be watched, control and be controlled. If M.
Paul’s parting gift to Lucy is a school, we can think of this as the seed of a community as
full and complex as Madame Beck’s school community. What Lucy will do with this
community, what range she will allow for her feelings, and what partners for
experimentation she’ll find, is the mystery the novel leaves us with.

118
FOREBODING AS CRITICAL READING PRACTICE:
OR, READER, YOU WERE RIGHT
ABOUT WILKIE COLLINS’S THE WOMAN IN WHITE
“I have a bad feeling about this.”
—Star Wars, Indiana Jones, etc.
“Epistemology will demonstrate that we
cannot know, cannot be certain of, the
future; but we don’t believe it. We
anticipate, and so we are always wrong.”
—Stanley Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love:
A Reading of King Lear,” 322

We’ve seen that in Austen and Brontë’s novels, authenticity and affect are
performative, historical, and contextual. Further, we’ve seen that negative affects are not
only natural responses to structurally determined expectations, but they also crucially
make things happen and produce pleasure. For Austen, authenticity is seen to be
performative, and inhabiting characters is pleasurable, even when it’s mischievous or
outright wrong. For Brontë, the problem of other minds is especially dangerous for the
disenfranchised, including those employed in care relations. But as Lucy Snowe
discovers, the negative feelings that emerge out of the treacherous power dynamics of
care relations can be productive of pleasure and expand the boundaries of care itself. In
this chapter, I turn to sensation fiction, the nineteenth-century genre most overtly
concerned with questions of affect (sensations drive plots and reading experiences alike),
authenticity (are characters who they say they are?), and ways of knowing (with law,
intuition, and communal knowledge competing for authority). Though the affective
dimensions of sensation fiction are often described in terms of anxiety, I will attend in
this chapter to a feeling related to but different from anxiety: foreboding, or the feeling
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you have when you’re right about the dangers or disappointments at hand. My attention
to foreboding importantly attends to instances when we do know others, and links that
knowledge to feelings of foreboding. In so doing, foreboding reveals ways in which
feelings, in relying on patterns and contextual information, participate in knowledgemaking. But foreboding might do a better job at this than other feelings, like, for
example, anxiety broadly understood or fear. As Martha Nussbaum argues in The New
Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age (2012), fear
and anxiety are self-directed, narcissistic feelings, and rely on the relationship between
external patterns (i.e., incidents of terrorism) and internally motivated precautions (i.e.,
fear for personal safety). Thus, those impacted by fear might potentially disregard facts
such as that most incidents of terror in the United States are inflicted not by Muslim
extremists but by White Christians, and might, as a result, wind up protesting against the
opening of a Muslim cultural center near the World Trade Center site in New York.
Foreboding, by contrast, opens up conversations about fears that are rooted in reality and
thus, about what kinds of action are appropriate in relation to this knowledge-based
feeling structurally organized around observed patterns. For example, it is foreboding, not
anxiety, to observe that a pattern of refusals to name terrorism committed by White
Americans as such will have damaging and lasting global impacts.
This chapter on sensation fiction thus turns to the genre’s ur-text, Wilkie Collins’s
The Woman in White, to examine the ways that it distinguishes between foreboding and
anxiety, and relates the former to discourses of authenticity and knowledge. Most critics
have described this novel as a pressure cooker of anxiety, both for characters and readers.
Our bodies and feelings, and those of the central characters, are continually ravaged by
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anxiety-provoking twists and turns, horrors, and dangers. And yet, I argue in this chapter
that it is worthwhile to consider the differences between anxiety—a generalized feeling
that hovers above and exists irrespective of reality—and foreboding—a more specific
feeling that rests on foretelling actual danger and holding complex patterns of behaviors
against a sense of vulnerability. By differentiating between anxiety and foreboding, I
show that the novel is concerned with what it means when fear is authenticated by reality,
with what knowledge and authenticity have to do with feelings associated with danger,
and with the degree to which feelings and thoughts are overlapped, joint processes.40 The
foreboding that courses through the novel is so well founded in fact precisely because it
is not just Fosco whose inauthenticity is dangerous and disturbing, but it is also,
disturbingly, Hartright. When inauthenticity is so pervasive, when it touches the obvious
villain as well as the supposed hero, suspicion is the only reasonable response, and
foreboding the dominant, evidence-based, useful feeling.
The Woman in White is a gripping novel in part because of all the suspicious acts
and behaviors dominating the plot, including drugging, spying, confining, and falsifying.
What’s so gripping has been spoken of as the production of constant ripples of anxiety,
dosed as on a drip to both characters in and readers of the novel. As D.A. Miller points
out in “Cage Aux Folles: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White”
(1986), “No reader can identify with unruffled characters like Gilmore or Mrs.
Michelson, even when they narrate parts of the story, because every reader is by
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For the relationship between knowledge and the domestication of the seemingly
naturally English detective figure, see Caroline Reitz’s Detecting the Nation. In her
account, the detective’s authority stems importantly from knowledge, not violence. The
use of knowledge in her history informs my focus on knowledge as a component
distinguishing anxiety and foreboding.
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definition committed to a hermeneutic project that neither of these characters finds
necessary or desirable. Instead we identify with nerve-wracked figures…” (110). The
sources and implications of the anxiety have been debated hotly41, but whether anxiety is
the best way to describe what’s happening has not. There is a difference between, for
example, anxiety that reflects reality by showing conditions in which actual events are
distorted, for good reason, beyond recognition, and anxiety that reflects reality by
anticipating and diagnosing it accurately. That is not to say that anxiety that distorts
reality is less real, it’s just that this novel registers that it’s different, and this novel is
concerned with exact correspondence. In other words, Hartright and Marian aren’t
anxious cases, they’re anxious about how corrupt things really are. They are anxious,
fearful, terrorized by actual, artful corruption and manipulation. What they experience is
foreboding—true anticipation of what is to come. Further, readers who rightly doubt
Hartright and Marian, likewise feel foreboding, and they should.
Unlike Collins’s Moonstone, for example, in which there are numerous red
herrings, such as Roseanna Spearman’s suspicious suicide suggestive of guilt, there are
no red herrings in The Woman in White. Every suspicion we have turns out to be
justified: Jane Catherick’s letter recommending Glyde and explaining their justification
for putting her daughter in an insane asylum is just as suspicious a document as we
suspected; Fosco’s power over Glyde and domination over his domesticated wife is just
as sinister and bodes just as badly as we supposed; the people we supposed to be guilty
41

Rachel Ablow, in “Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Masculinity in The
Woman in White” gives a useful rundown of what critics have ascribed the novel’s
anxiety to: gender (Pykett, D.A. Miller, Trodd, Williams), class boundaries breaking
down (Loesberg, Thomas), urbanization and depressive capitalism (Cvetkovich), sanity
vs. insanity boundary instability (Kurata, Leavey, Taylor, Shuttleworth), feminization of
writing and male writerly identity (Schmitt).
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parties are just as guilty as we feared. All this suggests that it’s not anxiety that drives
readerly pleasure, but on the contrary, it’s narrative confirmation. Identifying with, as
Miller put it, “the nerve-wracked” also means, significantly, reaping the same pleasures
upon being justified. Adjusting our terminology, therefore, from anxiety to foreboding,
makes available certain discussions about the authenticity of feelings, the authentication
of feelings based on their source, and the appropriateness of certain feelings to their
circumstances. Reading The Woman in White as a story of foreboding opens up the
possibility to identify circumstances when suspicious reading is justified, in both our
lives and reading practices.
This pervasive suspicion is, of course, the bread and butter of our nineteenthcentury critical inheritance: from the Panopticon, to the police, to the neighborly policing
that obviates the need for the police, arguments about totalizing suspicion are nothing
new.42 This is especially the case in sensation fiction. As Andrew Mangham writes in his
Introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Sensation Fiction (2013), “There is
something about the sensation novel’s methodological skepticism (or, in plainer words,
its unwillingness to leave anything undoubted and unquestioned) that led to a powerful
ability to question fixed traditions and ideologies in complex and radical ways” (3). What
I show, however, is first, that there’s a difference between suspicion as a matter-of-course
behavior, and suspicion when used for particular cases based on particular information
and pattern-recognition. Second, suspicion in the form of foreboding can be thrilling. The
feedback loop of authenticating one’s foreboding is warranted and pleasurable in this
novel.
42

See, for example, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, and D.A. Miller’s Novel and the
Police.
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This novel’s insistence on the justification of fear, on the actual dangers posed to
bodies, and on the difference between anxiety and foreboding prompts me to rethink
contemporary criticism on surface and depth reading practices. When it comes to Fosco,
suspicion turns out to be just, depth turns out to be surface, and care, in particular, turns
out to be as misapplied as it seems. There are scant red herrings, false assumptions, or
wrong turns. When it comes to Hartright, a lack of suspicion and a trust in the power of
love and sympathy are misapplied—surface reading is a mistake.43 What are the critical
implications of reading this novel in the terms of the surface and depth debate? What
kind of society is being imagined here, and what are the implications for a readership
encouraged to be suspicious, on the grounds that suspicion is always grounded? I show in
this chapter that, crucially, foreboding opens up a space for actionable suspicion.
However, as is the case with reading, which necessarily ends, foreboding, too, can’t be an
eternal condition. Precisely because foreboding involves accurately discovering, for
example, danger, it necessarily can’t always be useful. It is grounded on reality, and so
must be continually dictated by the evidence available. Because foreboding is externally
motivated, it is temporary, and different from, for example, paranoia or anxiety.
Upon reuniting with Marian and the presumed-dead Laura and hearing their
stories, Hartright seeks a consultation with Mr. Kyrle to convince him of the truth of
Laura’s survival and to determine a strategy for demanding justice. Kyrle listens with a
“calmly attentive face,” and responds with a claim about English practices of credulity
that bear striking resemblance to contemporary conversations about surface and depth
reading practices.
43

See Ablow for a challenge to the notion that Hartright’s ability to identify Laura’s true
identity stems from sympathy and love.
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Let me tell you the result of my experience on that point. When an English
jury has to choose between a plain fact, on the surface, and a long
explanation under the surface, it always takes the fact, in preference to the
explanation. For example, if Lady Glyde (I call the lady you represent by
that name for argument’s sake) declares she has slept at a certain house,
and it is proved that she has not slept at that house. You explain this
circumstance by entering into the state of her mind, and deducing from it a
metaphysical conclusion. I don’t say the conclusion is wrong—I can only
say that the jury will take the fact of her contradicting herself, in
preference to any reason for the contradiction that you can offer…In short,
there is no case, Mr. Hartright—there is really no case” (452).
Kyrle claims that surface reading just makes sense, and that the straight-forward, plainsense Englishman will naturally tend toward a surface interpretation of events.
Hartright’s challenge in this novel, and it’s a steep uphill battle, is to prove to plaindealing, surface-trusting Englishmen that in this case, the surface is the suspicious, that
the basic facts about the case are precisely the ones that sound most outrageous and
unbelievable.
Kyrle and Hartright’s conversation resembles debates in contemporary critical
discourse on the degree to which we should be in the practice of looking to reveal what’s
underneath the surface, whether suspicion is a legitimate critical posture to assume as a
matter of course, and whether we are treating texts fairly. In “Has Critique Run Out of
Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern” (2004), Bruno Latour asked: “While
we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of
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objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible
facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices?” (227). Rita Felski, in After Suspicion
(2009), wrote that “the animating spirit of our inquiry is the conviction that appearances
deceive and that texts do not willingly surrender their secrets. Instead of being
emblazoned in the words on the page, meaning lies beneath or to the side of these words,
encrypted in what the literary work cannot or will not say, in its eloquent stuttering and
recalcitrant silences…The hermeneutics of suspicion promotes a sensibility that prides
itself on its uncompromising wariness and hypervigilance” 28-29). Sharon Marcus and
Stephen Best, in their introduction to an issue of Representations (2009), propose to
“broaden the scope of critique” by exploring the affordances of “surface reading:” “We
were trained in symptomatic reading, became attached to the power it gave to the act of
interpreting, and find it hard to let go of the belief that texts and their readers have an
unconscious” (1). Eve Sedgwick, whose Epistemology of the Closet inaugurated Queer
Studies and was therefore a touchstone of the kind of symptomatic or suspicious reading
that Latour, Felski, Best and Marcus argued against, proved ever flexible and
intellectually exploratory, introducing the idea of “reparative reading” as early as 2003.
By way of opening “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid,
You Probably Think This Essay is About You,” Sedgwick describes a conversation she
has with her friend, activist scholar Cindy Patton, about the history of the AIDS
epidemic. Patton tells her, “Any of the early steps in its spread could have been either
accidental or deliberate … but I just have trouble getting interested in that” (123).
Sedgwick sees in Patton’s words a potential response to critique generally: “it suggests
the possibility of unpacking, of disentangling from their impacted and overdetermined
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and historical relations to each other some of the separate elements of the intellectual
baggage that many of us carry around under a label such as ‘the hermeneutics of
suspicion’” (124). Instead of asking “Is a particular piece of knowledge true, and how can
we know?” Sedgwick suggests that we might instead ask “What does knowledge do—the
pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the receiving again of knowledge of what one
already knows? How, in short, is knowledge performative, and how best does one move
among its causes and effects?” (124). Rather than fetishize knowledge itself, Sedgwick
proposes that we look at how knowledge is performed, affords power, and produces
effects. I propose that foreboding is, therefore, a form of reparative reading. It asks what
knowledge can do, and in its pattern-seeking, it avoids the constants of paranoia or
anxiety.
In this novel, and the Victorian period, there is much to be suspicious about, and
indeed, sensation fiction has been a natural home for suspicious and historicist
scholarship. Andrew Mangham argues that sensation fiction’s “queering of
characters…exposed tensions and injustices at the heart of Victorian idealism” (3), that
“the sensation format’s knack of questioning and probing beneath surfaces leads to
important representations of class, race, and gender” (4), and that “the form’s obsession
with masquerade and questions of identity disrupts the narrative in a way that raises
questions about what is considered to be ‘normal,’ and how we recognize it” (4). Pamela
K. Gilbert argues, in A Companion to Sensation Fiction (2011), that sensation fiction,
because of how deeply embedded radical revision was into its publication culture,
challenges our “now traditional commitment to close reading” (3). Because the serial
would often be a very different text than the three-volume edition, which might in turn be
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different from the next edition, sensation fiction challenges us to read contextually and
historically, a mode we should take beyond the problematic walls of the sensation genre.
“Studying popular fiction, because of its focus on immediacy and the site of
consumption, has highlighted a broader problem in studying Victorian literature that few
scholars have carefully considered in reading Eliot or Tennyson, though they probably
should: readings that hinge on particular words in a particular context are likely to be
called into question once situated in the broader context of the non-linear, mutating,
increasingly rhizomatic structure of Victorian literary, publishing, and consumer culture”
(4).
Perhaps even more fundamentally than that, however, is the centrality of secrecy,
suspicion, authenticity, and identity to the genre of sensation fiction. In The Serious
Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian Realism and Narrative Doubt (2003), Caroline Levine
argues that nineteenth-century novels across genres—from realism to suspense and gothic
plots, and from high to low—train readers to suspend judgment and remain in suspense.
Sensation fiction does this especially well, she argues, using Collins’s The Moonstone as
an example. Against D.A. Miller’s claim that, as Levine puts it, “very little is actually
mysterious in the novel” (47), she shows that the scientific experiment at the heart of the
novel’s resolution demands that readers and characters suspend their judgment. “The
delay of the experiment compels us to admit that our beliefs—however much we are
attached to them—do not necessarily correspond to the facts of the world” (50). We all
have to hold our breaths and see what the experiment yields. This withholding of
judgment, I argue, yields maximum pleasure in The Woman in White because our
hypotheses are ultimately proven right.
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Patrick Brantlinger has argued that “in place of the empiricist realism that strives
to be objective, direct mimesis, the sensation novel seems to substitute a different
measure of reality, based on primal scene psychology, that now reads objective
appearances as question marks or clues to mysteries and insists that the truth has been
hidden, buried, smuggled away behind appearances” (26). That is to say that whereas
realism relies on access to an objectively real world, sensation fiction belies mimesis’s
power by showing how much is hidden from view and unknowable. The Woman in White
complicates this dichotomy by showing that mimesis must accommodate the conflation
of the obvious and visible with the hidden and unexpected.
Turning my attention to foreboding, then, allows me to make several interventions
at once: it collapses surface and depth, deals in both interiority as well as external reality,
and attends to the validity of feelings precisely because they have the power to do this
collapsing work, precisely because they move between surface and depth, interior and
exterior. Much of affect theory has taken as a central concern what affects do, and what,
in particular, they do politically. Ann Cvetkovich, writing about feelings in relation to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wonders “what makes it possible for people to vote for
Bush or to assent to war, and how do these political decisions operate within the context
of daily lives that are pervaded by a combination of anxiety and numbness? How can we,
as intellectuals and activists, acknowledge our own political disappointments and failures
in a way that can be enabling? Where might hope be possible?” (1). Cvetkovich clarifies
that hope is not meant to function redemptive or pastorally, but rather, “the goal is to
depathologize negative feelings so that they can be seen as a possible resource for
political action rather than as its antithesis” (2). Her book, Depression: A Public Feeling
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(2012), maps the function and potential of depression on lived experience of
contemporary political, personal, national life. Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings looks at the
role of negative emotions in political disaffection, and speculates on the “politically
ambiguous work” (1) of more minor feelings less associated with “the classical political
passions (5). Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, in their introduction to The Affect
Theory Reader (2010), write that hard as it is to pin down and define affect, it is
undeniably a force, something “that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward
thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely
registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the
world’s apparent intractability” (1).
When I started writing this chapter, it was the summer of 2016 and Hillary
Clinton’s election to the Presidency of the United States seemed imminent. I returned to
the chapter for a round of edits in late-November 2016, while we are instead processing
the fact of a Donald Trump Presidency. As a nation, we have been relying on affect
theory more than in recent memory to make sense of what has happened. Every day, the
news media and my peers alike have been asking the same questions: What does anger do
that other feelings can’t, and how can we keep it going? What is the place of hope, if
any? What are the differences between public and private depression? What affects are
some Americans—white Americans, white female Americans—structurally enabled to
inhabit, that others are foreclosed from for reasons that are directly racial, historical, and
structural? Who can cry in public, who can show resentment in public, who can smile in
public? What does the question, “How’re you feeling?” mean in times like these?
Alongside all these questions, I’ve also been turning again, with renewed urgency, to my
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distinction between anxiety and foreboding. What was the role of foreboding in these past
few months running up to the election? Who had it, and what difference would it have
made if more of us had had it? What action does foreboding enable that anxiety, its
closest sibling, forecloses? Critical attention to foreboding seems more important than
ever, as we look ahead to the known unknown of racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and to
attacks on the very institutions that enable the free flow of information, information we
rely on to accurately forebode. Further, when our nation’s president mocks emotion as
hysterical, or faked for show, it serves us to think about the forms emotion takes, to
clarify the ways that emotion and knowledge work together, and make things happen.

Performances of Authenticity: Just Reading Under the Surface
In this novel of foreboding, the tension derives from the conflict between truth,
critique, and investigation on the one hand, and artfulness, deceit, and performance on the
other. Characters masquerade as authentic, and obtain control through that deception.
Being found out, interrogated, or critiqued would reveal inauthenticity, and damage or
dismantle power and control. In this strange circus act of a novel, there are two
competing ringmasters, both of whom perform authenticity and obtain control from that
performance: the obese light-footed man and the aspirational drawing master. Together,
they control the actions and narratives of the manly woman, the identical women, and the
man so full of hot air he goes up in flames. Fosco’s performance is marked by a
flamboyance so extreme, it appears the very stuff of authenticity. Hartright, meanwhile,
plays a middle-class Knightley—upright, strong, not at all flamboyant—but unlike
Knightley, his performance is not just of respectable gentleman, but also of reliable
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editor, calling things as he wants them, and stitching together a narrative that has no
checks or balances while masquerading as courtroom truth.44 In addition to performing,
Fosco and Hartright both direct performances: Fosco with manipulation and chemistry,
Hartright with editorial control and the coaching of Laura’s post-asylum and identity theft
performance.
Fosco is able to control everything, even his shocking, “odious corpulence” (220).
In fact, Fosco’s threat derives from the control he exercises over his performance of
complete authenticity, such that he passes as a unique oddball who can’t help being the
way he is. He charismatically presents as so “extraordinary” and with such a “marked
peculiarity” (221) that it seems he couldn’t possibly be purposefully performing his
idiosyncrasy. He cultivates a persona, with his “cockatoo, two canary birds, and a whole
family of white mice,” his extravagantly chivalrous relations with his wife, and his
ostentatious outfits, such as his “broad straw hat…with a violet colored ribbon round it”
paired with a “blue blouse, with profuse white fancy-work over the bosom…with a broad
fancy belt” over “nankeen trousers, displaying more white fancy-work over the ankles,
and purple morocco slippers” (230). Unlike Knightley’s performance of authenticity,
where his performance becomes so tied to authenticity that the performance becomes
invisible, Fosco’s supposed authenticity derives from his deeply performative, glaring,
strange flamboyance. Fosco is authentically a performative counterfeit.
Fosco doesn’t trick Laura who dislikes him right away. She reads beneath the
surface of his flamboyance, suspicious of his over-the-top chivalry, whether with herself
44

See Rachel Ablow’s “Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Mascuinity in ‘The
Woman in White’” and Ayelet Ben-Yishai’s chapter on The Woman in White in Common
Precedents: The Presentness of the Past in Victorian Law and Fiction.
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or with her husband. Fosco charms Marian against her better judgment, but the charm
doesn’t last long, as she learns to be suspicious, and to read into his surface. One thing
Marian wonders early in the novel, for example, is how he achieved such mastery over
his wife. Marian writes in her journal:
As Eleanor Fairlie (aged seven-and-thirty), she was always talking
pretentious nonsense, and always worrying the unfortunate men with
every small exaction which a vain and foolish woman can impose on longsuffering male humanity. As Madame Fosco (aged three-and-forty), she
sits for hours together without saying a word, frozen up in the strangest
manner in herself…On the few occasions when her cold blue eyes are off
her work, they are generally turned on her husband, with the look of mute
submissive inquiry which we are all familiar with in the eyes of a faithful
dog…. How far she is really reformed or deteriorated in her secret self, is
another question…. And is the magician who has wrought this wonderful
transformation—the foreign husband who has tamed this once wayward
Englishwoman till her own relations hardly know her again—the Count
himself? This in two words: He looks like a man who could tame
anything. (218-219).
Marian considers multiple interpretations here. She notes that Madame Fosco has become
stupefied, and lives in fear. Perhaps this is because he is a terrifying person, nowhere near
as chivalric when they are behind closed doors. Perhaps his charisma is a form of magic.
Perhaps the magic is money: Fosco has inspired her to silence and collaboration by
inducting her into the rites of his conspiracy to reclaim money. Or perhaps the description
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of Fosco as a “magician” sarcastically refers to the magic of chemistry—this is perhaps
reading too suspiciously, but perhaps Marian is speculating that Fosco controls his wife
through the magic of sedatives, easy to do with the bon-bons he is forever feeding her. In
any event, Fosco’s charisma and persona is compelling and dangerous precisely because
of his masterful performance of authenticity.
One of Fosco’s most effective disguises is flattery: many of his tricks rely on
fawning performances, often to the domestic workers he or Glyde employ. Fosco’s cook
in St. John’s Wood, Hester Pinhorn, reports in her narrative, solicited by Hartright, that
“he [Fosco] was not a bad master: he had a monstrous civil tongue of his own; and a
jolly, easy, coaxing way with him. I liked him a deal better than my mistress” (410). Mrs.
Michelson, the housekeeper at Blackwater Park, has far greater exposure and is far more
effusive in her approval of his “moral character” (369). In a climactic period in the plot at
Blackwater Park, after Fosco catches Laura in contact with Anne Catherick, Fanny,
Laura’s maid, is abruptly fired and Laura locked in her room, Marian writes letters to the
family lawyer’s partner, Mr. Kyrle, and to their uncle, Mr. Fairlie. These letters are to be
brought to their recipients by the recently dismissed Fanny. As Marian slips out of the
house to deliver the letters to Fanny, she checks to see where Fosco is and finds an
unexpected scene. “[I] saw, to my surprise, that he [Fosco] was exhibiting the docility of
the birds, in his most engagingly polite manner, to the housekeeper. He must have
specially invited her to see them—for she would never have thought of going into the
library of her own accord. The man’s slightest actions had a purpose of some kind at the
bottom of every one of them. What could be his purpose here?” (314). In her testimony of
the time of Marian’s illness and Laura’s departure from Blackwater Park, Mrs. Michelson
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mentions this episode in the context of her admiration of Fosco’s kindness: “He had the
manners of a true nobleman—he was considerate towards every one. Even the young
person (Fanny by name) who attended on Lady Glyde was not beneath his notice. When
she was sent away by Sir Percival, his lordship (showing me his sweet little birds at the
time) was most kindly anxious to know what had become of her, where she was to go the
day she left Blackwater Park, and so on. It is in such little delicate attentions that the
advantages of aristocratic birth always show themselves. I make no apology for
introducing these particulars—they are brought forward in justice to his lordship, whose
character, I have reason to know, is viewed rather harshly in certain quarters” (367).
Fosco, of course, is pumping Mrs. Michelson for information about Fanny, sure that she
will be delivering letters on behalf of Marian and Laura. His masterful performance of
kindness and flattery enables his deceptions and maneuvers, and he finds easy targets in
those not often flattered.
By comparison, Sir Percival Glyde is authentically a brute, able to present himself
and his suit successfully by performing a Knightley-esque gentlemanliness to Marian and
Laura, but underneath that single, simple layer of performance lies a fairly twodimensional bully. While performing, he is controlled, well-mannered, and
unobjectionable. Once safely married to Laura and back in Blackwater Park, he drops the
no-longer-necessary act, as Marian notes: “My sole motive for distrusting his honesty,
sprang from the change which I had observed in his language and his manners at
Blackwater Park, a change which convinced me that he had been acting a part throughout
the whole period of his probation at Limmeridge House. His elaborate delicacy; his
ceremonious politeness, which harmonized so agreeably with Mr. Gilmore’s old-
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fashioned notions; his modesty with Laura, his candour with me, his moderation with Mr.
Fairlie—all these were the artifices of a mean, cunning, and brutal man, who had dropped
his disguise when his practiced duplicity had gained its end…” (255).
Sir Percival can control his character to a degree, but he does have tic, a
connected series of somatic release hatches that he can’t control: his nervous cough, his
restless and bouncing leg, and his temper. Even when he is playing the part of humble,
courteous suitor, the anxiety driving his efforts breaks through his controlled act. It
comes through often, including at the moment when he expects to hear whether Laura
will decline to marry him. “There was suppressed anxiety and agitation in every line of
his face. The dry, sharp cough, which teases him at most times, seemed to be troubling
him more incessantly than ever” (169). After hearing that she declines his offer to decline
his offer, he is relieved but still unsure where he stands, and Marian observes “one of his
feet, softly, quietly, incessantly beating on the carpet under the table” (169). He is able to
mask his bad temper in that probationary period, but when he is safely married to his
source of income, his temper is quick and lacks control. It is up to Fosco to quiet him and
enable him to achieve his pecuniary goals—Fosco is a kind of prosthesis to Sir Percival,
who, once he had achieved his marriage, doesn’t have the control or energy to keep up
his act, though there is much work still to be done. Sir Percival’s acting suggests that
underneath the character, there’s another, true character: underneath the well-mannered
gentleman is a true self: a brooding, nasty, boring man who is interesting enough to have
a family scandal but not interesting enough to have more complexly layered selves. He is
boringly knowable—once you peel back the single layer, his authentic self is exposed and
it’s pathetic and simple.
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Hartright is in many ways the most complicated performer of the lot. The nature
of Hartright’s interest in Laura has surprisingly not been much-questioned in recent
criticism, and yet even a lightly suspicious reading of the novel begs the questions: Is his
ability to recognize Laura a true sign of his love, a wishful fantasy made real, a vehicle
for the continuation of his aspirations, or an invention that he forcibly manifests as a
reality? Is he a true middle-class gentleman with the bad luck to fall in love where he
doesn’t belong, and the ambition to doggedly first absent himself and then, sensing
danger, serve truth and save the day? Or is he an aspirational climber, as manipulative as
Fosco, though without the liveliness, flamboyance, and specialized chemical knowledge?
As Rachel Ablow writes, “For the most part, they [recent critics of Collins’s novel] have
understood The Woman in White to revolve around Walter’s development from a youth,
nervously susceptible to the sensations of his body, into a self-disciplined and reliable
adult member of society” (157). And yet, as Ablow shows, his intentions and motivations
are never quite clear, nor is his veracity. While most readers believe that it is Hartright’s
sympathy with Laura, incubated over a long period of tested love, that enables him to
recognize her, it isn’t actually clear that she is Laura, and even if she is, it isn’t clear that
sympathy and love serve as his compass. As Ben-Yishai shows, the novel itself as written
and edited by Hartright is a vast manipulation of past and present tense, designed to
establish his legitimacy as landed English gentleman. He makes himself appear to have
always been right, and therefore to have always been legitimate in the communal sense of
having achieved “a long-awaited and well-deserved return to his rightful place” (148).
Hartright has a habit of deciding when he will speak for or on behalf of others,
adjusting or rewriting their narratives for some conflation of his and our purposes. After
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declaring to both Marian and Laura his desire to marry and protect Laura and receiving
an affirmative response from both, Hartright writes, “My position is defined; my motives
are acknowledged. The story of Marian and the story of Laura must come next. I shall
relate both narratives, not in the words (often interrupted, often inevitably confused) of
the speakers themselves, but in the words of the brief, plain, studiously simple abstract
which I committed to writing for my own guidance, and for the guidance of my legal
advisor. So the tangled web will be most speedily and most intelligibly unrolled” (422).
Having entrusted Marian to provide her narrative in the past (whether or how it was
edited we can never know) Hartright decides that at this critical juncture in the story, it
would be best if he took over all narrative responsibilities.
It is no secret that Hartright stands to gain from a living Laura. After being
drugged, pronounced dead, given a false identity, and made to live in an asylum for two
and a half months, Laura is weak, easy prey one might say. And indeed, since Laura
emerges from her ordeal with no memory of her past life, Hartright trains Laura, teaching
her her lines, directing her in a performance of his dear Laura. This is perhaps an overly
paranoid reading of Hartright and of The Woman in White, but does not the novel teach us
that our feelings are best described as foreboding, not anxiety: in other words, that we’re
right, and that our suspicions are not just a generalized, paranoid dread? We were right:
Fosco is a dangerous creep, he is interfering with the mail, he is following and lurking,
his wife is listening in, Hartright is being followed, and on and on. So who’s to say that a
suspicious reading of Hartright is not in order?
Of course, questions of authenticity are not simply modes of reading character,
they are also written into the very plot and control the action: this is a novel about the

138
actual theft of two identities, not simply the theoretical effects of the inauthenticity of
self. Lady Glyde and Anne Catherick’s identities are actually called into question, and the
effects of this are more acute than they are for any of the men previously discussed and
interrogated in terms of authenticity. The two women are manipulated and their identities
are crossed and effectively erased, whether by death or by trauma. Inauthenticity is a
vehicle for power, and can be wielded as a weapon, but there is such a thing as
authenticity. One of the biggest threats of inauthenticity is precisely that it calls
everything into suspicion. If Fosco can be chivalric on the surface but scheming and
dangerous underneath, and worse, if Hartright can be heroic on the surface but potentially
self-serving underneath, then we would be justified in thinking there is no authenticity at
all. And yet, the novel leaves little room for doubt about whether Lady Glyde is indeed
the destroyed woman who emerges from the asylum. Fosco’s narrative confirms it, and to
assume Hartright simply wrote it and entered it into the narrative record would be to
question all things in an extreme skeptical mode akin to Hume’s theoretical speculations
about whether we should sit down with certainty that the chair beneath us will catch our
weight simply because it did so last time. It is precisely this overlay between the
authenticity of the men and of Anne/Laura that shows us how suspicious and just reading
practice might be merged: There are some things that are just (the identity of
Laura/Anne) and there are some things about which one needs to be suspicious, and
about which foreboding is well-placed. Foreboding relies on knowledge. In order to be
equipped with verifiable suspicions—in order to experience foreboding—one needs to be
able to recognize and compare patterns, one needs to have a relationship with history, one
needs to be paying attention.
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Care Without an Ethics of Care
Throughout this dissertation, one of the central sites of relationality and sources of
negative emotions is care precisely because of the heightened stakes, in care relations, of
the unknowability of others. In Villette, we saw an articulation of ethics of care that not
only accounted for, but encouraged the coexistence of uncaring feelings and care work.
In the next chapter, we will see a character whose unwillingness to provide maternal care
challenges the very creed of sympathy that many take to be the backbone of Eliot’s
project, but which I show to be the subject of her continually evolving skeptical critique.
The provision of care begs the question of authenticity: is care given for caring reasons?
If not, can the care be trusted? In this novel, hardly a scene or a plot-point goes by that
doesn’t revolve around care, but care in this novel is always compromised at best,
dangerous at worst. Further, in The Woman in White, it is characters on both sides of the
plot’s conflict providing this damaging care. Attending to the care dynamics allows us to
see how much is at stake in relation to foreboding. Talia Schaffer writes: “Ethics of care
asserts that human relations should be understood as interdependent exchanges of
caregiving and care-receiving, rather than the monadic persona of classic liberal thought,
often equated with Homo economicus, the rational subject of economic theory who
makes decisions to further his own interest” (160). What this novel demonstrates is that
caregiving can be performed by uncaring actors, but that there’s a difference between
Lucy Snowe, who cares with feelings inappropriate to care, but who is not distracted by
attempts to further her own interest, and the Foscos, who take on caregiving roles
exclusively in order to further their own interests. The difference is not that care is
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provided without feeling, or with feelings inappropriate to care; the difference is that care
is provided with an underlying self-interest. When self-interest is the driving motivator of
behavior, foreboding is not only possible, but necessary.
There is a second but related difference: in The Woman in White, care is provided
in secret, small, closed off spaces with no oversight. In Villette, Lucy’s particular,
affectively complex mode of caring is neutralized in part because she is always in a
community with multiple assigned care givers. It is not dangerous for her to teach or be a
bonne even though she enjoys abusing others and being abused in part because of the
surveillance, direct or indirect, of Madame Beck or, more broadly, of a community. So
not only is a care a form of interrelatedness in Villette, it is also an activity necessarily
done in physical proximity with other members of the care community. In The Woman in
White, all the care dispensed is done, necessarily, to achieve the ends of the actors, in
secret, in sealed off and even secret spaces.
As in the case of Lucy Snowe, circumstances have not been kind to Madame
Fosco. After an opinionated youth, she marries against her family’s wishes, is summarily
cast off and disinherited, and spends her days “sit[ting] speechless in corners” rolling
cigarettes for her husband, “clad,” as Marian describes, “in quiet black or gray gowns,
made high round the throat—dresses that she would have laughed at, or screamed at, as
the whim of the moment inclined her, in her maiden days” (218). Unlike Lucy, she is in a
position to give bad care to precisely the people she feels wronged by, and has the
opportunity to right perceived wrongs through this bad care. She is not acting through an
ethics of care but rather through an individualist self-interest.
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Fosco, too, often puts himself in a position to provide care, but of course, this is
because it gives him opportunity to, at best, monitor progress and develop plans
accordingly, and at worst, dispense drugs to affect desired outcomes. He describes his
relationship with Sir Percival Glyde in terms of their shared material embarrassments and
needs. “The bond of friendship which united Percival and myself, was strengthened, on
this occasion, by a touching similarity in the pecuniary position, on his side and mine. We
both wanted money. Immense necessity! Universal want!” (614). It is precisely on the
strength of his and Glyde’s interests that Fosco intervenes in the care of others, and the
novel’s plot is determined by Fosco’s efforts to resolve his pecuniary position by
controlling or accelerating others’ need for care. His plan, according to his confession,
occurs to him at the very moment of his observing the illness and need of Anne
Catherick: “The details of the grand scheme, which had suggested themselves in outline
only, up to that period, occurred to me, in all their masterly combination, at the sight of
the sleeping face. At the same time, my heart, always accessible to tender influences,
dissolved in tears at the spectacle of suffering before me. I instantly set myself to impart
relief. In other words, I provided the necessary stimulant for strengthening Anne
Catherick to perform the journey to London” (617). The sight of a person in need of
nursing inspires the “grand scheme” to see to his economic interests, and the emotion he
trumpets at seeing her suffering is simply his requirement that she remain alive a little
longer, so that she can plausibly die while being identified as Lady Glyde—something
that would necessitate Lady Glyde’s being in London. The feelings others interpret as
Fosco’s sincere concern and anxiety for suffering patients is, again and again, the anxiety
he feels for his own scheme.
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The one almost-exception is Fosco’s response to Marian’s suffering. The novel is
pretty convincing on Fosco’s feelings for Marian. As Fosco puts it, “At sixty I
worshipped her with the volcanic ardor of eighteen. All the gold of my rich nature was
poured hopelessly at her feet. My wife—poor angel!—my wife who adores me, got
nothing but the shillings and the pennies” (615). Fosco insists that he did nothing to
further Marian’s illness; she became ill the night she spent out in the rain, listening to
Fosco in conversation with Glyde, concocting his plot, and developed delirious fever and
ultimately typhus all on her own. This is one of two things we have suspicion of Fosco
for that can’t ever be proved: we suspect he meddled with Marian’s health, but he claims
he didn’t. (The other is our suspicion that he sedates his wife with medicinal bon-bons,
though it is just as likely that he simply dominates her into submission, or even that no
domination is needed and that she is motivated to work submissively alongside her
husband in the pursuit of recovered fortune.) Our inability to know whether Fosco
meddled in Marian’s health, coupled with our certainty that he admires, to put it
euphemistically, “the poetry of motion, as embodied in her walk” (618), leaves a little
mystery here in the case of Marian and Fosco—appropriate perhaps because it is the only
love match worth our attention, the only one with spark and characters vivid enough to
stimulate our imaginations.
And what of Hartright’s care? Does it stem from an ethics of care or is it, too,
ultimately an extension of his aspirations and interests? Upon discovering Laura and
Marian at Laura’s supposed grave, Hartright discovers that Laura is essentially a wiped
hard drive, containing nothing other than a vague sense of safety and trust around Marian
and Hartright: “She, who now remembered so little of the trouble and terror of a later
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time, remembered those words, and laid her poor head innocently and trustingly on the
bosom of the man who had spoken them” (422). He goes on, telling us what her reduced
state inspired in him:
Yes! the time had come. From thousands on thousands of miles away—
through forest and wilderness, where companions stronger than I had
fallen by my side, through peril of death thrice renewed, and thrice
escaped, the Hand that leads men on the dark road to the future had led me
to meet that time. Forlorn and disowned, sorely tried and sadly changed—
her beauty faded, her mind clouded—robbed of her station in the world, of
her place among living creatures—the devotion I had promised, the
devotion of my whole heart and soul and strength, might be laid
blamelessly now at those dear feet. In the right of her calamity, in the right
of her friendlessness, she was mine at last! Mine to support, to protect, to
cherish, to restore. Mine to love and honour as father and brother both.
Mine to vindicate through all risks and all sacrifices—through the
hopeless struggle against Rank and Power, through the long fight with
armed deceit and fortified Success, through the waste of my reputation,
through the loss of my friends, through the hazard of my life. (422)
Her weakness is narrated in terms of his journey, his role, and the hazards of his life. As
Rachel Ablow argues, “at least part of the popularity of and relative critical respect
accorded to Collins’s novel derives from the fantasy of male, middle-class identity that it
offers—a fantasy that, unlike those offered in later sensation novels, revolves around the
power of the middle-class man to define himself in highly profitable yet ideologically
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unproblematic ways. Walter’s power to improve his class position [relies on] convincing
others of his sympathetic relationship with his wife” (160). In fact, Hartright’s relation
with his wife is far from sympathetic, and in fact significantly impedes his care for her.
One of the paradoxes of Hartright and Marian’s care for Laura is that by walking
on eggshells around her “weakened, shaken faculties” (443), they drive her deeper into a
passive, incapacitated state. Earlier in the novel, Laura proved that she is capable of
bearing up and toughening up under hardships: during the long ordeal of her engagement
to Glyde, she is in many respects the stronger sister. And this is a novel that values hardy
women, and has high expectations for their hardiness and capacity. Along with Fosco, we
admire Marian above all else, precisely because she’s mannish, a proto-James Bond with
a mustache and Victorian dress. But rather than give Laura an opportunity to face her
“troubled and terrible past” and potentially recover her memory, they worry about “the
risk of turning her mind” upon it, and instead treat her like a child or like someone
incapable of returning to her previous capacities. “We helped her mind slowly by this
simple means; we took her out between us to walk, on fine days, in a quiet old City
square, near at hand, where there was nothing to confuse or alarm her; we spared a few
pounds from the fund at the banker’s to get her wine, and the delicate strengthening food
that she required; we amused her in the evenings with children’s games at cards, with
scrap-books full of prints which I borrowed from the engraver who employed me—by
these and other trifling attentions like them, we composed her and steadied her…” (444).
One way they compose and steady her is by returning her to the practice of
drawing, and later, when she is agitated because she wants to contribute to the household
income, telling her that her drawings are being sold. “Marian took them from me and hid
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them carefully; and I set aside a little weekly tribute from my earnings, to be offered to
her as the price paid by strangers for the poor, faint, valueless sketches, of which I was
the only purchaser. It was hard sometimes to maintain our innocent deception, when she
proudly brought out her purse to contribute her share towards the expenses, and
wondered, with serious interest, whether I or she had earned the most that week” (490).
Does this overabundance of care, and the treatment of Laura like a child unlikely to fully
recover, detrimentally affect her recovery? Is it a performance of adequate and good
care? Or does it lull her into remaining weak and unrecovered?
To answer these questions, a study of Marian’s care is essential, as she is so often
in partnership with Hartright, and in a caring relation to Laura. Both Laura and Marian
do everything in their power to maintain the hierarchical dynamics of the caring
relationship they are in. We first meet Marian with Hartright, and Marian apologizes for
Laura’s absence: she is unwell but will greet him as soon as she’s able. Laura is often
depicted as the weaker, less practical, less able of the two sisters. Marian liaises between
her and Mr. Fairlie, and between her and Hartright. There is one sustained period, when
Laura is steeling herself to accept Glyde’s proposal of marriage, when she is the stronger
and more willful of the two sisters, and Marian doesn’t like it. Marian walks into a room
and finds Laura “walking up and down in great impatience,” and writes: “There was too
much color in her cheeks, too much energy in her manner, too much firmness in her
voice” (164). She doesn’t like seeing Laura assert herself, or access her own powers of
will, and sees this energetic flash of resolve as a danger, not only to Laura, but to her role
as care giver.
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When Laura returns from her honeymoon, shaken but resolved to be longsuffering
and submissive, her power in relation to Marian remains in effect: she has crossed over
into a realm of experience unavailable to Marian, and she is choosing not to share any of
her new information with Marian. “I would tell you everything, darling, about myself
[…] if my confidences could only end there. But they could not—they would lead me
into confidences about my husband, too; and now I am married, I think I had better avoid
them, for this sake, and for your sake, and for mine. I don’t say that they would distress
you, or distress me—I wouldn’t have you think that for the world” (214). Laura is
choosing to withhold information, there is a set of relations that binds her, and she tries to
explain her loyalties and rationale to Marian, and in the process, emphasizes that Marian
is left out of a domain of experience, and makes excuses for keeping her in the dark.
Marian, as an unmarried woman, couldn’t understand, Laura suggests. And as a married
woman, Laura has responsibilities toward her husband that she must uphold, even as they
necessarily exclude Marian. The process of Laura’s marriage—from strength during the
drawn out acceptance phase to strength upon returning from the honeymoon—demotes
Marian, and obviates her caretaking responsibilities.
Luckily for Marian, whose whole existence is defined by tending to Laura, Laura
is so accustomed to needing Marian that the habits of weakness and neediness remain.
While Laura is giving the speech quoted above, telling Marian that she will exclude her
from certain information and insinuating that she knows things Marian will never know,
she is also described by Marian as “nervously buckling and unbuckling the ribbon around
my waist” (214). Any person who has ever provided care for someone who eventually
outgrows certain needs knows the joy of being touched, cuddled, or treated in a way that
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harkens back to the period of complete dependence. Laura deepens this experience for
Marian when she tells her she’ll always need her. “‘Oh, Marian!’ she said, suddenly
seating herself on a footstool at my knees, and looking up earnestly in my face, ‘promise
you will never marry, and leave me. It is selfish to say so, but you are much better off as
a single woman—unless—unless you are very fond of your husband—but you won’t be
very fond of anyone but me, will you?’” (215). Laura’s neediness and reliance on Marian
is no doubt gratifying to Marian, especially in this phase of Laura’s newfound
independence. It is also, of course, selfish, as Laura herself notes, and manipulative. Care
relations change over time, as the cared-for and care giver have changing needs and
circumstances. But even as circumstances change for Marian and Laura, neither wants to
shift with the circumstances. Both latch on to the care dynamic, and reassert it, especially
when it is insecure.
It is this mutually insisted-upon, insecure attachment to their care dynamic that
inspires Marian’s collaboration with Hartright in treating Laura like a child. For Marian,
Laura’s altered state is a return to the child-like period before Laura’s maturity through
marriage to Glyde. Laura’s will and knowledge has been obliterated, and she is again an
innocent creature utterly dependent on Marian’s care. Laura’s insistence that Marian not
marry and leave her is repeated, but this time, without the selfish manipulation. Marian
prefers Laura’s marriage to Hartright to her marriage to Glyde in large part because there
is room for her to be completely in the know, more so than even Laura herself. It enables
her to participate in a lion’s share of her maintenance and care. And it is in some ways a
marriage for herself, too, as she and Hartright are in a partnership dedicated to the care of
their quasi-daughter.
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Foreboding and Cognitive Impairment: Collapsing Surface and Depth from Both
Directions
So, we’ve seen that foreboding is an appropriate and even productive state in this
novel. We’ve seen that care relations can be particularly dangerous ones, and that
foreboding has a special use in these contexts. We’ve seen that it’s possible to first have
the intellectual ability to accurately forebode and then sink to passive inability, as Laura
becomes a blank slate, without knowledge, and reliant on others for the most basic of
care. Importantly, then, surface and depth are collapsed in two radically different cases in
this novel: in the case of foreboding, and in the case of what I’ll call stupidity in the most
neutral sense possible. In the case of foreboding, there is a truth that is met by a person
intelligent enough to read patterns against historical precedent. In the case of stupidity,
there is no ability to read patterns or history, and so surface and depth are the same: they
are meaningless. After Laura’s traumatic incarceration in the asylum reduces her to a
state of cognitive impairment, there is no difference between what is on her surface and
what is below it: both are equally devoid of content. Foreboding requires the accurate
reading of patterns, the comparative analysis of historical precedent, and the cognitive
and experimental aptitude for holding multiple possibilities in mind at once. The kind of
cognitive disability Laura experiences, which entails loss of knowledge, memory, and
history, makes foreboding impossible. Knowledge is the hinge here: having it in spades
or not at all leads to this collapse of surface and depth, or of suspicion and just
interpretation practices. This brings us back to Sedgwick’s provocation that instead of
pursuing the hermeneutics of suspicion (“This was a time when speculation was
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ubiquitous about whether the virus had been deliberately engineered or spread, whether
HIV represented a plot or experiment by the U.S. military that had gotten out of control,
or perhaps was behaving exactly as it was meant to” (123)) we instead think about what
knowledge does.
In this novel, foreboding and knowledge are in a constant feedback loop:
knowledge produces foreboding, which leads to action to acquire more knowledge that
can function as proof. Foreboding stems from knowledge and points toward knowledge.
The knowledge discovered through the foreboding process (Fosco’s confession, the
discovered copy of the marriage registry, various overheard conversations) does a lot: it
enables Hartright and Laura to marry and breed an heir to Limmeridge. It also, however,
causes Marian to fall ill. Foreboding leads her to spy on Fosco and Glyde, and spying
leads to knowledge that affirms her suspicions. Yet, this distressing knowledge, obtained
in dangerous circumstances, in rain and cold, yields grave sickness, fever, and a loss of
the very control she needs most. Lack of knowledge also has a range of effects. Think of
Laura, who is made simple and happy by her lack of knowledge and her lost ability to
forebode. Or think of her uncle, willfully walled off from knowledge and uninterested in
foreboding. Laura is taken care of, but she is also robbed of the ability to forebode, and
lives at the mercy of her sister and husband, both of whom have an interest in keeping her
in her near-infantile state of dependence. Foreboding is not a ticket to the ball, then: it
doesn’t guarantee success. Instead, it might lead to collapse and illness. But it might also
lead to something else, something better.
Foreboding and knowledge do a lot in this novel. But what about after the novel?
Whereas characters and readers follow a near-exact path, foreboding and then
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discovering knowledge in a tidy, self-congratulatory cycle, the novel ends with a choice
and a divergence: the characters cease to forebode—Marian, Hartright, and Laura inhabit
a picture-perfect domesticity of happiness and contentment, with everyone in the role
they most wanted to assume indefinitely. But does the reader cease to forebode? This is a
choice, and it’s one that, because of the novel form, which both ends, and is built on
invention, can’t sustain foreboding: you can’t be satisfied that what you forebode is
accurate, and you can’t forebode any longer for people who aren’t people, and whose
lives don’t extend beyond the last page. As readers, we have to decide whether to be
suspicious when we can no longer ever learn whether our suspicions are true. We can be
suspicious at the end of the novel, but we can no longer forebode. Ben-Yishai argues that
the reader, by the end of the novel, is worn out. “By the novel’s end the reader, longing
for some form of order and stability, is ready to embrace Walter’s frame story of
restoration, rather than look closely at its disruption. Walter’s legitimation, in this
explanation, can be attributed to the reader’s exhaustion from sensation; at this point she
is willing to accept any framework that promises continuity and respite from tribulation”
(157). Maybe so for some readers, but maybe other readers, readers who have seen the
relationship between surface and depth, are less sure of Walter’s legitimacy. But what
does this state entail?
In much the same way that Sedgwick and others warned against paranoid
reading’s place as a required methodology for critical practice, we can use this end-point
for foreboding as a warning against always foreboding. Sedgwick writes: “How are we to
understand paranoia in such a way as to situate it as one epistemological practice among
other, alternative ones?….In [Melanie] Klein, I find particularly congenial her use of the
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concept of positions—the schizoid/paranoid position, the depressive position—as
opposed to, for example, normatively ordered stages, stable structures, or diagnostic
personality types….The flexible to-and-fro movement implicit in Kleinian positions will
be useful for my discussion of paranoid and reparative critical practices, not as
theoretical ideologies (and certainly not as stable personality types of critics), but as
changing and heterogeneous relational stances” (128). Foreboding can’t be sustained
indefinitely, and shouldn’t be: it is a position, a practice, and like any other, it is only
temporarily useful and, further, inhabitable only according to other, shifting and
relational contextual circumstances. But what foreboding offers is not to be overlooked. It
enables a point of contact for affects and actions, it ties cognitive and affective processes,
and it respects the historical, structural, and contextual. It also attends to the way that
cultures, institutions, and affective expectations shift: as we saw with Emma’s Knightley,
the authentic gentleman is a construction, a new breed of man for a particular moment in
history. Foreboding, too, in its insistence on mapping evidence against new evidence,
feeling against proof, suspicion against knowledge, is by its very nature a contextual
feeling, especially useful in particular moments of history or experience. Foreboding
allows us to trust our suspicions, while at the same time, seeming them as rooted in
evidence and dependent on verification.

152
ACKNOWLEDGING OTHERS:
GEORGE ELIOT’S “EXTENSION OF OUR SYMPATHIES,” REVISITED
“The minds of all men are similar in their
feelings and operations; nor can any one be
actuated by any affection, of which all
others are not, in some degree, susceptible.
As in strings equally wound up, the motion
of one communicates itself to the rest; so all
the affections pass from one person to
another, and beget correspondent
movements in every human creature.”
—Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature,
3.3.1.7
“One will thus never really know with
whom one is dealing.”
—Rousseau, First Discourse
“It seems somehow appropriate—whatever
the scientific equivalent of poetic justice
may be—that the first animal to be
successfully cloned was a sheep. Sheep,
after all, are not famous for their
idiosyncrasy, for the uniqueness of their
characters. We had assumed that sheep were
virtually clones of each other, and now we
have also been reminded that they are
inevitably—all but two of them—genetically
different.”
—Adam Phillips, “Sameness is All”

So far in this dissertation, we have seen Austen’s interest in the ways that
authentic selves are constructed and shaped by performance and historical context; we’ve
seen Brontë’s Lucy Snowe derive deep and complex gratification from her role as
unknowable cipher; and we’ve seen Collins explore the nature of feelings that correspond
with knowledge. Throughout, I’ve found mainly bad or troubled relations, ones that are
more complex given their foundation on the grounds of epistemological uncertainty.
Focusing on the trickier, nastier byproducts of relationality, we have hardly touched that
fundamental feature of epistemological discussions: sympathy. In this final chapter, we
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turn finally to sympathy, and to its High Priestess: George Eliot. In so doing, however, I
show that even the ur-advocate of sympathy, and especially sympathy through and in art,
is in fact deeply critical of both sympathy’s potential and its effects. It is no great surprise
to say that Eliot is concerned with sympathy and its difficulties, or with, as George
Levine puts it in “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology” (2010), “the crisis of Western
epistemology” that is “the mind’s incapacity to get outside itself” (52). To discover “that
[another] had an equivalent center of self,” as Dorothea does about Casaubon, is one of
the most important discoveries an Eliot character can make across all of her novels. And
yet, more often than not, it is the limitations, assumptions, and hierarchical connotations
of sympathy that Eliot investigates.
These epistemological questions as they relate to discourses of sympathy take us
back, once again to the moral sentimentalists. As we saw in Chapter One on Austen, for
Hume, morality stems from feelings and the passions. You naturally have access to
morality because you feel something -- approbation, disapprobation, pleasure, pain—
which translates directly to moral response. The problem, however, is that these feelings
are more active and reliable when initiated in proximity, with people you can see and
know. The very problem with sympathy, the reason why he considered it insufficient to
form a stable basis for ethical behavior, is the fact that our sympathy is activated more
strongly and more regularly for those who are nearest to us—our family—and that it
becomes weaker in concentric circles outward from there. It “gives the preference to
ourselves and friends, above strangers” (3.2.2.11). As a corrective, Hume imagined a
system of justice that “fix[es] on some steady and general points of view” (3.3.1.15,
italics in the original) that take into account the general good of mankind. Because we are
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always in flux in situation and feeling and proximities to others, we learn to adopt a
general point of view according to which we correct our feelings. This privileging of
feelings is central for understanding Eliot, as is the challenge of closeness and proximity.
Also vital, however, is Adam Smith’s insistence that we can’t actually know the other’s
feelings or feel them ourselves: we are always ourselves, simply imagining what the other
is feeling. In watching a hardened criminal hanging for a crime, we might feel shame and
desolation, for example, but we can’t believe that the person hanging to death is feeling
shame or any of our “nice” feelings.
Just as some of the earliest and most cited theorizers of sympathy had extreme
doubts about the value and uses of sympathy, so, too, did Eliot. In fact, she added to
them. In addition to Hume’s anxieties about sympathy’s functionality for those far away,
Eliot also doubts the power of sympathy for those nearby, and notes again and again in
her fiction the failure of sympathy in the family context, or more broadly, in cases of
familiarity. And going farther than Smith, Eliot not only contends that sympathy entails
imagination and acknowledgment of otherness, she also shows that this is a project of
domination, involving troubling hierarchies of knowledge and control about and over the
other. In other words, if the crisis of epistemology is that we can’t know the other, the
emergency response, for Eliot, is not to exercise the moral muscle in the hopes of
overcoming the deficiency and seeing into the hearts and minds of others, but rather to
learn to trouble that very ideal. As she observes in her final novel, sympathy is not only
sometimes impossible, it is also potentially dangerous, leading to inaction or domination.
Critics often see as too static what I see as a body of work that displays a mind
that is constantly thinking dialectically and reassessing what it previously hypothesized

155
about interpersonal relations and ethical obligations. In this chapter, I trouble the idea that
Eliot’s thinking on sympathy is stable throughout her career. I look at the shifts in her
thinking, and attend to the tension between sympathy and negative affects. Her essay on
Wilhelm Riehl’s ethnography of the history and class structure of his native Germany,
“The Natural History of German Life,” published in the Westminster Review on the eve of
her novel-writing career, for example, is often taken as a manifesto for Eliot’s lasting
credo on sympathy. In this essay, Eliot makes the famous claim that “[t]he greatest claim
we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the extension of our
sympathies” (Essays, 110). A few lines down, in the same essay, Eliot expands on her
claim that art enlarges sympathy. “Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of
amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds
of our personal lot. All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to
paint the life of the People” (Essays, 110). In this essay, Eliot argues that through art,
through novels for example, the reader will virtually experience other people and
conditions, and will see and understand more of their fellow men. If depictions of
peasants are reductive, as Eliot argues they are in her essay occasioned by what she
argues is Riehl’s non-reductive approach, and depict ruddy cheeks and simple happiness,
then consumers of that art will have the wrong impression. If depictions of peasants, on
the other hand, are more true to life, more sympathetic, then they will depict peasants as
they really are: as moral or immoral, happy or unhappy, healthy or unhealthy as any other
lot. Reading is therefore a charged moral activity: through it, one is granted more
opportunities to know the other. This is, as I will show, Eliot’s thinking at the time of
writing The Mill on the Floss.
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But what if in spite of every effort, one can’t come to an understanding of the
other? This is what Eliot takes on in Romola, and furthers in her later career novels. Her
claims in the Riehl essay remain important to understanding the stakes for Eliot in writing
fiction, but I show that the ethical problems she is concerned with, by the time she writes
Romola, have shifted slightly. Rather than rectify the available novelistic representation
of others in order to expand her readers’ sympathy through increased knowledge and
identification, I argue that her concern is with the impossibility of knowing the other. The
ethical dilemmas that Eliot is writing against are no longer “[h]ow little the real
characteristics of the working classes are known to those who are outside them…”
(Essays, 108) but, rather, that the real characteristics of anyone, even the self, can remain
unknown no matter how much effort one expends in trying to obtain that knowledge.
In Daniel Deronda, these questions remain ever-present, but added to them are ethically
charged questions about the very subject-position of the sympathizer. What does it mean
to write about the ruddy-cheeked peasant, even if the project is meant to humanize them?
How might an over-developed sympathy lead to misery or, worse, inertia and inaction?
And how might a surfeit of knowledge produce bad relations? Eliot articulated some of
her most known concerns about sympathy in Middlemarch: “If we had a keen vision and
feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the
squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence.
As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.” In Daniel Deronda,
the consequences are not just personal—overstimulation and overextension through
excessive sympathy—they are political, and reflect the dangers of knowledge to
interpersonal and political contexts.
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In her early fiction, readers and characters alike are intended to arrive at
knowledge of the other, and if they don’t, they suffer morally or otherwise. Adam Bede,
Eliot’s first novel, provides near its end a confession, and therefore knowledge, of
something we already knew to be true: Hetty was responsible for her baby’s death. Along
with Dinah, we have compassion for Hetty even in advance of her confession, but that
compassion is then validated by her shattered (and shattering) narrative, delivered to
Dinah in her cell. We never have to be in suspense: we know enough about Hetty to
know what likely happened, and we are right. Along with Dinah, through our privileged
position as readers of omniscient third person narration, we have come to know her, and
so our ethical response to her is primed. We understand her, we have guesses as to what
might have happened given her moral weakness and heartbreak, and we later find out we
are right. Feeling deeply for and about the other to the point of intimate knowledge of
that other is hard work, but it can be done, as it is by Dinah, and by us, the reader. In The
Mill on the Floss, the narrator encourages our sympathy by providing knowledge about
all the characters and their thoughts and feelings. Tom doesn’t stop to think how Maggie
might feel, to disastrous effects, but if he had tried he could have. Further, though he
doesn’t make the effort with Maggie, we make the effort with him, following him to
school and leaving Maggie behind for a while in order that we should know and
understand him and therefore sympathize with him in spite of his failings. Silas Marner,
which Eliot wrote while also writing Romola, is a very different type of novel than Eliot’s
others, hovering on the boundary between realism and fairy tale. Because of its
allegorical nature, the novel offers more structural symbolism than depth of character
(with the partial exception of Godfrey Cass who comes closest to having an inner
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struggle, meager as it is). The questions the novel presents are not ones of sympathy for
individuals so much as ones about why the world works the way that it does: Why is
everything beautiful (Eppie coming into Silas’s life) colored by a sinister backdrop (her
adoption is the product of moral failings, drug addiction, and theft)? Why does tragedy
follow certain people? The novel unsettles and upsets the real world in this way, asking
disturbing questions not of the extent to which we can know others, but about the extent
to which the world responds to us, and even the extent to which it is real. (The novel ends
with the ontological rather than the epistemological: does Lantern Yard exist?) The novel
leaves much unsettled, and it is perhaps this willingness to end with unresolved doubt
that helps Eliot back into the writing of Romola, and into a novel about maintaining and
even cultivating doubt. In Romola, there are things you can’t know about other people no
matter how hard you try, presenting a significant ethical dilemma. What are one’s duties
toward those we don’t know or understand, especially when they themselves waver in
their ethical behavior or elicit an urgent demand for sympathy? While it may seem
perverse to skip Middlemarch in a chapter about Eliot, sympathy, and negative affects,
moving ahead to Daniel Deronda allows me to think more explicitly about power and
domination.

I.

The Mill on the Floss and “the great fundamental fact of blood”

The chapter that describes Mrs. Tulliver contemplating the loss of all her
household goods is titled, mockingly, “Mrs. Tulliver’s Teraphim, or Household Gods.”
With the bailiff downstairs and the linens about to be sold, Mrs. Tulliver is reduced to a
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pathetic state. At the news of their bankruptcy, her first move is to go and line up her
ladles and sugar tongs, finger the monogram on her linens, and weep before her idols.
She is a materialist, the narrator is telling us. She cares about her possessions more than
she cares about her husband, who is lying unconscious a few rooms away. Many readers
of the novel stop there, seeing this as a thoroughly derisive portrait of Mrs. Tulliver, who
was previously shown obsessing over her sister Pullet’s cap, fussing over her daughter’s
unruly hair, and vigorously but ridiculously defending her china with the “small gold
sprig all over ‘em” (204). The scene in which Mrs. Tulliver weeps over her household
goods, or gods, is funny the way Mr. Pullet’s constant sucking of candies is funny, or the
way Mrs. Glegg’s fusty gowns are funny. But it would be a mistake not see the extent to
which we are also being invited to sympathize with Mrs. Tulliver. “To think of these
cloths as I spun myself,” (203) she says mournfully when her children appear at the door,
and silly as it is to cry over tablecloths when her family is suddenly facing abject poverty,
her response is touchingly human. For Mrs. Tulliver, her handiwork is the physical
manifestation of her values and of the time she spent emotionally preparing for a new life
with a virtual stranger for a husband, albeit a stranger she supposedly chose. Each one
represents hours of work and reminds her of the time when, as a young woman, she
imagined what her marriage and her adult life would be like. Now that imagined future
has come to nothing, indeed because of that virtual stranger who became a husband. To
have to give them up, especially the ones with initials or “Elizabeth Dodson,” her full
maiden name, inscribed on them, is devastating and humiliating, and we watch ultimately
with sympathy.
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This scene of sympathy is representative for the novel: even in cases where
sympathy requires overcoming some preconceived notion—in this case, overcoming the
sense that Mrs. Tulliver is ridiculous—it is eminently manageable. This is true for Tom
Tulliver, too, who, as Karen Bourrier has argued in The Measure of Manliness: Disability
and Masculinity in the Mid-Victorian Novel (2015), is difficult to sympathize with in part
because he represents “a critique of and commentary on the Tom Brown and Tom
Thurnall types of the muscular Christian and schoolboy novels of the 1850s” (79). His
strength and capacity as a self-made man sets him apart from Maggie, as well as from
Philip Wakem, both more closely identified with giving and receiving sympathy.45 But,
especially through free indirect discourse, the narrator extends sympathy even toward
Tom, for example, in the climactic scene in the Red Deeps when Tom, having discovered
the nature of Maggie and Philip’s relationship, marches Maggie into the Red Deeps to tell
Philip that they can never see one another again. Tom hurls insults at both Maggie and
Philip, mocking Philip’s physical disability by laughing at the very idea of his being a
lover, and telling Maggie that she is a traitor to the family whose feelings for Philip are
disgusting and disgraceful.
Tom has never been colder or more conceited, which is saying a lot, and the
chapter ends with our sympathy squarely on Maggie’s side. Through free indirect
discourse we are even in her head, with front row seats to her emotions as she rages about
Tom and even confesses to herself a distressing sense of relief at her forced separation
from Philip. We have never felt closer to Maggie, or sensed that she was more alone and
45

See Forest Pyle’s “A Novel Sympathy: The Imagination of Community in George
Eliot.” Pyle argues that Maggie and Tom’s irreconcilable differences are an
incompatibility of genres (he is a character in an epic while she is in a romance) (16).
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in need of our sympathy. And so it is especially painful and significant that the very next
chapter, and the next thing to happen in the novel, though the narrator tells us that three
weeks have elapsed, should be Tom’s success in making enough money to pay back all
the family’s debts. In other words, immediately after being told that she has been
dishonoring her father and is a disgrace to the family, Maggie has to watch Tom loyally
serving his family, as do we.
Adding insult to injury, Mr. Tulliver, Maggie’s ally and supporter within the
nuclear family, speaks ill of Philip Wakem, though of course without knowing anything
about Maggie’s relationship with him. “Tom, my lad […] I’ll tell ‘em it’s you as got the
best part o’ the money. They’ll see I’m honest at last, and ha’ got an honest son. Ah!
Wakem ‘ud be fine and glad to have a son like mine—a fine straight fellow—I’stead o’
that poor crooked creatur!” (352). After this outburst, the narrator says, “Tom never lived
to taste another moment so delicious as that; and Maggie couldn’t help forgetting her own
grievances. Tom was good…” (352). It is Maggie’s voice that is buried in this third
person narration—it is Maggie who thinks to herself that “Tom was good.” Maggie is
feeling charitable. She has entered into his happiness and feels it with him, just as we
entered into her head for a moment and felt with her that maybe Tom is good.
The narrator regularly puts us in this difficult position of having to sympathize
with Tom. We follow him to school, not Maggie, effectively schooling us, the reader, into
caring for Tom as well as for Maggie. We regularly witness Maggie’s small
delinquencies, as when she forgets to feed the rabbits who die as a result, and we
sympathize with Tom’s indignation. But we also understand and sympathize with
Maggie’s feelings. The narrator always makes sure that it’s six of one, half a dozen of the
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other. When she tells Tom, after the family goes bankrupt and he has to leave school to
begin making money, that it’s too bad she didn’t learn bookkeeping because she could
then have taught it to him, Tom becomes enraged. He tells Maggie: “You teach! Yes, I
daresay […] You are always setting yourself above me and everyone else […] You think
you know better than anyone, but you’re almost always wrong” (234). Twice, in the third
person narration that surrounds this dialogue, the narrator describes Tom’s anger as
“just”: first, he is described as frowning in the way he always does when he is about to be
“justifiably severe” and then again, when the outburst is over, the narrator gives
background to Tom’s emotional state: “Poor Tom! He had just come from being lectured
and made to feel his inferiority: the reaction of his strong, self-asserting nature must take
place somehow; and here was a case in which he could justly show himself dominant”
(234). This repetition is confusing. Is there a shade of free indirect discourse here, or is
this strictly the narrator’s voice? If the former, then Tom thinks he is just in his anger but
we can think, along with the narrator, that he isn’t. But, if the narrator shares Tom’s sense
of justice, then are we supposed to condone Tom’s outburst? In the famous chapter in
Adam Bede in which Eliot gives us a gloss on her theory of realism and sympathy, she
tells us that we have to learn to sympathize with even ugly or stupid people. In this novel
more than in any of her previous, the characters are stupider and uglier, and her
experiment in sympathetic realism is furthered. The sympathy is harder, but therefore
even more essential.
Free indirect discourse, by blurring the distinction between narrator and character
in a way that resembles the work of sympathy, carries us along this process quite often in
this novel, but sometimes it can be very hard to know whether free indirect discourse is
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being deployed, as in the case above. Free indirect discourse requires close reading to
notice it happening, but even close reading will sometimes not solve the mystery of
whose words are being voiced. It is this built-in instability that Eliot is drawing our
attention to with her occasionally ambiguous free indirect discourse. She is reminding us
of the mediation inherent in free indirect discourse, and in sympathy more generally. As a
model for sympathy, free indirect discourse is an extremely subtle narrative technique. It
teaches us that entering into another’s thoughts might be possible –the narrator is able to
do it, at least, some characters are sometimes able to do it, and as readers we are able to
do it. It also teaches us that it requires close reading—carelessness and inattention will
not reveal much about character and human nature in real life, either. It also teaches us
that we have to be extremely careful in our thinking about sympathy. Sometimes we
suppose we have entered into another’s mind and know what they think, but sometimes,
as in free indirect discourse, we can’t tell, we might be mistaken, we might be
trespassing, or we might not be able to distinguish between our mind and another’s.

In spite of this challenge, sympathy in The Mill on the Floss is possible, even if
difficult. Maggie has the capacity to be exemplary in this regard (though she more often
fails). She anticipates that Tom should be told of her father’s fall (both literal and
symbolic) before arriving back home and asks permission to go to him at school to break
the news. Philip, disabled himself, anticipates that Tom will be anxious about his
recovery after an accident and, with great insight into what must be Tom’s most pressing
thought, asks the doctor whether he will be lame and then relays the good news to the
anxious patient. But when sympathy fails, as it often does in this novel, the novel form
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itself becomes a vehicle for readerly sympathy that surpasses the capacity of her
characters. True to her review of Riehl, it is the role of The Mill on the Floss to expand
the sympathies, and Eliot achieves this often through free indirect discourse.46
Eliot uses free indirect discourse to model the sympathy that is absent in familylife, to offer her readers an alternative to kinship networks that fail and family relations
that disappoint, and to let her readers connect to fictional others who are perhaps more
real than those in one’s actual household. And in this work, Eliot emphasizes that
sympathy is most often absent or unperformed in one’s closest relations and with those
whom we share the most, especially one’s family. Tom and Maggie have similar
experiences growing up. They share the same jam-puffs, they have the same parents, they
love the same river. And yet, their feelings couldn’t be further from similar. Similarity is
not sympathy.47 This important lesson about sympathy is one that Eliot frames in the
context of family, because family gives her the appropriate model for constructing
unsympathetic similarity. The Dodsons, for example, assume that since they are all
similar, they must all agree and feel the same way about things. They are described as an
inflexible unit, sure of their superiority and united in their tastes early in the novel:

46

See Raymond Williams’s “The Knowable Community in George Eliot’s Novels” for a
critique of the sufficiency of community and sympathy through narrative. Williams
interrogates the paradox between the ethical and aesthetic projects in Eliot’s sympathy. In
this chapter, I attend to how this shifts for Eliot, rather than viewing “Eliot’s community”
as static.
47
See Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy for more on the role of identification in the
Victorian scene of sympathy. Jaffe argues that sympathy in the nineteenth century is a
class-oriented process of reestablishing one’s difference from the downtrodden, poor, or
pitiable.
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There were particular ways of doing everything in that family: particular
ways of bleaching the linen, of making the cowslip wine, curing the hams,
and keeping the bottled gooseberries; so that no daughter of that house
could be indifferent to the privilege of having been born a Dodson, rather
than a Gibson or a Watson. Funerals were always conducted with peculiar
propriety in the Dodson family: the hat-bands were never of a blue shade,
the gloves never split at the thumb, everybody was a mourner who ought
to be, and there were always scarfs for the bearers. When one of the family
was in trouble or sickness, all the rest went to visit the unfortunate
member, usually at the same time, and did not shrink from uttering the
most disagreeable truths that correct family feeling dictated; if the illness
or trouble was the sufferer's own fault, it was not in the practice of the
Dodson family to shrink from saying so. In short, there was in this family
a peculiar tradition as to what was the right thing in household
management and social demeanor, and the only bitter circumstance
attending this superiority was a painful inability to approve the condiments
or the conduct of families ungoverned by the Dodson tradition (43-44).
Their unity as a group, as signified above by the irony often used in narration about the
Dodsons, is often less than they would like it to be. While they often bring up their
cohesion and similarity, it is repeatedly in the context of a complaint about the failure of
their similarity to produce the appropriate agreement on some seemingly important
matter. Mrs. Glegg, the sister most dogmatically observant of the Dodson principles,
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remarks, upon arriving at Mrs. Tulliver’s house punctually only to discover that she is the
first:
“I don't know what ails sister Pullet," she continued. "It used to be the way
in our family for one to be as early as another,–I'm sure it was so in my
poor father's time,–and not for one sister to sit half an hour before the
others came. But if the ways o' the family are altered, it sha'n't be my fault;
I'll never be the one to come into a house when all the rest are going away.
I wonder at sister Deane,–she used to be more like me. But if you'll take
my advice, Bessy, you'll put the dinner forrard a bit, sooner than put it
back, because folks are late as ought to ha' known better” (54, italics in the
original).
Regularly, Mrs. Glegg brings up the Dodson ways when they are not being properly
observed. She is not the only one. All the sisters agree, for example, that it is a shame that
the children turned out to be so unlike the Dodsons, and too much like the Tullivers. They
simply cannot understand why, or accept the fact that, their similarity of experience, their
shared credo, their identity as Dodsons, does not always or even usually result in fellow
feeling. And in fact, the sisters, when all is said and done, do not enjoy one another’s
company. As Talia Schaffer writes in Romance’s Rival , and which we can extrapolate to
refer to the tensions between kinship networks and nuclear families generally: “Where
other Victorian novels show cousins as people who share memories, kindnesses, and
mutual respect, the world of The Mill on the Floss forecasts a future of independent
nuclear-family financial rivals, squabbling over who begs, borrows, or owes money to
whom. They are not unified but rather operate like species competing to survive…This is
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a tragedy, of course, for Eliot, the great advocate of networks. [Suzanne] Graver argues
that Eliot wants to remake the network through art and abstract thought; be that as it may,
Eliot writes the end of a tradition in which it can be made through marriage” (194-5). It
can’t be made through marriage, or, indeed, any close relations.
Despite their similarities as members of the same family, and indeed, often
because of their shared upbringing, Tom is unable to understand Maggie. Throughout,
Tom’s attitude toward Maggie is marked by an unwillingness to attend to her difference.
He assumes she has the same values that he does, including his adherence to the family
goal of wreaking revenge on the Wakems. They both love and revere their father. Why,
then, doesn’t Maggie revile Philip? Tom doesn’t even bother to formulate this question,
assuming that she should revile him and her failure is a failure of family feeling, and of
ethics more broadly. Tom, who never thought about the family at all before his father’s
fall, except to feel that “a proud sense of family respectability was part of the very air
Tom had been born and brought up in” (189), thinks of himself post-fall as the family
redeemer. Maggie’s multiple and contradictory needs have no reality to him—he neither
attempt to know them or understand them. In their childhood, Maggie has no reality for
him, except insofar as her actions might affect him. She comes into view for him mostly
when she has done something wrong—eaten the bigger half of their split splice of cake,
or killed his rabbit. She only exists when she acts on his world, and thus she is never
considered as a separate person.
Troublingly, though he has never made an effort to know her, or see what passions
motivate her, he has the capacity to be right about her, and passes a judgment on her that
is true. After she has come back from her almost-elopement with Stephen, Tom says, “I
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loathe your character and your conduct. You struggled with your feelings, you say. Yes! I
have had feelings to struggle with; but I conquered them. I have had a harder life than
you have had; but I have found my comfort in doing my duty” (485). As harsh as it is,
Tom is, to right: this novel values duty and Maggie has abandoned hers. But in another
sense, he is unbelievable: what feelings has he had that needed conquering? What
passions does Tom have to rival Maggie’s? His struggles have included his humiliation
and boredom while working in his Uncle Deane’s warehouse, and perhaps also his muted
partiality for his cousin, Lucy Deane, but having followed both Maggie and Tom’s
consciousness, we know that this similarity of suffering is not likeness, and that it
prohibits rather than encourages sympathy.

Eliot’s ethical project to enlarge the sympathies of her readers sometimes rubs up
against the aesthetic requirements of creating a novel. Troublingly, Adam Bede has to
lose Hetty in order to learn about pain and experience sympathy. Hetty is sacrificed, and
the reader is troubled by the exchange. Relatedly, Philip enters a “new life,” an “enlarged
life,” in which he has learned to love Maggie more than he knew how to before, but the
ethical process is bound up, ominously, in an aesthetic one. He writes to her, in his
famous letter absolving her of guilt: “You have raised a dim unrest into a vivid
consciousness. The new life I have found in caring for your joy and sorrow more than for
what is directly my own, has transformed the spirit of rebellious murmuring into that
willing endurance which is the birth of strong sympathy. I think nothing but such
complete and intense love could have initiated me into that enlarged life which grows by
appropriating the life of others; for before, I was always dragged back from it by ever-
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present painful self-consciousness. I even think sometimes this gift of transferred life
which has come to me in loving you, may be a new power to me” (503). As Maggie is
figured as a gift to him, sympathy is bound up with appropriation. Audrey Jaffe writes in
Scenes of Sympathy that “in Victorian fiction [sympathy] is always about the construction
of social and cultural identities, about the individual’s subject relation to the group” (23).
In The Mill on the Floss, sympathy does more to alter an individual’s sense of self than
their understanding of the subject of sympathy. Philip is impacted in ways that won’t
affect his relationship to Maggie. Sympathy is for him, not her, and this relates to the
aesthetic nature that his sympathy takes. As was the case with Austen’s Mansfield Park,
the project of ethical imagination is tinged complicatedly with aesthetic production.
Eliot turns from writing non-fiction to fiction in part because it is through the
aesthetic project that she feels she will be most able to further the ethical one. When the
narrator of The Mill on the Floss says, “it is necessary that we should feel it, if we care to
understand how it acted on the lives of Tom and Maggie,” what he (the narrator is
gendered male, it seems, in this as in many Eliot novels) means is that through literature,
we can come to feel for others that we otherwise wouldn’t be interested in even
considering. Through the aesthetic work we come to know others, which is the
fulfillment of the ethical work. But, though the ethical and aesthetic are ideally partners,
they are often in conflict.
As Karen Bourrier has shown, Philip is an artist, as well as a sensitive, deformed
outsider. Philip, like his author, is involved in his final letter in an aesthetic as well as an
ethical project, and this similarity leaves Eliot with a guarded, but still optimistic sense of
the power of sympathy: by writing for others and inviting their readership, some form of
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sympathy is extended; on the other hand, it isn’t imagined as being possible between
characters. In Mill, reading provides complete knowledge, even though it’s not available
in life. Eliot’s later fiction takes on this disturbing discrepancy, addressing the gap
between the illusion of full knowledge that can be made possible in fiction and the
various illusions about knowledge or the lack of knowledge that plagues us in life.

II.

Knowledge and Acknowledgment in Romola: "Her soul cried out for some
explanation"

If Mill reflects faith in sympathy but registers some doubts about its difficulty as well as
its potential for appropriation and aestheticization, Romola reveals a deeper skepticism
about the conditions necessary for sympathy, and of sympathy itself. In Romola, the
novel that marks the middle of her career, and prepares her for her final novels, which are
read as manifestos of sympathy, Eliot takes as one of her main characters a real, historical
figure: Girolamo Savonarola, the fifteenth-century Florentine Dominican friar famous for
his bonfires of the vanities, charismatic leadership, prophesies, and, finally, his
confession, under torture, of falsehood. Despite years of poring through the archives,
reading all of Savonarola’s writing, sending George Henry Lewes to archives she
couldn’t access as a woman, returning to Italy and its libraries and monasteries,
immersing herself in the culture and language, and even visiting Savonarola’s cell at San
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Marco, Eliot is unable to come to a conclusion about Savonarola’s inner state;48 even
after hours of close reading and rereading, the reader doesn’t know what to make of the
conflicting relationship between prophecy and realism,49 or between Savonarola’s
confession and his character as previously revealed through narrative; and the eponymous
Romola herself, despite having an intimate relationship with Savonarola spanning years,
does not know what to make of him. And yet, finally, Romola does respond to him
ethically, and she does come to experience a form of sympathy. In reading his confession
and witnessing his execution with her emotional and critical skills working in tandem,
Romola comes to an ethical response that remains, crucially, rooted in ambiguity.
By Romola, then, Eliot suggests that sympathy must be rooted in ambiguity, and
that it involves recognition that knowledge is inconclusive coupled with what George
Levine has called, writing about Daniel Deronda, “disciplined intensity of feeling.”
Levine writes, “It is only in Daniel Deronda that George Eliot risks challenging the ideal
of rational and detached objectivity with her deep-seated belief that knowledge is always
implicated in and sustained by feeling. Objectivity for her [in Daniel Deronda] is
possible not through elimination of the self and feeling but through a disciplined intensity
of feeling” (69). While Levine sees Eliot’s challenge to “rational and detached
objectivity” only in Daniel Deronda, I find it pronounced in Romola, too, and see this
challenge as essential to understanding Eliot’s evolving views on sympathy. In Romola,
Eliot not only critiques the ideal of dispassionate “rational and detached objectivity” on
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For details on George Eliot’s research and preparations while writing Romola, see
Gordon S. Haight (343‒66) and Nancy Henry (129‒30). For insight and background on
Eliot’s use of sources, see Felicia Bonaparte’s The Triptych and the Cross.
49
Felicia Bonaparte argues that the novel is not a work of realism but, rather, a symbolic
novel (15) or, as she also argues, a poem (5).
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its own without feeling, but also interrogates objectivity, calling into question her own
previous thinking on sympathy as being produced in response to knowledge derived by
training careful attention on an other. But rather than stopping at this skeptical impasse,
Eliot hypothesizes a way through her skepticism, radically revising her earlier positions
on sympathy, imagining it instead as a way of acknowledging an other rather than
knowing him or her. This shift from knowledge-based to acknowledgment-based
sympathy is most visible in her treatment of Savonarola.
Eliot’s claims in her early Riehl essay remain important to understanding the
stakes for Eliot in writing fiction, but the ethical problems she is concerned with, by the
time she writes Romola, have shifted. Rather than rectify the available novelistic
representation of others in order to expand her readers’ sympathy through increased
knowledge and identification, she asks questions about instances—common as they are—
when it is impossible to know the other. The ethical dilemmas that Eliot is writing against
are no longer “[h]ow little the real characteristics of the working classes are known to
those who are outside them . . .” (260) but, rather, that the real characteristics of anyone,
even the self, can remain unknown no matter how much effort one expends in trying to
obtain that knowledge.
By setting the novel deep in the past, and centering it on the experiences of a real,
historical, and unknowable figure, Eliot asks questions about what to do when others are
ultimately unknowable—when knowledge is not enough. In the face of this chasm, Eliot
suggests that sympathy is arrived at by honestly facing the limits of one’s knowledge and
holding that up against one’s own “disciplined intensity of feeling.” In what follows, I
will borrow from Stanley Cavell and call this humbled merging of feeling and knowledge
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“acknowledgment.” In Cavell’s essay “Knowing and Acknowledging” (1976), he
articulates a way of proceeding ethically in spite of our skeptical inheritance, arguing that
acknowledgment goes beyond knowledge. Whereas knowledge suggests certainty (I
know you’re in pain), acknowledgment entails a response even in the absence of certainty
(I acknowledge that you’re in pain even if I can’t know it). Cavell gives the following
example, using the plain language he inherits from ordinary language philosophy and that
helps him overcome the logical positivism he found stifling. “From my acknowledging
that I am late it follows that I know I’m late (which is what my words say); but from my
knowing I am late, it does not follow that I acknowledge I’m late—otherwise human
relationships would be altogether different than they are” (257). Later in the same essay,
Cavell ups the ethical ante:
I might say here that the reason ‘I know you are in pain’ is not an
expression of certainty is that it is a response to this exhibiting; it is an
expression of sympathy. (‘I know what you’re going through’; ‘I’ve done
all I can’; ‘The serum is being flown in by special plane.’) But why is
sympathy expressed in this way? Because your suffering makes a claim
upon me. It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer—I must
do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must
acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what ‘(your or his) being in pain’
means” (263; emphasis in the original).
Cavell overcomes the impasse of skepticism by arguing that to know is not the point and
so it doesn’t matter that it’s impossible. Instead, acknowledgment is the adequate and
appropriate ethical response given our skeptical condition, and acknowledgment requires

174
that something happen. When the limits of knowledge are mingled with the “disciplined
intensity of feeling,” a person can be said to acknowledge the other, thereby doing
something to or for that person.50
In the novel’s last scenes, Romola does not know what Savonarola feels, and yet
she acknowledges his pain. That is all she can do given his impending execution and her
inability to actually hold knowledge of his inner state. Rather than depicting what I’ll
called knowledge-based sympathy, as Eliot had in her earlier novels, in Romola, she
articulates what I call acknowledgment-based sympathy: a sympathy that recognizes the
skeptical position, and that requires instead a response that derives from studied critical
detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling.” When Romola, watching Savonarola’s
execution, comes to feel what he is feeling, she is displaying acknowledgment, not
knowledge. This process is largely not explained by the narrator, and as readers, we are
tasked with going through the process alongside her. We are asked to acknowledge that
Romola’s identification is itself acknowledgment-based, which is to say that we as
readers have to enter into an ethical position that necessitates our own moving forward in
spite of skepticism.

For Savonarola, obligation and rebellion take religious and political form.51
Savonarola is a religious reformer with grand and controversial plans for Florence. He
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See Patchen Markell’s useful gloss: “What matters in our relation to another, Cavell
suggests, is not knowing something special about him, or knowing him (his pain,
pleasure, humanity, character, or very being) in a way that could evade doubt once and
for all. What matters, instead, is what we do in the presence of the other, how we respond
to or act in the light of what we do know. That is acknowledgement, or its failure....”
(Bound by Recognition, italics in the original).
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reports prophecies, rebels against the Pope, preaches against the humanistic leadership of
the Medici family and the vulgar, materialistic excesses that their leadership promotes,
and becomes ever more deeply embroiled in the political maneuvering and intrigue of the
period. His charisma and persuasive rhetoric touches Romola and many Florentines
deeply, but as the novel progresses, two questions emerge, both the result of an inability
to know the other: First, to what extent is Savonarola’s religious and political zeal
honestly felt and reported, or to what extent is it trumped up for ends that, good as they
might be, are corrupting? And second, to what extent is his downfall the result of his
presuming to know the other—whether it be God, the Pope, the people of Florence, or the
political actors of Florence, including the devious Tito—but getting it wrong? Both
Romola and Savonarola are unable to determine what the appropriate ethical action is in
any of their given contexts, in large part because they are unable to penetrate others’
minds, others on whom they depend but whose reliability is unknowable.
This is the main question that Eliot works through in the writing of this maturing
novel, which functions as a hinge between her earlier and later works: What obligations
do we have to others in light of the fact that our ignorance about them can be
insurmountable? While most critics writing about Romola focus on Tito, I will focus
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Gender is, of course, a major factor in the potential scope of one’s obligations. Romola
and Tito are both the children of un-ideal fathers (or father figures), and for both,
rebellion is held up as an option, but unsurprisingly only the man, not the woman, resists
paternal authority. Romola and Savonarola both consider rebellion from obligation, but
Romola’s obligations are largely interpersonal whereas Savonarola’s larger sphere of
influence and therefore obligations could only be possible for a man. See Homans (189‒
222) for more on gender expectations and restraints in the Renaissance and Victorian
periods. See David (177‒96) on Romola as a female intellectual, Paxton (143‒49) on
Romola as a feminist heroine, Beer (123) on Eliot’s female heroines as saints, and Gilbert
and Gubar on Eliot’s female characters, including Romola, trapped between “angelic
passivity or Satanic revenge” (495).
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largely on Romola’s attempts to understand Savonarola in an effort to decipher Eliot’s
reckoning with this question and its complex set of possible answers. This is a
particularly fruitful dynamic for several interrelated reasons. Savonarola is a real,
historical person and yet (or and so) it is impossible to know for sure what he was
thinking, what he was up to, and what to think of him, because unlike a fictional
character, there are answers that go beyond the text. Understanding Savonarola, for us
readers, is akin to Eliot’s process of reading about Savonarola in her research, which is
again akin to Romola’s process of coming to know Savonarola. All of us have the same
problem: we can’t know, and yet we are asked to think ethically about him and determine
the degree to which he is morally culpable.
The problem that both Savonarola and Romola face—of knowing “where the
sacredness of obedience ended, and where the sacredness of rebellion began” (474)—is
connected to the epistemological problems the novel confronts. All but Eliot’s last novel
are historical novels, but Romola is set in a much more distant (and foreign) past, and one
effect of this historical distancing is that the epistemological problems are connected to
historical ones. This novel compellingly presents the problem of the archive as an
epistemological problem. Savonarola, a historical figure shrouded in mystery, and about
whom scholars and historians have taken radically different positions, is examined by
Eliot, her narrator, and her eponymous heroine, but the mystery remains: Is he the real
thing, a religious and social reformer whose aims are pure and whose prophetic capacity
is authentic, or is he a fraud, as hungry for power in post-Medici Florence as Romola’s
husband, Tito (or the articulator of his creed and minor character in the novel,
Machiavelli)? Eliot’s research for this book went beyond her process for any other. Lewes
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wrote in a letter to John Blackwood, her publisher (though not, ultimately, for this novel),
that Eliot was “buried in old quartos and vellum bound literature which I would rather not
read; but she extracts nutriment, no doubt” (Letters 3: 430; quoted in Haight, 350).
Haight’s biography is full of references in this period to Eliot’s growing despair at her
ability to understand Savonarola. In another letter to Blackwood, Lewes writes, “Polly is
still deep in her researches. Your presence will I hope act like a stimulus to her to make
her begin. At present she remains immovable in the conviction that she can’t write the
romance because she has not knowledge enough” (Letters 3: 473‒74; quoted in Haight,
353). Of course, Eliot does write the novel, but not with any conclusive knowledge about
Savonarola’s inner state. Cultivating this willingness to experience uncertainty, which
Eliot passes on to both Romola and her readers, is central to the novel’s aims.
This cultivation of uncertainty is related to what Amanda Anderson has argued is
a dominant Victorian habit of mind. In The Powers of Distance, Anderson claims that
Eliot’s valuing of Riehl’s “inductive method” is representative of a larger Victorian
interest: “Eliot’s essay serves as an illuminating example of what I argue is a prevalent
Victorian preoccupation with distinctly modern practices of detachment, a preoccupation
characterized by ambivalence and uncertainty about what the significance and
consequences of such practices might be” (3). She argues that writers of the period—she
considers Eliot, Brontë, Dickens, Wilde, Mill, and Arnold—“explore in a sustained way
what it means to cultivate a distanced relation toward one’s self, one’s community, or
those objects one chooses to study or represent” (4). Anderson does not only study the
habit or interest in detachment of the Victorian period, though that is certainly largely her
aim, but also argues that it is an ideal, “the aspiration to a distanced view” (6). In so
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doing, she addresses the provocative nature of this claim in a critical age deeply
suspicious of any “claims to objectivity or reflective reason” (7), but responds, with Mill,
that any responsible perspective has to be first made distant and tested.
Anderson claims that Eliot is deeply ambivalent about the importance of distance
and detachment, which is in conflict with her “valuing of rootedness” (14) but which is so
essential for observing and knowing others as they really are. This ambivalence directly
relates to Eliot’s complicated thinking on sympathy. Anderson writes that Eliot’s
“endorsement of Riehl’s procedure of pedestrian observation, coupled with her calls for
disinterestedness and sympathy, is an example of what Christopher Herbert has identified
as the conflicted postures of ethnographic subjectivity, which begin to appear in the
nineteenth century and continue to inform the development of anthropology in the
twentieth century. Such conflicted postures attempt to mediate between sympathetic
immersion and detached analysis and judgment” (15). In this article, and by looking at
Eliot’s working through of these questions in Romola, I argue that sympathy itself
becomes an exercise in detachment: Eliot shifts from depicting sympathy as an
“immersion” in an other’s experience to depicting sympathy as an activity that requires
and thrives on distance.
Anderson and George Levine both train their attention on Daniel Deronda,
arguing that it is a novel that brings into focus their various ideas about detachment and
sympathy. While Anderson says that Eliot, in Daniel Deronda, showcases modern critical
detachment, Levine argues, on the contrary, that in Daniel Deronda, Eliot challenges the
ideal of rational detached objectivity and puts faith, instead, in feelings. In my reading of
sympathy, detachment and feeling are jointly deployed in responding ethically to the
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subject of sympathy. It is not a choice between detachment and immersion, but rather, the
combination of detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling,” which allows the
retention of one’s difference from the other. In Romola, Eliot investigates this relation
between critical detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling” and finds a space for a
more refined and ethical sympathy.
There have been many sensitive critics of Victorian sympathy in recent years that
have examined assumptions about sympathy, such as that it is based on immersive
identification, or what I’ll call knowledge-based sympathy. These critics have focused on
the dangers of identification: namely that it negates the other’s reality and otherness.
Rebecca N. Mitchell makes the case, in Victorian Lessons in Empathy and Difference,
that identification is solipsistic and possessive. She argues powerfully that sympathy is
possible only when isolation and difference are recognized; sympathy can grow through
the maintenance, not the reduction, of alterity. Rae Greiner has argued, along similar
lines, that a lack of knowledge, not omniscience, aids sympathy. She writes: “It was
crucial for [Adam] Smith, and later for the realists, that sympathy not secure the sort of
intimacy we now associate with empathy. . . . Sympathy as the realist novelist understood
it involves a belief that our sympathy depends on an awareness that the other is other: not
me, not my photographic image” (419). Cara Weber, in “‘The Continuity of Married
Companionship’: Marriage, Sympathy, and the Self in Middlemarch,” shows that by
Middlemarch, Eliot is interested in critiquing identificatory sympathy on two counts: it
negates otherness and assumes static identity. I endorse this reading, but argue that this
critique begins earlier.
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I argue that by the time Eliot comes to write Romola, she has the same objections
to knowledge-based sympathy that these critics have, and is thinking again about the role
of distance and detachment in art and its ability to enlarge sympathy. If sympathy is not
enlarged through hard-earned knowledge of the other, then how? As David Kurnick
points out in “Abstraction and the Subject of Novel Reading,” Romola is a novel about
reading. It is a book full of scholars and about scholarship, its protagonist is regularly
pictured reading or aiding the study of others, and it is the product of Eliot’s own deep
reading. By looking at how Eliot depicts Romola’s reading, and thinking about Eliot’s
reading, we can get a better understanding of what Eliot thinks is left if we take
knowledge of the other out of the sympathetic experience and replace it with detachment
and disciplined feeling, or acknowledgment.
Caroline Levine, writing about Romola in The Serious Pleasures of Suspense,
writes that the novel represents two alternative models of reading and being in the world:
first, the rationalist model by which suspicions are tested against reality, and second, the
prophetic model by which dreams and desires are believed to be meaningful or real.
“Perhaps rather than choosing between the two—as critics in the past have done—we
might imagine that George Eliot mobilizes both the rationality of the test and the
nonrationality of the dream as alternative modes of representing the world. Indeed, I
propose to read the novel as an interrogation of two conflicting ways of reading the
real—one the realist experiment, the other the antirealist model of prophecy. Romola is a
narrative that asks how and whether we might establish one as more valid than the other”
(139, italics in the original). My reading runs parallel to Levine’s. I argue that Eliot is
asking us to hold multiple possibilities in mind without necessarily choosing between
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them: regarding the truth of prophecy, we are asked to believe both that Savonarola’s
prophecy has some element of meaningful but not religious truth, and that his and Fra
Lucca’s prophecies and dreams actually did have prophetic truth; regarding Savonarola’s
motives and truthfulness, that Savonarola truly believed he was receiving prophecy
directly from God, and that he only hoped that his thoughts were corroborated by God;
regarding his political ambitions, that Savonarola believed his religious duties were in
line with his political goals and that there was an element of realpolitik knowingly
involved. On the one hand, Savonarola represents a mythological, symbolic character
with access to a higher truth in a way that draws on Feuerbach’s idea, an extremely
influential one for Eliot, that even without God, religious ideas are mythically and
symbolically meaningful. On the other hand, Savonarola represents a gritty, disheartening
realism, and his downfall is the product of a psychologically realistic egoism. This
uncertainty frustrates the reader’s desire for closure, and suggests instead that closure or
resolution is essentially illusory. All possibilities regarding Savonarola—the reality or
unreality of his prophecy, the righteousness of his intentions, and the extent of his
honesty—are kept open, and we readers must allow for several, conflicting versions of
Savonarola’s interior states, without ever settling on a single narrative. Like Levine and
Kurnick, I argue that this is as much a challenge for Romola as it is for the reader, and
that this novel is as much about the interrelation of the characters as it is about the
relation between the reader and the text.52
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Rebecca Mitchell argues, in Victorian Lessons in Empathy and Difference, that the
lessons of alterity are posed for characters, but not for readers. Readers, she argues, have
access to knowledge about the characters, and so aren’t tested in the same way the
characters are, or the same way that we all are in our lives. I agree, but maintain that in
Romola, Eliot makes it impossible for even the reader to know Savonarola.
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The novel’s penultimate chapter (not including the “Epilogue”) provides the best
example of this challenge to keep multiple possibilities in suspension indefinitely. The
chapter addresses Savonarola’s written confession, extracted under torture, by discussing
the various responses to the confession experienced or exhibited by various kinds of
readers, including Romola. Her reading experience is held up against the reading
experience of other reader-types, including “the more devout followers of Savonarola”
(575), “Other friends of Savonarola, who were less ardent partisans” (576), and “Men of
ordinary morality” (577), also described as “shrewd men” (577). All of these types are
described as having distinct reading experiences and responses, all with regard to their
way of relating the text to their own experience outside the text. The “shrewd men,” for
example, weigh their understanding of how “the seductions of a public career” (577)
might have altered Savonarola over time, while the “more devout followers” attribute
anything damning, anything that doesn’t read like the Savonarola they hold in their
minds, to “the falsifying pen of Ser Ceccone, that notary of evil repute” (575). Each
succeeding reader-type responds differently and with a combination of reasoned attention
to the text and preconceived opinion regarding the text and its subject. As readers of these
various readers’ responses, we get to experience all of them, and we see the reason (as
well as the failures in reason) behind each one.
The materiality of the reading experience is central, and is insisted upon several
times over the course of the chapter. The confession is described repeatedly as a printed,
circulating object: “the document,” “there were copies accidentally mislaid,” “a second
edition,” “the printed document,” “the printed confessions” (575‒78). Romola is
described as a close reader: partaking in “long meditations over that printed document,”
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“read[ing] this evidence again and again” (575), and reading so carefully as to discover
that “many sentences bore the stamp of bungling fabrication” but that on the other hand,
“the fact that these sentences were in striking opposition, not only to the character of
Savonarola, but also to the general tone of the confessions, strengthened the impression
that the rest of the text represented in the main what had really fallen from his lips” (578).
“One memorable passage” (578) is quoted at length and then analyzed by both Romola
and the narrator. Our text document—the novel—couldn’t be more insistent: this is a
written document of personal experience that, like a novel, can be read and reread,
analyzed down to the level of the sentence or word, and examined for all possible
meanings.
It is through Romola’s reading experience that we, as readers of the novel, experience
the various readers’ experiences of the confession and the confession itself. She is described
as reading the confession over and over again, comparing her memory and experience of
Savonarola to his supposed words of confession. “Romola, who began to despair of ever
speaking with Fra Girolamo, read this evidence again and again, desiring to judge it by some
clearer light than the contradictory impressions that were taking the form of assertions in the
mouths of both partisans and enemies” (575). This is near the start of the chapter, and the
“contradictory impressions” are what make up the next part of the chapter, until the narrator
reports, “Romola’s ears were filled in this way with the suggestions of a faith still ardent
under its wounds, and the suggestions of worldly discernment, judging these things according
to a very moderate standard of what is possible to human nature. She could be satisfied with
neither” (577). Romola takes in all the narratives and contradictory impressions, and by
holding them in her mind simultaneously, she reaches the conclusion that they are
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unsatisfactory. She sees neither from the perspective of an ardent adherent nor that of a
cynical bystander; instead, she attempts to articulate for herself an alternative that is true to
her experience of Savonarola. Romola is enacting the sort of detachment Anderson describes:
she stands apart, reads and rereads, and remains critical of the ready-made positions before
her, preferring to hold them in her mind simultaneously and skeptically rather than attaching
herself to one of the narratives. But this critical distance is coupled with years of feelings that
stem from her deep attachment. “She brought to her long meditations over that printed
document many painful observations, registered more or less consciously through the years of
her discipleship, which whispered a presentiment that Savonarola’s retraction of his prophetic
claims was not merely a spasmodic effort to escape from torture. But, on the other hand, her
soul cried out for some explanation of his lapses which would make it still possible for her to
believe that the main striving of his life had been pure and grand” (577). She brings to this
moment knowledge of his past, his character, and their relationship, an understanding that this
knowledge is not enough, and, crucially, her feelings. “Her soul cries out” for more
information, “for some explanation,” because in spite of her “years of discipleship,” she can’t
know what he was thinking, what was coerced and what was honest confession, and yet she
does feel pain and a soul-crying need. So she speculates, trying out different hypotheses:
And perhaps this confession, even when it described a doubleness that
was conscious and deliberate, really implied no more than that wavering
of belief concerning his own impressions and motives which most human
beings who have not a stupid inflexibility of self-confidence must be liable
to under a marked change of external conditions. In a life where the
experience was so tumultuously mixed as it must have been in the Prate’s,
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what a possibility was opened for a change of self-judgment, when,
instead of eyes that venerated and knees that knelt, instead of a great work
on its way to accomplishment, and in its prosperity stamping the agent as a
chosen instrument, there came the hooting and the spitting and the curses
of the crowd; and then the hard faces of enemies made judges; and then
the horrible torture, and with the torture the irrepressible cry, ‘It is true,
what you would have me say: let me go: do not torture me again: yes, yes,
I am guilty. O God! Thy stroke has reached me!’” (579‒80; emphasis
added)
I emphasize the language of hypothesis in this passage because what Romola does
here and in the previous passages is extraordinary: she works through a set of possibilities
that is at once based on critical distance and based on her heightened feelings, and
remains, all the while, undecided. The arc of her long exploration of hypotheses ends
with one that proposes that Savonarola is guilty of weakness, rather than craven
falsehood. This hypothesis is easier, emotionally, to accept than if he had been as
Machiavellian as Tito, and harder to accept than if he was simply tortured into
submission. It is also more likely, given what she has the ability and access to know, and
it is so vivid to Romola that she even imagines the scene and his cry. What comes next is
a shift from consideration and testing to something that resembles knowledge-based
sympathy. Romola seems to imagine her way into Savonarola’s experience, contradicting
her earlier sense that she couldn’t know what he is thinking or feeling. “As Romola
thought of the anguish that must have followed the confession . . . that anguish seemed to
be pressing on her own heart and urging the slow bitter tears” (580). His anguish
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becomes her anguish. Through a strangely doubled moment of free indirect discourse, we
hear through her feelings what he himself is feeling: “Every vulgar self-ignorant person
in Florence was glibly pronouncing on this man's demerits, while he was knowing a
depth of sorrow which can only be known to the soul that has loved and sought the most
perfect thing, and beholds itself fallen” (580, italics in the original). Her mind is shown
thinking what his mind is thinking. Through some process of critical detachment and
emotional perception, Romola has enacted at least hypothetical identification. This
identification is heightened in the next chapter, when Romola hears that Savonarola
retracted his confession and hopes that he will speak the truth at his execution, when he
has nothing left to fear. She hopes for more evidence and for truth untarnished by his or
her hopes.
The execution scene, for which she is seated beside Jacopo Nardi, the actual
historian whose account of Savonarola influenced Eliot so greatly in her writing of the
very novel we are reading,53 points in multiple ways to the inability, even to the scene of
death, to know the other or hear a true confession. The narration repeatedly focuses on
the clothing of the condemned and the way in which outward signs influence
interpretation. Savonarola comes out in his Dominican robe but is stripped to his
undergarments, and thus appears more guilty and ruined to the onlookers who are open to
seeing him as a disgraced heretic. This is the basis of Romola’s problem—that the
outward and inward do not correspond—and the reason that she has come to the
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Daniel Malachuck, in “Romola and Victorian Liberalism,” claims that Pasqual Villari
is one of three main sources that informed Eliot in her writing of Romola (the others
being Lewes and Thomas Trollope) and that Villari was greatly influenced by Nardi
himself. Importantly, each of these influences had radically different impressions of
Savonarola’s honesty and intentions.
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execution hoping to hear from Savonarola’s own mouth his inward truth. But he doesn’t
speak, and counterintuitively, this prompts, for Romola, more identification: “But in the
same moment expectation died, and she only saw what he was seeing—torches waving to
kindle the fuel beneath his dead body, faces glaring with a yet worse light; she only heard
what he was hearing—gross jests, taunts, curses” (584, italics in the original). At the
moment she realizes that she can’t know what he thinks or what his motives were, she
identifies with him so strongly that she sees and hears along with him, and even imagines
him, bizarrely, as already dead and yet still aware of the flames kindling for his
consumption. This scene, which directly draws on Adam Smith’s depiction of the brother
on the rack, and on Smith’s thought experiment about identification with the dead, is,
crucially, identification, but it is identification without knowledge. Identification, in
Romola, has shifted from something based on actual knowledge of the other, to
something that happens in spite of a lack of knowledge. Indeed, it is the very fact that
Romola remains “filled . . . with dismayed uncertainty” (582) that makes her
identification so poignant.
So what does it mean that Eliot is exploring an identification that can happen
outside of knowledge of the other, and is in fact enhanced by that lack of knowledge, and
what does it mean that identification is still relied upon and held up as an appropriate
ethical response in spite of this lack of knowledge? Is Romola’s move toward
identification in spite of knowledge condoned by the narrative? It will help to look at the
relationship the novel sets up repeatedly between knowledge and feeling, and the weight
it gives to feeling as a mode of or aid to knowledge. Romola’s evolution over the course
of the novel has prepared her for letting both feeling and knowledge comingle to inform
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her view of the world and of others. Early in the novel, when she is still under her father’s
roof, she is regularly told that she is too feminine and emotional to be a rational scholar
like himself. Bardo tells Tito, a complete stranger at that point in the novel, “I constantly
marvel at the capriciousness of my daughter’s memory, which grasps certain objects with
tenacity, and lets fall all those minutiae whereon depends accuracy . . .” (64). The novel
proves Bardo doubly wrong: Romola is eminently reasonable, and Bardo’s inability to
interrogate his feelings about what duties others owe him is likely the cause of his work’s
ultimate failure (an especially ironic failure given its humanistic nature). The sharp
distinction Bardo makes between reason and feeling is belied by Romola’s more
persuasive form of thinking and feeling in the novel.
Tito and Savonarola also blame Romola for letting her feelings get in the way of
her reason. When Savonarola first stops Romola from running away, he tells her she is
consulting her feelings rather than the actual fact of her duty. He is right, of course, that
she is being guided by feeling, but he is too patriarchal and dominating in this moment to
be fully persuasive, and furthermore, there is a great deal of reason behind her desire to
run away. Tito has failed her and revealed himself to be a false person. And she does have
intellectually driven plans for her future that can’t be seen as entirely emotionally
motivated, and that in fact stem from her humanistic, rational upbringing. “She did not
know that any Florentine woman had ever done exactly what she was going to do:
unhappy wives often took refuge with their friends, or in the cloister, she knew, but both
those courses were impossible to her; she had invented a lot for herself—to go to the
most learned woman in the world, Cassandra Fedele, at Venice, and ask her how an
instructed woman could support herself in a lonely life there” (327). But Savonarola
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condescends, commanding her to return home and not to run away (“Ask your
conscience, my daughter. You have no vocation such as your brother had [to run away
from familial duties]. You are a wife” [365]) and when Romola’s “mind rose in stronger
rebellion with every sentence” (360) the reader not only understands but rises in rebellion
along with her. The discerning reader will see that Savonarola errs, like Bardo, in his
inability to appropriately bring together feeling and reason, and to note the strength of its
combination when he encounters it. Tito, not to be left out of the male chorus of scolds,
rarely speaks openly enough to Romola to actually articulate his condescension, but on
those rare occasions when he does, he chides Romola for being too swayed by feeling to
understand the reasons behind his actions. “My Romola,” he says, oozing contempt, “You
are so constituted as to have certain strong impressions inaccessible to reason” (418).
While these male authority figures repeatedly make claims of this kind, casting
aside the value and use of feelings, they are full of feelings themselves. Bardo and Tito
share a propensity for self-love and a quickness to feel wronged and blame others. In
other words, they have feelings, just not ones that tend outward to others. Savonarola, by
contrast, has an excess of feelings, but is unwilling to consider them as meriting attention
in others. When he intercepts Romola’s attempt to run away from Florence and Tito, he
claims to know enough about her situation to be able to judge it, not only disregarding
her feelings but “car[ing] for her apart from any personal feelings” (361). “‘I know
enough, my daughter: my mind has been so far illuminated concerning you, that I know
enough.’” Whereas Romola’s mind was still torn by conflict,” (366) Savonarola is
assured and decisive—the difference between them is that Romola attends to both her

190
feelings and her understanding, while Savonarola is too assured of what he claims to
know.
In another scene, after returning to Florence and struggling to understand how to
feel about her uncle and Tito’s involvement in Florentine politics, the narrator describes
Romola as engaged in “thought” as regularly as she is described as “feeling” (449), and
then says, “After all has been said that can be said about the widening influence of ideas,
it remains true that they would hardly be such strong agents unless they were taken in a
solvent of feeling” (449‒50).54 Knowledge and feeling are linked in this novel—
knowledge works best when mingled with feeling, or even when discovered through
feeling.55
John Cross wrote that George Eliot, speaking of Romola, “told me she could put
her finger on it as marking a well-defined transition in her life.” She told him: “I began
[Romola] a young woman—I finished it an old woman” (Cross 2: 255). In the writing of
Romola, the questions Eliot asks about sympathy shift from what they were in her
previous novels. Rather than asking, “What should we do to better understand and
identify with the other?” she asks a harder, more cynical question: “Given that we can’t
know the other, how should we proceed?” In Romola, sympathy is no longer explored as
a process of identification derived from knowledge of the other. Instead, it requires a
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Bonaparte’s argument that the novel is best read as a symbolic poem is based, in part,
on her use of Eliot’s claim, in “Notes on Form in Art,” that poetry “begins when passion
weds thought by finding expression in an image” (4).
55
Isobel Armstrong credits Eliot’s depiction of the primacy and complexity of emotions
to her deep engagement with Spinoza, while Hina Nazar credits Eliot’s depiction of
sympathy as a combination of feeling and insight, emotion and reason with her deep
engagement with Feuerbach.
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“disciplined intensity of feeling,” a willingness to acknowledge what one doesn’t or can’t
ever know, and a commitment to respond ethically in spite of that skeptical impasse.

III.

“I was living myriad lives in one:” Daniel Deronda and the Dangers of Sympathy

In Mill sympathy is shown to be possible for readers who have the capacity for
complete knowledge, but is shown to be unlikely between characters, especially
characters who theoretically should be more able to identify. Likeness does not lead to
sympathy, we found, but the full knowledge of readership does. In Romola, not even the
reader was treated to anything approaching full knowledge, and so the challenge of
sympathy became figured within the context of acknowledgment: in spite of or perhaps
even because of the inability to know anything for certain, we respond. In Daniel
Deronda, these ideas become even more complex, as Eliot returns to a knowledge-based,
identificatory sympathy that has damaging impacts on the performer and subject of
sympathy.
Sympathy, Eliot posits, is a problem of endless alternatives. The novel opens with
an epigraph of Eliot's own writing on the essentially imaginary, creative nature of the
concept of a beginning. The number one is a useful concept, she writes, but is also
essentially meaningless. “Science” doesn’t have a beginning. At least “[Science's] less
accurate grandmother Poetry has always been understood to start in the middle.” Before
the start of any story, number, or claim, there are an infinitesimal number of things that
could, and do, contribute to that whole. This radical inclusiveness, however, is staggering
and suspending: if there’s no beginning, how can anyone ever begin anything? This is
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the problem that Daniel Deronda faces. There are too many factors for Daniel, too many
potential directions and possibilities. His diffuse sympathy is too diffuse. He is too open,
too willing to be swayed, too interested in everything, and too unable to settle on
anything. There is, problematically for Eliot, no authentic Daniel.
Andrew Miller has written about the Victorian obsession with and fear of
weakness of will, a condition often associated with too much sympathy, too strong a
capacity to consider and take on other perspectives. Although Victorians idealized
sympathy and its moral function, they were also terrified that understanding an
alternative perspective, though ethically useful, might be destructive of one's sense of self
and of one's vigor.56 Miller quotes Henry Sidgwick57, writing in 1869: “We are growing
year by year more introspective and self-conscious: the current philosophy leads us to a
close, patient, and impartial observation and analysis of our mental processes…We see
that there are many sides to many questions: the opinions we hold we hold if not more
loosely, at least more at arm’s length: we can imagine how they appear to others, and can
conceive ourselves not holding them. We are losing faith and confidence: if we are not
failing in hope, our hopes at least are becoming more indefinite; and we are gaining in
impartiality and comprehensiveness of sympathy” (Sidgwick, “Poems and Prose,” 363364, qtd in Miller, 57). Miller continues that while “the Victorian discourse about
sympathy was famously idealizing, seeing it indeed as the spring of moral behavior—as
in Eliot’s early and now famous remarks about that greatest benefit we owe to the artist,
56

See also Neil Hertz’s George Eliot’s Pulse. In “Recognizing Casaubon,” Hertz argues
that Eliot’s writing is consumed with anxiety about the egotism inherent in writing:
“Writing, like the self-doubling of narcissism, is disturbing not simply because it may
seem ‘self-centered,’ but because it is both that and self-dispersing at once” (25).
57
Andrew Miller notes, amusingly and importantly, that Sidgwick was Eliot’s “friend
and tennis partner” (69).
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whether painter, poet, or novelist…. But writers soon came to realize that, in enlarging
moral reflection, this wide-ranging, cosmopolitan form of sympathy could hamstring the
very impulses it was to motivate” (60). Miller shows that alongside the idealization of
sympathy existed an equivalent fear about its potential for diminishing “vigor.”
“Sidgwick perceives that the very mechanism designed to launch moral reflection can
disable its motivations. And, in the next decade, John Morley would speak of an ‘elegant
Pyrrhonism,’ a ‘light-hearted neutrality’ according to which people ‘look on collections
of mutually hostile opinions with the same kind of curiosity which they bestow on a
collection of mutually hostile beasts in a menagerie’ dead to the ‘duty of conclusiveness’
(Morley, On Compromise, 130, qtd in Miller, 60).
It is not news to argue that Daniel is too interested in everyone and everything,
that his sympathy is too diffuse, and that he is weak-willed in just the way Victorians
were afraid of. He refuses to settle on an imaginary beginning and work forward from
there. A classic moment that showcases Daniel's too diffuse sympathy is the scene in
which he floats on the river “using his oars little, satisfied to go with the tide and be taken
back by it” (188). Eliot's novels are full of river scenes, and of people either drowning in
them or failing to drown in them, of people floating aimlessly down them or moving
purposefully along their currents. Here is another version of that theme, and this time it is
to show how Daniel just lets the world carry him, never taking an active role, never
exerting his will. Daniel is aware of his aimlessness, and is aware of Sir Hugo's
frustration with it, and the chapter opens with a description of Daniel’s continued state of
aimlessness.
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On a fine evening near the end of July, Deronda was rowing himself on
the Thames. It was already a year or more since he had come back to
England, with the understanding that his education was finished, and that
he was somehow to take his place in English society; but though in
deference to Sir Hugo's wish, and to fence off idleness, he had begun to
read law, this apparent decision had been without other result than to
deepen the roots of indecision....He had a boat of his own at Putney and
whenever Sir Hugo did not want him, it was his chief holiday to row past
sunset an come in again with the stars. Not that he was in a sentimental
stage; but he was in another sort of contemplative mood perhaps more
common in the young men of our day—that of questioning whether it
were worth while to take part in the battle of the world: I mean, of course,
the young men in whom the unproductive labour of questioning is
sustained by three or five percent on capital which somebody else has
battled for (185).
It's been more than a year that Daniel has been floating along in this aimless way through
life. He can't settle on anything except to settle that he definitely can't settle on anything.
He is one of those modern young men, and it is important to note that this is the only
novel Eliot wrote set in the present rather than in the recent or distant past, who is unable
to “take part in the battle of the world.” He is too understanding of all people and ideas, a
position idealized in the discourse of the ethics of perspectival sympathy but dangerous
even on ethical grounds in that it precludes one from making decisions about right and
wrong. If your sympathy is too diffuse, as Daniel's is, might one come to sympathize with
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people like Tom Tulliver, as we did in Mill, or with a murderer, as we do with Hetty
Sorrel in Adam Bede. Sympathy can take one out of one's culture in that it can preclude
action and participation. Sympathy can take one out of one’s culture, too, in that it can
lead to sympathy with any and all people and positions. But in order to be of the world
and act in it, “men need the make-believe of a beginning.” Daniel is good at a fully
sympathetic, perspective-less existence, but he cannot settle on a place to begin. Floating
along aimlessly on the river, he is in his element.
He chose a spot in the bend of the river just opposite Kew Gardens, where
he had a great breadth of water before him reflecting the glory of the sky,
while he himself was in shadow. He lay with his hands behind his head
propped on a level with the boat's edge, so that he could see all around
him, but could not be seen by any one at a few yards' distance; and for a
long while he never turned his eyes from the view right in front of him. He
was forgetting everything else in a half-speculative, half-involuntary
identification of himself with the objects he was looking at, thinking how
far it might be possible habitually to shift his centre till his own
personality would be no less outside him than the landscape (189).
Daniel is concerned here with effacing himself—putting himself in the shadow, hiding
himself in the boat so that he can see out but others can’t see in to him, and most
importantly, and complicatedly, experimenting with shifting his center of self as far as
possible outside himself. Echoing the language of Middlemarch, in which Dorothea
discovers, on her honeymoon in Rome, that her husband has “an equivalent centre of self,
whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference” (211). Daniel
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doesn't need to be taught that there are equivalent centers of self. He knows it, and is
interested in seeing how far he can enter into those centers.
This is problematic, though, for several reasons. The first I've already touched
on—it precludes one from actively engaging with the world, and potentially stunts one's
ethical capacity to know right from wrong, and to make lines in the sand, effectively
choosing a beginning and going from there, rather than always starting in the middle and
going back, creating reasons, and imagining justifications. Another danger is that, in
placing oneself in the unseen shadows while communing with other centers of self, one
assumes a position of power, an imperious distance that can be destructive and shattering
of those other selves one is so willing to imagine. Take, for instance, the opening scene of
the novel, in which Daniel's gaze interrupts Gwendolen's gambling and seems to have
some magical negative effect on her winning streak. He watches from a distance, judging
her beauty and her gambling. From Gwendolen's perspective, this feels like an appraisal
of her whole worth. “But in the course of that survey her eyes met Deronda's, and instead
of averting them as she would have desired to do, she was unpleasantly conscious that
they were arrested—how long? The darting sense that he was measuring her and looking
down on her as an inferior, that he was of different quality from the human dross around
her, that he felt himself in a region outside and above her, and was examining her as a
specimen of a lower order, roused a tingling resentment which stretched the moment with
conflict” (10). Gwendolen is not wrong. He is looking down on her, he is judging her, he
does see himself as infinitely superior to the scene before him, a scene which, in his
mind, might serve to justify Rousseau “in maintaining that art and science had done a
poor service to mankind” (9). His limitless gaze and his ability to see into people has the

197
capacity slide into judgmental attitudes, imperiousness, and a power-dynamic that places
him in unsound relations to others.
The uneven power dynamic between Daniel and Gwendolen is central to their
relationship, and after a phase of rebellion, it is actually invited by Gwendolen, who
desires his imperious gaze because it makes her feel known by someone, and because she
seems to masochistically want to be punished for her deeds by someone who knows all.
The form of sympathy that entails full knowledge of and insight into the other is, it
seems, a sympathy that dovetails with domination and power. To know fully and to feel
fully for the other is also to have power over that other. This feeling of power and
domination is uncomfortable when it comes to Gwendolen, the most fully realized and
sympathetic character in the novel. It is also uncomfortable when it arises with Mirah, the
least realized character in the novel and the one readers often struggle to fully care for.
Daniel is aware of his power over Mirah and makes an effort to refrain from ever exerting
his influence over her during the period before he knows his own heritage. He knows
how much she idealizes him, and how indebted to him she feels, and tries to steer clear as
much as possible. He is afraid to ask her to sing, for example, because he knows she will
do anything he asks, but doesn’t want to make her unhappy by being coerced to perform
for him.58 Given this extremely self-aware knowledge of his power over Mirah, the
scene of his marriage proposal seems especially disturbing. Upon discovering that he is
Jewish, and then upon being told by Hans that Mirah loves him, Daniel wastes no time.
What this means, though, is that he proposes to her at exactly the moment when she is
58

Mordecai’s Biblical sister-daughter-cousin-figure, Esther, was the Queen who was
chosen based on her willingness to perform for her husband, King Ahasueros, unlike his
previous wife, Vashti, who refused. Mordecai’s sister in Daniel Deronda, Mirah, has a
vexed relationship with performing for others.
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most abjectly positioned before him. Her father, Lapidoth, who had stolen her from her
mother and brother, forced her to sing for profit, and even attempted to marry her off for
profit, has returned to the scene and has been grudgingly allowed to stay with Mirah and
Ezra. The scene that culminates in the proposal begins with her father stealing Daniel’s
ring that was given to him by Sir Hugo but which had actually belonged to his real father.
Daniel had placed it on the small side table while sitting with Ezra and Lapidoth had seen
the opportunity for easy money and taken it. Mirah, already deeply ashamed of her father,
realizes immediately upon hearing that Daniel can’t find his ring that it must have been
her father, and this instance of shame relating to her father is even greater than all the
others because this time her father has done something disgraceful directly to the person
she loves and feels indebted to.
She watched him and said, ‘It is not there?—you put it on the table,’ with
a penetrating voice that would not let him feign to have found it in his
pocket; and immediately she rushed out of the room. Deronda followed
her—she was gone into the sitting-room below to look for her father—she
opened the door of the bedroom to see if he was there—she looked where
his hat usually hung—she turned with her hands clasped tight and her lips
pale, gazing despairingly out of the window. Then she looked up at
Deronda who had not dared to speak to her in her white agitation. She
looked up at him, unable to utter a word—the look seemed a tacit
acceptance of the humiliation she felt in his presence. But he, taking her
clasped hands between both his, said, in a tone of reverent adoration—
‘Mirah, let me think that he is my father as well as yours…’ (791-2).
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She looks at him with a look of abject shame, representative of the humiliation she, in
some sense, always feels in his presence. Seeing that, understanding it, knowing her to be
in white agitation, he takes her hands and asks her to consider her shame to be his shame,
too, and her father his father, too. It is at once a deeply equalizing gesture that allows
them to share the pain and shame equally, and a deeply disturbing scene in which she is
asked for her hand in marriage at precisely the moment in which she has been brought
lowest in her own estimation of herself in regard to her beloved.
So sympathy has the capacity to create some strange, disturbing power dynamics.
It also has the tendency to efface the self, causing a potential weakness of will and an
inability to participate in the world. It also has the capacity to efface the other. This is
most fully realized in Daniel’s complete sympathy with Ezra, which Ezra means to quite
literally efface Ezra’s memory. Daniel takes on his legacy, takes on his sister to be his
own (the relationship between Daniel and Mirah is never erotic—it is a familial marriage,
one that allows both to be comfortable with a sibling-like bond in memory of, in Mirah’s
case, a real sibling bond, and in Daniel’s case, a homo-social bond)—he essentially takes
his whole identity, transmuting from the apathetic Christian English gentleman to the
Jewish, idealistic, scholarly, and fanatical figure that Ezra once was. Immediately upon
discovering that he was right, and that Daniel is a Jew, Ezra exclaims:
It has begun already—the marriage of our souls. It waits but the passing
away of this body, and then they who are betrothed shall unite in a stricter
bond, and what is mine shall be thine. Call nothing mine that I have
written, Daniel, for though our Masters delivered rightly that everything
should be quoted in the name of him that said it—and their rule is good—
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yet it does not exclude the willing marriage which melts soul into soul…
(751).
Daniel smilingly declines this proposal of Ezra’s, that the two lose their identities so
entirely in the other that their names and identities become meaningless. The English
gentleman in him insists on credit where credit is due. But, this is a true melding of
identities, a marriage of souls (again, it is Ezra and Daniel who are really marrying here,
not Mirah and Daniel). But though Daniel feels a blush of discomfort with all of Ezra’s
enthusiastic speeches about the two of them being one, Ezra gets the last words in the
novel. He takes a hand each of Daniel’s and Mirah’s and says, “Death is coming to me as
the divine kiss which is both parting and reunion—which takes me from your bodily eyes
and gives me full presence in your soul. Where thou goest, Daniel, I shall go. Is it not
begun? Have I not breathed my soul into you? We shall live together” (811). Ezra is not
just with him as a memory after death. Their marriage of souls, from two into one, is
work that has already begun. He has already breathed his soul into Daniel’s, and Daniel,
with his ideal receptiveness which we saw at work especially as he floated along the
Thames and practiced moving his own center of self to the centers of self he found
around him, has received Ezra, has been given his identity. It is a literal, complete
sympathy. And it is disturbing. Eliot makes this transfer both beautiful and dark, ideal and
disturbing, realistic and mythical.
Daniel’s hyper-active sympathy is what keeps him from doing anything for much
of the novel. A consummate reader-figure, he is committed to narrative and can’t do
anything until he knows his own story, until he meets with his mother and attains the selfknowledge that eluded him throughout his parent-less, past-less life. His commitment to
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narrative, the narratives of others as well as his own, takes us back to where we started
with Mill. In Mill, the reader has all the knowledge whereas the characters don’t have
enough. The readers can sympathize but the characters can’t, even in instances where
they do have enough knowledge, but don’t have the will to consider the other. In Daniel
Deronda, Daniel is now in the position of the reader. He sits back and reads his own life
story, as well as the life stories of the others. At the start of Eliot’s career, reading was a
vehicle for sympathy which was in turn an ethical tool one could import back into life.
Here, Eliot shows how reading, or reading others, can inhibit the ethical work of life.

In closing, I’d like to turn to the person who does act but who doesn’t care: the
Princess Leonora Halm Eberstein. Like Henry Crawford, Deronda’s mother is an actor
who takes on many roles, but does not extend that sympathetic rigor to her life or its real
characters. Deronda, on first seeing her, is chiefly aware that “her face [was] so mobile
that the next moment she might look like a different person” (624). Explaining her lack of
interest in assuming the role of “mother,” she says, “I was living myriad lives in one”
(626). She has no interest in living for another, or extending sympathy to her father,
husband, or son. But before we write her off as an unwilling sympathizer in a George
Eliot novel, and therefore unqualified to receive high ethical marks, we should consider
what it means in this particular Eliot novel to act—both generally and in terms of
performance.
In Eliot’s novels, we’ve seen families whose closeness and kinship is not
conducive to sympathy. We’ve seen sisters and mothers whose sympathy fails. We’ve
seen husbands whose sympathy, so active and imperious, becomes abusive. Finding

202
herself in a web of interconnection, and demanded to marry and procreate, the Princess
responds by refusing. As in so many of Eliot’s characters, duty and passion are at odds for
her. Unlike her son, Deronda, whose life conspires to join his passion and duty, hers
doesn’t, and can’t. Unlike Lucy Snowe, who has no other options other than to provide
care professionally, the Princess is able to find a way out, and takes it. She does not have
to find outlets for her negative feelings as Lucy does—instead, she refuses care
altogether, and performs her feelings not to others imposed on her, but on the stage. Her
domineering, demanding father wishes she had been a son, and instead, turns her into an
object made to produce a Jewish son. She refuses this model of relational transmission,
choosing instead of the performance of dutiful daughter, wife, and mother, that of
professional performance on the stage—a life in which she can perform multiple roles,
not just the small, circumscribed one she is assigned.
That readers have so thoroughly rejected the Princess and, further, read her as
rejected by her author is a failure of sympathy—one that Eliot expects and, rather than
settle, leaves charged. This is pressure point of sympathy which, like the ethics of care,
demands particular relations with particular others, or what Andrew Miller calls second
person relations. Leonora’s unwillingness to provide maternal care, or any kind of care, is
a response to the relational institutions in which she is born and expected to behave. Our
willingness to sympathize with Leonora, or our unwillingness, is a radical test of our
sympathy, and of our openness to negative affects in the nineteenth century. Along with
Henry Crawford earlier in the century, however, I see the authors of these badly behaving
actors as being deeply invested in their responses to and against affective expectations,
including expectations for sympathy.
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